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he assault on the Berkeley School of Criminology 
(at the University of California-Berkeley), a hub of 
radical organizing, theorizing, and action, is one of the 
likely forgotten or overlooked (or never known) salvos 
of Ronald Reagan’s frontal assaults on dissent and resis-
tance (particularly in domestic terms). Launched in the 
1960s  and  carried  out  extensively  between  1973  and 
1976, the campaign against the Berkeley School radicals 
would see final victory in 1977. 
T
In this engaging and pointed book Julia and Herman 
Schwendinger,  two  key  participants  in  the  Berkeley 
School (and two who were penalized for their committed 
involvement in the school and broader community strug-
gles  against  exploitation  and oppression),  provide  im-
portant  insights  and  open,  honest,  unflinching 
assessment of these battles. They provide crucial lessons 
for contemporary organizers and activists in the acade-
my, and beyond, and reinforce the great need for radical-
ism  within  disciplines  like  criminology  that  are 
supposed  to  identify,  analyze,  and  end  practices  (and 
causes) of social harm. And speak out against the role of 
power  holders  in  generating  and  reproducing  social 
harm. 
i
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Like  the  better  known attack  on  the  air  traffic  con-
trollers union only three years later, the breaking of the 
Berkeley School would decimate an infrastructure of re-
sistance to neoliberal capitalism (and ideologies expressed 
in New Right criminology in this case) in its early stages 
as well as sending a message to possible allies that they 
should watch their step (lest they endure a similar fate). It 
also, like the air traffic controllers struggle, tested the re-
solve  of  neoliberalism’s  potential  opponents—and  the 
willingness of “soft supporters” or liberal forces to act on 
behalf of those caught in the crosshairs. In both cases the 
broad oppositional forces, and particularly potential allies 
and soft supporters, were found fatally wanting. And the 
emergent  forces  of  neoliberal  reaction  (and  New  Right 
ideology) gained important victories and developed new 
confidence to push on.
The Berkeley School radicals identified the real sources 
of social  harm in society—state,  military,  and corporate 
actions. They also insisted on calling these harms by their 
proper  name—crimes.  They  openly  identified  the  wars 
against  Indigenous peoples  across Turtle  Island as what 
they were—campaigns of genocide. The Vietnam assault 
was recognized not as unfortunate war, geopolitical event, 
or  American  crisis  (or  tragedy)  but,  unflinchingly,  as  a 
criminal  endeavor  undertaken  by  the  US  state.  The 
Schwendingers lay out the captive place of the university 
in the military-industrial-complex, detailing the depth and 
breadth of corporate influence and control.
Most of all, the Berkeley School radicals, perhaps more 
than any academic criminologists before or since, bridged 
the false gap between community resistance and academic 
labors. They immersed themselves in struggles, not apart 
from or in conflict with their roles as researchers, learners, 
and/or knowledge producers—but as a direct outcome of 
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those pursuits. For this they were targeted by politicians 
and  administrators.  Punished  as  community  members 
and activists, reprimanded and fired as intellectual work-
ers.
The Berkeley School stands as a model toward which 
contemporary critical (even better, radical) criminology 
might strive. The account by the Schwendingers offers 
both a guide to organizing in the present and a caution 
about steps to avoid and the lessons learned through real 
struggle. 
This compelling work reminds us of a criminology 
not of the classroom but of the communities and work-
places.  It  reminds us of a criminology of active resis-
tance. It is a criminology rooted in real world responses 
to ongoing concerns about social harms in communities 
most subjected to those harms. This is a criminology that 
is  neither  utopian  nor  ideological  because  it  actually 
identifies and names the social structures and relations 
that cause social  harms and which prevent them from 
being addressed. And it openly confronts and challenges 
those exploitative and oppressive structures and relations 
(rather than accepting them merely as objects of study).
This is also a proposal and an invitation. Not only to 
radicals  but  to those who claim to be critical  in good 
times but become “pragmatists” or “realists” when it af-
fects  them  personally  (with  apologies  to  Phil  Ochs). 
Criminologists in pursuing social justice will, eventually 
(and  must)  offend  university  administrators,  criminal 
justice officials, law enforcement agents, and politicians. 
We should not apologize for this nor should we hide our 
analysis away in the comfort of lecture halls, seminars, 
or conferences.
Compromise has become a signal word of the neolib-
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eral period (like the “consensus” of an earlier epoch). Yet 
compromise tends to overlook the imbalance of forces—
of resources, of power, and of harm. It offers a profoundly 
unjust  equalization  of  (unequal)  responsibility  and  ob-
scures the fact that certain groups (classes, strata) bear the 
brunt  of  harms  inflicted  one-sidedly  by  another  group 
(class, stratum). This compromise almost always ends up 
satisfying (and justifying) power holders.
The current period of New Right hegemony (in govern-
ment, media, and the academy) and the decades long pro-
motion  of  law  and  order  ideology  as  public  policy, 
requires,  finally,  an  active,  organized  opposition  from 
criminology that is based not only in (ineffectual) critique 
but  political  mobilization  in  solidarity  and  community 
with those who have been subjected to the right wing on-
slaught.
This is a crucial history, a significant example of strug-
gle. It is relevant for anyone interested in the development 
of neoliberal capitalism and austerity governance. It is re-
quired reading for anyone concerned with building infra-
structures  of  resistance  in  the  current  context  and, 
particularly, linking the struggles of campus and commu-
nity in a way that might challenge dominant structures and 
relations of ruling and forge and maintain connections of 
solidarity and active resistance.
The assault on the Berkeley School radicals was noth-
ing short of, as the Schwendingers state it, “the repression 
of a struggle for justice.” And it had lasting impacts, both 
on social struggles and on the development of criminology 
(which shadowed the Reaganomics of the 1980s with New 
Right ideology and ‘broken windows’ class violence). 
More than a work of criminology, this is a vibrant and 
honest telling of overlooked histories of radical struggle 
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(and the perhaps surprising, for current audiences, part 
played by criminology in solidarity with movements of 
the poor and oppressed). It fills in missing pieces in the 
history of the peoples’ liberation movements of the late 
twentieth century. 
As the Schwendingers note, it is impossible to under-
stand  radicalism (or  criminology)  without  recognizing 
social context. In particular it is necessary to understand 
particular contexts of social struggle, social movement, 
and change. The interface of social and political move-
ments, and the place of criminologists within these (radi-
cal or otherwise), is important.
In the context of Occupy mobilizations and mass re-
pression in  various  sites  (including extensive  violence 
by police at the University of California-Berkeley itself) 
this is essential reading for anyone seeking a deeper un-
derstanding  of  repression  and  resistance.  The 
Schwendingers’ recount tactics, such as early manifesta-
tions of kettling, that are perhaps too often viewed as re-
cent manifestations of neoliberal policing practice.
Readers might also note the use of demonizing lan-
guage to discredit all forms of resistance. The phantom 
communist of the 1960s and 1970s has been morphed by 
state capital into the phantom terrorist of today. In each 
case the specter is used by governments to justify grow-
ing uses of repressive violence, illegal state surveillance, 
and violations of civil and human rights.
As critical  thinking in  the academy is  sacrificed to 
concerns of the labor market or “relevance” (for whom?) 
and technocratism, managerialism, and expediency drive 
“curriculum,” over scholarship broadly conceived,  this 
story has much to tell us. This is a living and vital docu-
ment of a vital (and still living) movement and project. It 
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should be read, reread, studied and, most importantly, built 
upon in practice.
In the era  of neoliberal  austerity  and “law and order” 
hegemony it is as pressing as ever that criminologists de-
mystify traditional  rationales  for  exploitation and oppres-
sion. Indeed, criminologists  must address the very nature 
and aims of criminology in this period of surveillance and 
repression. As the Schwendingers ask, how can conscien-
tious criminology students and faculty, whose very subject 
of study is crime, remain quiet in the face of state and capi-




Surrey (Newton), British Columbia
Introduct ion
Déjà Vu
uring  the  1960s  and  1970s,  The  School  of 
Criminology  at  the  University  of  California 
Berkeley (UCB) had more than 30 full-time or part-time 
faculty  members  teaching upper-division  and graduate 
courses  in  criminalistics  and  criminology.  The  School 
was  the  leading  American  institution  devoted  to 
criminology. Nevertheless, it was abolished in 1977 by 
California’s  Governor,  Ronald  Reagan,  and  the  UCB 
Chancellor, Alfred Bowker. 
D
Bowker in later years defended himself by saying the 
School  had become “politicized”—implying that  it  no 
longer fulfilled its academic responsibilities. But his al-
legation  was  false.  The  School  was  closed  because  a 
group of 30 students and 4 faculty members had fought 
against the brutal suppression of political dissent as well 
as the racist and sexist law-enforcement policies prevail-
ing  throughout  the  country.  These  members  also  op-
posed the crimes being committed by the United States 
in the Vietnam War. They enhanced the academic status 
of the School among criminologists in the United States 
and Europe. They did not reduce that status.
Members of this group became “usual suspects” be-
1
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cause  they  joined the  thousands  in  the  San Francisco 
Bay Area who had protested the crimes inflicted by the 
U.S. government during the War. In fact, the events lead-
ing to the School’s closing began when they publically 
expressed their  outrage over  the  brutal  suppression of 
“Stop the Draft Week” demonstrations in 1967.
These members were attacked by university officials 
even though they epitomized the highest ideals of their 
profession.  They had opposed the devastation of Viet-
nam, Cambodia and Laos because the U.S. government 
was creating landscapes  overflowing with land mines, 
toxic chemicals, mutilated people, and corpses. The U.S. 
Air Force had strafed  everything that moved including 
farm animals, children, old people, women and men. 
Simultaneously,  when  political  dissent  erupted 
through the United States after Cambodia was invaded, 
civil liberties were lawlessly assaulted by the CIA, FBI, 
state,  and  local  police.  In  Berkeley,  Reagan  sent  an 
armed  convoy  of  National  Guardsmen  to  control  this 
dissent.
Further examples starting with genocidal wars against 
Native Americans and the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts 
demonstrate that the U.S. government has never been the 
entity  idealized  by  public  school  civics  lessons.  Like 
Janus, the Roman God of gateways and exits, the Statue 
of  Liberty,  the  gateway to  the  U.S.  signals  a  vista  of 
democratic spirits and American dreams. But that vista 
is periodically eclipsed by the suppression of civil liber-
ties and human rights. 
1 |  Gilbert Geis’ Autopsy
ilbert Geis, an academic criminologist, conducted 
a fantastical autopsy twenty years after the School 
of  Criminology  was  assassinated.  Geis  accomplished 
this amazing feat even though he wasn’t at the scene of 
the crime and the corpse was decomposed, so he could 
not put it under his knife. Nonetheless, he was able to 
scrutinize recollections and documents by onlookers and 
perps who were at the scene. With such so-called “indis-
putable  facts”  he  cobbled  an  explanation  of  why  the 
School was killed and who did it in.
G
In a section entitled, Postmortem Lividity, Geis stated, 
“the School of Criminology did not fade away quietly, 
though the Sindler report1 virtually dictated its demise. 
Torrents of words were written into the record between 
the end of 1973 and July 15, 1976, when the guillotine 
finally  dropped  by  formal  approval  of  the  regents.” 
However,  in  Geis’ view,  none  of  the  perps including 
UCB Chancellor Bowker and Prof. Alan Sindler actually 
committed the crime intentionally. They may have com-
mitted  schoolslaughter but  not  murder  in  the first  de-
1 An in-house committee,  appointed  by UCB administration and 
chaired by Alan Sindler, wrote the report.
3
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gree, that is, not with malice aforethought. They acted 
impetuously—only  committing  the  crime  after  being 
provoked by the radicals.2
To back this verdict, Geis rounded up the usual sus-
pects.3 The radicals, he declares, were in no small part 
responsible  because of  their  unwillingness  to  compro-
mise. Instead, they stubbornly continued to make “them-
selves  highly  visible  and,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
university administration, embarrassingly unpopular not 
only with it, but also with the local law enforcement es-
tablishment.”  “They also offended California’s  Gover-
nor,  Ronald  Reagan  and  Edwin  Meese  III,  then  the 
governor’s legal affairs secretary, on the school’s adviso-
ry council.” Consequently, in Geis’ opinion, the radicals’ 
stubborn willfulness should also be blamed. These emo-
tionally charged individuals wanted to become martyrs. 
They were unwilling to stay in the closet and discontin-
ue their “highly publicized acts of political protest.”
Geis took pains to let  everyone know his coroner’s 
report was impartial and scolded the University authori-
ties as well. He accused them of being “insensitive” and 
2 Gilbert  Geis,  “The  Limits  of  Academic  Tolerance:  The 
Discontinuance  of  the  School  of  Criminology at  Berkeley.”  In 
Punishment and Social Control: Essays in Honor of Sheldon L.  
Messinger.  (Eds. Thomas G. Blomberg and Stanley Cohen. New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995 pp. 280–281).
3 The  phrase,  “usual  suspects”  is  borrowed  from  a  remark  by 
Claude Raines  in  the movie,  Casablanca.  In  that  film,  Captain 
Louis Renault (played by Claude Raines) witnesses Rick Blaine 
(Humphrey  Bogart)  shoot  the  German  officer,  Major  Strasser 
(Conrad  Veidt).  Upon hearing  the shot,  gendarmes  rush  to  the 
scene of the crime; but Captain Renault merely exclaims, “Major 
Strasser’s  been shot.”  He pauses  as  he looks at  Rick and then 
casually  turns  to  the  gendarmes,  saying,  “Round  up  the  usual 
suspects!” The gendarmes obediently drive away and Rick gets 
away with murder.
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“mulish”  and,  consequently,  contributing  to  a  mutual 
failure at communication and compromise.
What we had, then, was a jousting match, often taste-
less, at least if dignity is the judgment criterion charac-
terized on one side by partisan beliefs and, on the other, 
by rather implacable insensitivity. There was no question 
where the ultimate power lay, though those who lost out 
seemed astonishingly unaware of what social class and 
governmental  forces  dominated  political  developments 
even though these forces used their power effectively.4
How should we, as two of these radicals, respond to 
Geis?  Perhaps  we  should  use  stronger  language  to 
counter his claim that the radicals were indifferent to the 
School’s  closing  or  that  they  wanted  martyrdom.  But, 
with the passage of time, we will simply observe that he 
trivialized the forces, motives, and actions leading to the 
closing of the School. His interpretation reduced the re-
pression  of  a  struggle  for  justice  and  an  end  to  the 
slaughter in Vietnam to a “jousting match.” His use of 
psychological  causes  (like  “willfulness”  and  “mulish-
ness”) is preposterous. Further, since the radicals—cer-
tainly not the administrative authorities—were harmed, 
his theory blames the victims of the crime.
To warrant his reference to radical “willfulness,” Geis 
regurgitated  Bowker  and  Sindler’s  cover  stories.  Dis-
cussing the nature of the conflict between the adminis-
tration  and  radicals,  he  says  the  radicals  refused  to 
recognize criticisms aimed at  the School.  He validates 
this false assertion with phony circumstantial evidence. 
He claims that  the  quality  of  the  Criminology faculty 
was questionable. The integrity of their curriculum was 
dubious. The academic and public services performed by 
4 Ibid.
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the School needed “shoring up.” The radicals, he added, 
also needed to come to agreement with the administra-
tion about “tolerable and intolerable” behavior in class-
rooms  although,  of  course,  by  his  own  admission, 
agreement on this option was never in the cards because 
each side “mulishly refused to grant  legitimacy to the 
concerns of the other but rather took refuge behind its 
own rhetoric …”
Geis misinforms readers when he calls Bowker’s and 
the  Sindler  Committee’s  reservations  about  the school 
“indisputable facts.” His claim had no basis in reality. 
The  school  was  purported  to  oppose  “professional” 
goals and resist servicing the law enforcement establish-
ment.  Yet  the  School’s  program  produced  qualified 
forensic experts. Its faculty had engaged in experiments 
expanding their field of knowledge. It was consulted by 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and police. In addition, 
other  faculty  members,  such as  Jerome Skolnick,  ser-
viced crime commissions. Another member, Bernard Di-
amond,  repeatedly  provided  expert  testimony  for 
defense attorneys. Richard Korn and David Vogel con-
ducted projects aimed at educating judges. The School 
sponsored a  pioneering  prisoner  education  program at 
San Quentin. An LEAA funded Master’s degree program 
serviced police officers drawn from various parts of the 
United States. Tony Platt helped criminal-justice reform 
groups  formulate  model  legislation  while  Paul  Takagi 
served  as  a  consultant  for  criminal  justice  agencies. 
Even Herman Schwendinger contributed to criminal jus-
tice programs although he usually focused on theoretical 
approaches  to  crime  causation  rather  than  control.5 
5 In fact,  he had received a research grant  larger  than any other 
member on the faculty had received–over a half million dollars– 
to pursue his investigation of illegal markets. To obtain the grant,  
he  was  required  to  select  someone  who  could  monitor  his 
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Schwendinger taught a seminar in a Master’s program 
designed for police officers and made repeated visits to 
Pacifica, south of San Francisco, in response to a request 
from the officer handling juvenile crime. With Takagi, 
Schwendinger obtained National Institute of Health and 
Welfare funds for organizing a conference on delinquen-
cy  control.  He had also testified  in  person before  the 
Congressional Subcommittee on Crime and the Judiciary 
about  federal  funding  for  delinquency  programs..  He 
never divorced himself from these kinds of activities. 
Furthermore, most of the research conducted by the 
School’s doctoral students focused on law enforcement 
policies and penal institutions. The research represented 
an  array  of  professionally  oriented  topics  such  as  the 
creation of drug policies to the control of prison popula-
tions.  Other  topics  include  the impact  of  drug control 
policies on communities of urban drug users, the forma-
tion of police in the 18th century, the Benthamite move-
ment  for  legal  reform  in  England,  the  economic 
foundations of classical criminology, the rise of convict 
labor  in  America,  the  emergence  of  prostitution  in  a 
Western frontier  community,  the relations between the 
police and women’s suffrage movements, and grassroots 
organizations devoted to reforming the ways that medi-
cal and law enforcement agencies treated rape victims. 
Geis insists that the radicals were not reasonable be-
cause they were shortsighted, highly emotional utopians. 
To prove this point, he sprinkles his article by citing the 
radicals  themselves.  He  quotes  Tony  Platt’s  writings 
about the “theoretical weaknesses of radical criminolo-
expenditures  because  the  grant  was  awarded  shortly  before  he 
received his doctoral degree at UCLA. Joseph Lohman, the Dean 
of the School of Criminology offered to become a co-sponsor to 
meet this requirement.
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gy” that indicated it  suffered from short-term activism 
and  idealist  expectations  about  the  impact  of  social 
protest.6 Geis  also  cited  a  personal  communication 
where “Platt said that, if he had it to do over, he would 
seek to form better strategic alliances to try to guarantee 
the school’s survival.” Yet Platt, whose courage was in-
disputable, added that he has had no regrets even though 
he with other radicals “were optimistic in the way that 
utopians often are.”7 
Geis quotes liberal authorities on the Sixties to dis-
credit the tactics supported by radicals at the School. Al-
though Todd Gitlin’s work is an inadequate framework 
for understanding the breadth and diversity of protest ac-
tivity  in  the  Sixties,8 Geis  says  Gitlin’s  “sophisticated 
retrospective” provides further support for condemning 
the radicals. Gitlin had observed that the early idealism 
of Berkeley’s Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 
came apart because of “its commitment to an impossible 
6 Geis quotes Platt’s letter: “Radical criminology in its earliest days 
tended  toward  ultraleftism,  romanticism,  and  a  messianic 
utopianism.”  In  Anthony  M.  Platt,  personal  communication to 
Geis, October 30, 1993.
7 Geis  quotes  Platt  who  said,  “Obviously,  from  the  way  things 
turned out, we were misguided; otherwise we wouldn’t have done 
it.”  However,  this  statement  should not  be taken at  face value 
because  Geis  does  not  provide  its  context.  Finally,  there  were 
differences  among  the  radicals  that  sharply  contradict  Geis’ 
interpretations and stereotypes.
8 Andrew Hunt  points  this  out  “When  Did  the  Sixties  Happen? 
Searching for New Directions.”  Journal of Social History. Also, 
criticism of Gitlin’s thesis indicates other reasons for the SDS’ 
demise;  for  instance,  see  Nancy Zaroulis  and  Gerald  Sullivan, 
Who Spoke Up? American Protest  Against  the War in Vietnam 
1963-1975.  Finally,  Gitlin,  in  our  opinion,  ignores  significant 
differences  within  the  SDS  on  lower  organizational  levels, 
especially regarding ‘violent’ and ‘nonviolent’ tactics.
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revolution” and because of its “passionate hairsplitting, 
irresponsible leaders,  desperado strategy,  insupportable 
tactics.” Geis obviously believes the Criminology radi-
cals were no different.9 
Finally, Stan Cohen is brought into play as an authori-
ty on how the radicals behaved or what they believed.10 
Geis claims that Cohen offers us an informative “lesson 
on how the emergent women’s movement, with its focus 
on rape,  trashed the radical movement’s romantic por-
trait of criminals as politically oppressed, deserving of 
sympathy.” Even though radicals in Criminology  never 
romanticized rapists and most shared similar ideas and 
reformist agendas, Geis concludes:
. . . critical scholarship has well exposed the 
problems  of  this  original  agenda,  but  the 
very effectiveness of the demystification job 
is a little embarrassing. One has to distance 
oneself  from  those  original  ideas  and 
reforms: dismiss one’s enthusiastic support 
for them as matters of false consciousness or 
perhaps  a  product  of  overenthusiastic 
youthful exuberance. 
Geis says, “Cohen warns against radical impossibilism, 
which asserts that all reforms are doomed. There is evi-
dence enough that the upheavals of the Sixties produced 
meaningful change. But how does it all add up?” Obvi-
9 Geis, op. cit. p. 987. 
10 According  to  Geis,  Cohen regards  his  own works  during  the 
Sixties and Seventies as “brash, simplistic, and tendentious.” This 
may be true but whether they were radical is another matter – we 
found no writings validating that status. When he was a Visiting 
Professor  (from  England)  at  the  School,  his  professional 
associations were apolitical and he wasn’t involved in any radical 
project or protest movement.
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ously, if Geis’ account is to be believed, it all adds up to 
a tragedy of displaced passions and a valiant but impos-
sible attempt to scale the heavens.
2 |  How Does It Really Add Up?
lthough the School of Criminology’s assassination 
occurred over 35 years ago and the radicals were 
framed for the murder, the contract for the kill was actu-
ally fulfilled by government and university officials. The 
perps even included faculty whose cowardice or com-
mitment to “friendly fascism”1 was bred by decades of 
McCarthyism and the Cold War.
A
The officials—Ronald Reagan, Richard Nixon, Spiro 
Agnew and J. Edgar Hoover—provided ordnance for the 
on-campus assassination  team. Their  arsenal  of  dema-
gogic injunctions, covert surveillance, police repression 
and budget cuts rallied the team’s supporters, neutralized 
its opposition and extorted cooperation and silence from 
the faculty at large. Reagan, who had been an informer 
for the House Un-American Activities Committee long 
before he became Governor in 1966, had promised to cut 
the budget and clean up “the mess in Berkeley.” To mon-
itor the School of Criminology, he appointed his “trou-
1 The phrase, “friendly fascism,” is borrowed from Bertram Gross, 
Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America. (New York: 
Evans  and  Co.  1980), where  he  suggests  that,  unlike  Germany, 
police state developments will appear in stages rather than emerge 
full-blown in a short period of time.
11
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bleshooter,” Edwin Meese III, to its Advisory Council.2 
He also appointed people like Max Rafferty, the notori-
ously right-wing State Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion, as University of California Regents. The Regents in 
turn stepped-up their opposition to campus civil liberties 
and anti-war movements.
The 24 Regents and their powerful associates owned 
and operated the State  of California.  None of the Re-
gents  except  Max  Rafferty,  whose  worthlessness  as  a 
professional had become legendary, were educators by 
profession. Even H.R. Haldeman of Watergate fame was 
a Regent before he resigned to join the Nixon adminis-
tration.  When their  stock portfolios were disclosed on 
December  10,  1968,  the  Regents  included  Mrs.  Ran-
dolph A. Hearst, Norman Chandler, Samuel B. Mosher, 
John  E.  Canaday,  Philip  L.  Boyd,  Norton  Simon, 
William E. Forbes, William M. Roth, Mrs. Edward H. 
Heller, Frederick G. Dutton, William K. Coblentz, De-
Witt  A.  Higgs,  W.  Glenn Campbell  and so on.  These 
people served on the boards of directors or as CEOs of 
The Hearst Foundation, Security Pacific National Bank, 
Western  Bancorporation,  Broadway-Hale  Stores,  First 
Surety Corporation, Stanford Bank, Commonwealth As-
surance  Corporation,  Crown-Zellerbach  Corporation, 
Pacific Lighting Co., and more than 20 other large cor-
porations and utilities.3
2 The word,  “troubleshooter,”  for  Meese  is  borrowed from Bob 
Woodward’s Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate. 
(See his chapters on President Reagan’s Irangate and Contragate.)
3 Including Arizona Bancorporation,  Southern California Edison, 
Pauley Petroleum, Del Monte Foods, Irvine Foundation, DiGiorgio 
Company, Norton Simon Inc., the 230,000 acre Tejon Ranch Co., 
Safeway  Stores,  Bell  Brand  Foods,  Dresser  Industries,  Pan 
American World Airways, Western Airlines, Air West, F.E. Young 
Construction  Company,  Kaiser  Steel,  Crucible  Steel,  Atcheson 
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The Regents were plugged into transnational corpora-
tions with subsidiaries in Europe, the Caribbean, Latin 
America,  Africa  and  Asia.  Their  names  symbolized 
Who’s Who of the American Industrial Empire, with fi-
nancial holdings and directorships in industry, agribusi-
ness, mass media, financial institutions and defense and 
intelligence agencies.
The raw power and influence of the Regents extended 
beyond  California.  They  were  also  owners  or  on  the 
boards of directors of corporations that controlled such 
conservative media as:  the Associated Press  and King 
Features Syndicate, the San Francisco Examiner, Satur-
day Review,  US News and World Report and Scholastic 
Publications. They also owned McCall’s, Redbook, Pop-
ular  Science,  Good  Housekeeping,  Avon  Paperbacks, 
Harper’s Bazaar, and so on. 
They held commanding positions in firms supported 
by military contracts such as the Lockheed Corporation, 
Stanford Research Institute, Brookings Institution, Insti-
tute  for  Defense Analysis,  Communication  Electronics 
Inc., Watkins-Johnson Co., Center for Strategic Studies, 
Asia Foundation and Hoover Institution on War, Revolu-
tion and Peace. Charles Hitch, President of UC and an-
other  member  of  the  Regents,  had  previously  been 
employed  in  military  agencies  and  research  institutes 
supported by the Pentagon before Robert McNamara ap-
pointed him Assistant Secretary of Defense. 
During the Sixties and early Seventies, only the radi-
cals questioned the conflicts of interest between the Re-
gents  and their  ties to  armaments  industries  and think 
tanks serving the Department of Defense and CIA. The 
Topeka and Sante Fe Railway Company, Northern Pacific Railroad 
and other corporations. 
 14 |   WHO KILLED THE BERKELEY SCHOOL?
Regents helped ensure that UCB faculties were celebrat-
ed as long as they didn’t challenge the interests of their 
military-industrial  empire.  When  these  interests  were 
critically spotlighted in the Sixties, however, the Regents 
seized  the  power  to  veto  tenure  recommendations—a 
power traditionally given to UC chancellors.
This veto power undoubtedly affected the outcome of 
one of the most notorious academic freedom cases oc-
curring on the Berkeley Campus: the case of Tony Platt.4 
Despite favorable recommendations from two tenure re-
view committees, Chancellors Roger Heyns and Albert 
Bowker made a preemptive strike: By steadfastly refus-
ing  to  grant  tenure  to  Platt,  a  faculty  member  in  the 
School  of  Criminology,  they  saved  the  Regents  from 
widespread condemnation and embarrassment. Their re-
fusal also blocked the possibility for overturning the Re-
gents in the courts. 
Bowker, replacing Heyns as Chancellor in the fall of 
1971, headed the on-campus team of assassins.  Previ-
ously, he had been Chancellor of the City University of 
New York (CUNY) where his credentials attracted the 
UC Regents. For instance, the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP) found that Bowker’s of-
fice  at  CUNY had violated  the  principle  of  academic 
freedom when it dismissed three CUNY assistant profes-
sors on one campus and ten faculty members at another.5 
4 An equally notorious case involved Ely Katz who was an assistant 
professor in the early Sixties. He had refused to cooperate with 
HUAC when  it  asked  whether  he  had  been  a  member  of  the 
Communist Party. He was fired from the university because he 
refused  to  answer  the  same  question  when  UCB  Chancellor 
Strong posed it. He then sued the university and forced it to rehire 
him.  However,  despite  favorable  recommendations  from  his 
tenure review committee and Dean, he was denied tenure. 
5 Bulletin  of  the  American  Association  of  University  Professors. 
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The first case involved a professor who had been an ad-
visor to an SDS chapter. He had participated in sit-ins 
with two other dismissed colleagues.  The second case 
involved  faculty  support  for  a  “third  world”  student 
rights movement.6 
In both instances, Bowker’s administration employed 
shifting  and  dilatory  tactics  to  cover-up  the  political 
purges. In the so-called case of the Ten, his administra-
tors defended the dismissals by disclosing political doc-
uments  from  secret  files  compiled  on  the  faculty.7 
Responding to the uproar over the dismissals, Bowker 
claimed that he had not conducted a political purge; in-
stead, the faculty had been fired solely because they had 
misused their positions or had defects of moral character 
or were too incompetent  to meet academic standards.8 
Besides, he said, a projected reduction in enrollment also 
had necessitated the reduction in the faculty. Yet when 
1973. “Queensborough Community College (CUNY),” Vol.  59, 
No.  1.  pp.  46–54 and  Bulletin  of  the  American  Association of  
University Professors. 1974. “The City University of New York 
(SEEK Center).” Vol. 60, No. 1. pp. 67–81. 
6 The  students  forced  the  resignation  of  a  Director  favored  by 
Bowker.  The  Director  told  four  of  the  10  faculty,  who  had 
supported  the  students’ rights  movement,  that  he  felt  they  no 
longer had a “constructive role” to play at the Center. Students,  
almost  entirely  African  Americans  and  Puerto  Ricans,  then 
successfully fought to replace the Director with a ‘third world’ 
person.
7 For instance, the AAUP Bulletin mentions that a faculty member, 
who called for support of black workers at a Ford plant, wrote one 
document. Circulation of this information was legally irrelevant 
to their case and violated their academic freedom.
8 Since  the  case  involved  a  mass  firing,  Bowker  faced  the 
possibility of legal action. He preempted this action by selecting 
three black faculty from the other faculty and rehiring them to 
teach courses he had previously said they weren’t competent to 
teach.
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enrollments did not decrease as expected,  Bowker did 
not reinstate the people he had fired.9 
In  addition,  the  American  Federation  of  Teachers 
(AFT) faculty union at Berkeley (Local 1474) reported 
that Bowker was hired to add support within the univer-
sity system for Reagan’s plan to oust Charles J. Hitch, 
President of the University of California (UC). Reagan 
believed that Hitch had not acted ruthlessly enough in 
combating  the  free  speech,  civil-rights  and  anti-war 
campus movements. To assure Reagan and conservative 
Regents that he was the man to replace Hitch and bring 
UC into line, Bowker, according to the AFT, operated a 
lobby effort  in the state capital  that rivaled and coun-
tered Hitch’s.10
Sindler, the second member of the team, was dedicat-
ed to eliminating the so-called “core members” of anti-
government and anti-racist movements on campus. Orig-
inally at Cornell, Sindler had been the head of a univer-
sity commission appointed to define student relations to 
law enforcement. While at Cornell, he had been enraged 
by  attempts  to  provide  amnesty  for  African-American 
students faced with disciplinary charges after conducting 
a sit-in at Willard Straight Hall. During the night of the 
sit-in, these students, who belonged to the Black Power 
movement,11 reportedly  foiled  fraternity  members  who 
9  Jeff Moad, “Bowker’s NY Past.” The Daily Californian May 16 
1974. p. 5. As indicated, the so-called ‘incompetent’ faculty were 
African Americans.
10 “UC Tie-Line.”  University Guardian,  AFT Local 1474, March 
1973, p. 6.
11 Students representing the Free Speech Movement (FSM) campus 
chapter joined the African American students after the initial sit-in 
had taken place. Cornell had the third largest SDS chapter in the 
country.  For  different  perspectives  and  a  chronology  of  the 
Cornell events, see Cushing Strout and David I. Grossvogel (eds.) 
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attempted to break into the Hall to attack them. Terrified 
by the break-in, the African-American students obtained 
arms  to  defend  themselves.  This  move  immediately 
risked a clash with the Ithaca police who would have 
employed deadly force to  expel  the students from the 
Hall.
Certainly, the memory of the vicious brutality target-
ing African-American student protesters at southern uni-
versities  must  have  encouraged  the  Cornell 
administration to refrain from calling the police. A Cor-
nell dean contacted the students and promised support 
for amnesty if the students left the Hall. After the stu-
dents  marched  out,  guns  in  hand,  the  dean  asked  the 
Academic Senate to recommend “reconciliation,” with-
out harm to the students, when the violations were con-
sidered. The Senate deliberations went through various 
stages until the faculty wisely voted for reconciliation, 
thereby  blocking  the  threat  of  further  demonstrations 
and deadly responses from police.
A diary kept by Sindler’s department chair,  Clinton 
Rossiter,  tells  how the reconciliation debate at Cornell 
took a nasty turn. Sindler, a foremost opponent of recon-
ciliation, felt so strongly about the issue that he publicly 
threatened to resign if the Senate majority sided with the 
students.  His  opposition provoked a Black Power stu-
dent  leader  to  threaten  him and his  family  in  a  radio 
broadcast.12 Sindler rented a hotel room and left his fam-
Divided  We  Stand:  Reflections  on  the  Crisis  at  Cornell.  New 
York: Doubleday 1970. 
12 A student who thought the radio broadcast had not begun made 
the  threatening  comments  (in  an  informal  discussion  with  the 
announcer). His comments appear to have been couched in the 
exaggerated  ‘ghetto  rhetoric’ often  employed  by  black  power 
students regardless whether their own class backgrounds.
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ily for a few nights. Rossiter, who was also threatened, 
did not leave his residence and no one harmed him or his 
family.13 
Despite Sindler’s efforts, the Senate approved the rec-
onciliation measure and he resigned, leaving when his 
academic year was up. He accepted an offer from Berke-
ley where politically compatible administrators and col-
leagues supported his views.
Beginning in 1971, Sindler’s name appeared on vari-
ous UCB documents aimed at repressing campus radi-
cals  or  curtailing  their  support  among  the  faculty.  A 
Senate committee that succeeded in expanding the rules 
for disciplining faculty who acted “against the interests 
of  the  university”  issued some of  these  documents  in 
February 1971. Another set of documents included the 
June 15, 1973 report (and various memos) by Sindler—
who chaired Bowker’s committee evaluating the School 
of Criminology. The committee report fabricated the so-
called  “indisputable  facts”  and  ideological  terrain  on 
which the struggle over the school’s fate emerged.
Still another document from May 30, 1972, reflected 
his  anti-union sentiments and would have undermined 
Local 1474 of the American Federation of Teachers, the 
only UCB faculty organization that consistently opposed 
Reagan, Bowker and their cohorts throughout the 1970s. 
Throughout  the  late  sixties  and  early  seventies,  Local 
1474 had defended UCB employees against discrimina-
13 A number  of  other  faculty  members  were  threatened  by  the 
broadcast and they also spent a few nights at hotels because of 
their alarm. See Donald A. Downs,  Cornell ’69: Liberalism and 
the Crisis of the American University. Ithaca; Cornell University 
Press,  1999.  Also,  Caleb  S.  Rossiter.  The Chimes  of  Freedom 
Flashing: A Personal History of the Vietnam Anti-War Movement  
and the 1960s. Washington DC: TCA Press 1996.
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tory hiring policies as well as Reagan’s budget cuts, ad-
ministrative abuses and political  persecution.  Although 
the  administration  and  its  faculty  allies—including 
Sindler—could not control the AFT Local, they finally 
attempted  an  end-run  around  it.  They  encouraged  the 
Academic Senate to pass a resolution calling for the cre-
ation of a so-called “professional association” to “pre-
pare for the eventuality of collective bargaining.” Within 
days of the resolution’s passage,  Sindler and six other 
conservatives distributed the resolution among the UC 
Berkeley faculty and requested them to join up. Bowker 
was  obviously  involved  in  this  conspiracy,  because  a 
“check-off” form with a UC seal, clipped to the resolu-
tion,  allowed faculty members to automatically deduct 
membership dues from their  earnings.14 Ironically,  this 
sordid enterprise was abandoned when California’s Leg-
islative Analyst,  Alan Post,  quickly recommended that 
funds for the Academic Senate be line-itemed to prevent 
any involvement in collective bargaining. Since the Sen-
ate was a state-funded agency, Post declared, it could not 
“participate directly or indirectly in collective bargain-
ing.”15 To avoid conflict  with the state  legislature and 
courts, Sindler, his conservative cohort and the adminis-
tration,  abandoned  their  attempt  to  form  a  company 
union.
Sanford  Kadish,  a  professor  at  the  School  of  Law, 
was the third notable member of the assassination team. 
Kadish,  it  is  important  to  note,  headed  the  faculty 
“search  committee”  that  recommended Bowker  as  the 
14 The  statement  implicated  administrative  collusion  because  it 
informed the faculty that they could have their dues automatically 
deducted from their salaries. A check-off accounting department 
form was attached.
15 “Berkeley  Faculty  Association  Threatens  Senate  Funding.” 
University Guardian, AFT Local 1474, March 1973, p. 3.
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new Chancellor. Although the San Francisco Chronicle, 
on  February  28,  1971,  dubbed  Kadish  “UC’s  Ethical 
Moderate,”16 he was, in reality, a voice for the Regents 
who alleged that movement professors were “subverting 
the liberty” they were striving to protect.17
Also, Kadish believed trade unionism was antithetical 
to university aims and made the ridiculous claim in the 
Chronicle interview  that  pro-union  professors  under-
mined the university, considering themselves “employ-
ees  first,  and  academics  second.”  As  student  protests 
rocked the campus, he protested that Berkeley was not 
“a political battleground.” Nevertheless, he insisted that 
conservatives “balance the liberals” when faculty com-
mittees were appointed. With Orwellian flair, he further 
declared that “extremists, students and many of the pro-
fessors” were not entitled to academic freedom, because 
16 Carl  Irving,  “What  Worries  Profs  Most  –  Freedom,  Tenure, 
Funds.” S.F. Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, February 28, 1971. p. 
10.
17 The  Chronicle interviewer said Kadish “has been credited with 
averting extreme stands in such matters as the People’s Park, the 
course  involving  Eldridge  Cleaver  and  the  demands  of  Third 
World Groups.” In actuality, prior to being appointed Dean of the 
School of Law, Kadish helped neutralize the Academic Senate’s 
obligation  to  uphold  academic  freedom  –  especially  when  it 
involved  a  conflict  with  the  Regents.  Kadish  was  AAUP 
Executive Committee chairperson at UCB when it was confronted 
in  1968,  with  an  unprecedented  ruling  by  the  Regents  that 
prevented the well-known sociologist, Troy Duster, and two other 
faculty members from holding an experimental course scheduling 
Eldridge Cleaver as an ongoing ‘guest lecturer.’ Kadish convinced 
the  Committee  and,  then,  the  Academic  Senate  to  adopt  a 
resolution  that  vaguely  supported  academic  freedom  but 
abandoned the three faculty members who were jointly teaching 
the  course  and  who  had  requested  backing  from  the  Senate. 
Schwendinger, who also was on the AAUP Executive Committee, 
resigned because the three faculty members were not supported.
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they were “hacking away at the most precious asset on 
campus - an atmosphere of freedom.”18
In this contentious environment, Bowker, Sindler and 
Kadish were participants in a counter-reformist alliance 
that suppressed students and faculty who (1) supported 
student  participation  in  university  management,  (2) 
drafted legislative initiatives for a civilian police review 
board,  (3)  unmasked  right-wing  crime-fighting  initia-
tives (4) advocated prison reforms and (5) opposed po-
lice brutality. The radicals who built this program were 
also primarily responsible for unprecedented changes in 
the racial and gender composition of students and facul-
ty within the School. Taking charge of the Criminology 
admissions committee over a three to four year period, 
they  actively  recruited  students  from  minority  groups 
and  women.  Previously,  instructors  were  virtually  all 
white  males.  The  radicals  championed  faculty-hiring 
policies that made unprecedented changes during the rel-
atively short period when they were influential.19 
Despite urgent student and faculty demands for affir-
mative action, these changes were by no means typical. 
In  March 1973,  for  example,  the  AFT faculty  union20 
published segments of the Health Education and Welfare 
Office of Civil Rights report dealing with women in aca-
demic positions.21 The report accused the UCB adminis-
18 Carl Irving, op cit.
19 Platt  and  Schwendinger  chaired  the  admissions  committee 
during most of this period.
20 Although HEW gave the report to UC administrators, it refused 
to make it available to those who filed the complaint that led to 
the review. These administrators also refused to release the report 
on the grounds of pending legal action
21 Other segments, it pointed out, covered “Minorities in Academic 
Positions”  and  “Minorities  and  Women  in  Non-Academic 
positions.”
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tration of not complying with federal civil-rights man-
dates.22 It  especially  singled  out  the  Academic  Senate 
whose membership reflected employment policies that 
discriminated  against  women  and  minorities.23.  Other 
publications, such as  Public Affairs Report: Bulletin of  
the  Institute  of  Government  Studies,  showed  that,  in 
1970, women comprised only 2.3 percent of all full pro-
fessors at Berkeley. In 1973, the ratio had not improved; 
in fact, “larger proportions of women held lower posi-
tions lacking both tenure and status.”24 Three years later, 
in 1976, the Committee on Senate Policy reported to the 
Academic Senate that only a limited number of depart-
ments were treating the issue of gender discrimination 
seriously rather than taking refuge behind the myth that 
affirmative action is “counter-productive to the quest for 
excellence.”25
The changes produced by the radicals went beyond 
22 “UCB Stalls Affirmative Action Compliance” and “HEW Report 
on  Women:  ‘UC  Not  In  Compliance.’”  University  Guardian, 
March  1973,  p.  4.  The  Local  published  some  of  the  OCR 
findings,  noting  that  the  administration  had  refused  to  release 
these findings on the grounds of pending legal action. Litigation 
brought  by  the  League  of  Academic  Women  alleging  sex 
discrimination was being argued in court around that time.
23 The Senate review committees were either composed of people 
who supported the administration or who were split into factions 
of  belligerent  conservatives,  ambivalent  moderates  and 
‘principled’ liberals.  While,  as  far  as  we know,  there  were  no 
socialists  in  these  committees,  there  were  people  like  Paul 
Seabury,  who  was  repeatedly  attacked  for  ties  to  defense 
agencies, and Sindler.
24 Public Affairs Report: Bulletin of  the Institute of Government  
Studies V. 14, December 1973, No. 6, p.2.
25 “Report of the Committee on Senate Policy State of the Campus 
Message, Meeting of the Berkeley Division,” Monday, April 26, 
1976.
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the school. For instance, Takagi, who was at that time 
the first and only tenured Asian American social science 
professor at UCB, held the first Asian American Studies 
course in the United States. He helped municipal gov-
ernments  and  police  and  probation  departments  intro-
duce  police  training,  cultural  sensitivity  training  and 
research into the treatment of racial minorities. He was 
repeatedly asked by the community relations division in 
the Department of Justice to participate in training ses-
sions, conferences, Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-
istration (LEAA) planning sessions, and so forth as an 
expert  on affirmative  action  and racial  discrimination. 
On one occasion, the director of the division, in his in-
troductory  comments  reported  that  nine  out  of  the  10 
black criminologists with doctorates in the United States 
had graduated from “Paul Takagi’s shop at Berkeley.”26 
Also, largely due to affirmative action initiated by the 
radicals, the School of Criminology graduated at least 20 
women with doctorates before it was closed down.
The UC Berkeley School of Criminology was target-
ed for additional reasons. It actually offered a politically 
balanced curriculum taught by conservative and moder-
ate liberals as well as radical democrats. Out of about a 
dozen  professors,  for  most  of  the  period  in  question, 
only four were considered radicals and three of them did 
not have tenure.27 The curriculum, as a whole, empha-
sized  traditional  professional  courses;  but  the  radicals 
initiated  courses  rarely  offered  by  criminologists  else-
where. Barry Krisberg, Tony Platt and Paul Takagi, for 
example,  reorganized the introductory course and pro-
26 Apparently,  eight  had  doctorates  but  the  ninth  may not  have 
completed his degree.
27 This would make five when Elliot Currie is included. He is the 
lecturer  mentioned  in  the  list  of  radicals  but  was  an  Acting 
Assistant Professor in the final years of the School.
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vided radical as well as non-radical topics dealing with 
the causes, characteristics and control of crime.28 They 
designed  the  course  for  students  at  large,  attracting 
around 800 undergraduates eager to know what the field 
was about even when they were not interested in becom-
ing criminologists.  Like other  criminology courses  of-
fered  by  the  radicals,  these  instructors  emphasized 
economic, political and social relations that determined 
the historical development of crime and criminal justice. 
In addition, Schwendinger taught theoretical courses on 
crime and delinquency and seminars on “instruments of 
discovery” that veered away from the blind empiricism 
and sterile survey methods dominating the field.29
Other members of the staff  also contributed to this 
new beginning in learning. Elliot Currie, originally a lec-
turer  and  eventually  an  Acting  Assistant  Professor, 
played an important role in this regard. Drew Humphries 
and other female graduate students who taught courses 
also contributed. Faculty such as Aviva Menkes, Richard 
Korn, Lloyd Street and John Davis focused on racial and 
ethnic repression, crimes against women, civil liberties 
and reforms of the police and correctional institutions.
Contact  with  visiting  professors  such  as  Marie 
Bertrand, an outstanding feminist scholar from the Uni-
versity of Montreal; Richard Quinney, a pioneer in criti-
cal  criminology;  Alphonso  Pinckney,  a  noted  black 
28 The course description, evaluation and readings can be found in 
the first edition of Crime and Social Justice. See Barry Krisberg, 
“Teaching Radical Criminology: Criminology 100A-B, Professors 
Barry Krisberg, Tony Platt, and Paul Takagi,”  Crime and Social  
Justice, 1974, 1 (Spring-Summer) 64-66.
29 This course among other things exposed students to ethnography, 
sociometrics,  small  group  experiments,  and  the  writings  of 
Charles  Pierce  and  other  pragmatists  interested  in  the 
development of scientific thinking.
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sociologist from Hunter College; John Irwin, a trailblaz-
er  in  penal  studies;  and  David  Du  Bois,  the  son  of 
W.E.B. Du Bois and editor of the Black Panther party’s 
newspaper, expanded the new learning.
Speakers from labor organizations such as the United 
Farm Workers were invited to relate how police harass-
ment and brutality repressed the unionization of migra-
tory workers. Finally, the School was further enriched by 
campus-wide  talks  featuring  speakers  such  as  Ralph 
Nader, who excoriated “Crime in the Suites.”
The radical faculty helped reorganize the undergradu-
ate curriculum. They encouraged a systematic approach 
to criminology, encouraged internships in criminal-jus-
tice  agencies  and  organized  individual  studies  that 
catered to student interests. It was no secret that the cur-
riculum had been influenced by this faculty but when the 
School was attacked virtually every course with socially 
critical content was labeled as “radical.”
Despite their small number, this faculty generated a 
vibrant intellectual climate. Fundamental questions were 
raised about America, about its class, gender and racial 
inequality. And the interaction between radical students 
and faculty generated the “critical mass” that produced 
an Enlightenment-like explosion of rich theoretical ideas 
about the nature of crime and criminal justice.30 
Some of the students educated by the radicals helped 
edit  Issues  in  Criminology,  publishing  articles  and 
interviews  that  would  not  have  appeared  in  major 
30 The originality of their work is missed in mainstream summaries 
of  radical  writings,  which usually mistake English writings for 
American  even  though  prominent  radicals  at  Berkeley  and 
elsewhere  had  gravitated  toward  political  economy rather  than 
sociology of deviancy (e.g., labeling theory), which had become 
fashionable at that time.
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criminology  journals.  Interviews  with  pioneering 
Canadian and British scholars31 and some of the earliest 
challenges  to  mainstream  positions  appeared  there—
including Gene Grabiner’s attack on value-free science 
and state morality, Barry Krisberg’s trenchant critique of 
a University of Pennsylvania training program for gang 
leaders, and Schwendingers’ ground-breaking article on 
the legal definition of crime.32 Critical historical studies 
included Melanie Fong and Larry D. Johnson’s critique 
of the Eugenicist movement and institutionalized racism, 
Dorie  Klein’s  exposé  of  sexism in  theories  of  female 
criminality, Martin B. Miller’s scrutiny of progressive-
era  prison  reforms,  John  Pallas  and  Bob  Barber’s 
analysis  on  prison  struggles,  Tony  Platt  and  Randi 
Pollock’s article  on public  defenders,  Joyce Clements’ 
critique  of  the  rhetoric  of  repression,  Elliot  Currie’s 
article on medieval witch hunts and Richard Quinney’s 
approach to legal order.
Racism in  criminal  justice  was  further  targeted  by 
John A. Davis’ views of black men toward crime and 
law, Charles Reasons’ study of prisoner’s rights, Larry 
D. Trujillo’s analysis of criminology literature on Chi-
canos,  and  Homer  Yearwood’s  critique  of  police  dis-
crimination  against  blacks.  In  addition,  in  1973,  the 
editors of  Issues33 broke new ground by publishing an 
31 Such as the University of Montreal feminist, Marie Bertrand, and 
three  British  criminologists,  Ian  Taylor,  Paul  Walton  and  Jock 
Young.
32 Thirty  years  later,  in  the  introduction  to  What  is  Crime?: 
Controversies over the Nature of Crime and What to Do about It 
(Rowman & Littlefield) the editors, Mark M. Lanier and Stuart 
Henry, call the article “the classic counterstatement to the legal 
definition” of crime.
33 The  editors  included  June  Kress,  Virginia  Engquist  Grabiner, 
Cynthia Mahabir, Wayne Lawrence, Eleanor Evans, Susan Barnes 
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entire edition devoted to women with articles by Dorie 
Klein,  Meda  Chesney-Lind,  Kurt  Weis,  Sandra  S. 
Borges, and Dale Hoffman-Bustamante.
The radical faculty published articles in  Journal  of  
Marriage  and  the  Family,  Federal Probation,  Social 
Problems, Issues in Criminology, Insurgent Sociologist,  
Crime and Social Justice and so forth. Works by Platt 
and Schwendinger also appeared in anthologies such as 
the Politics of Riot Commissions, 1917-1970, and Delin-
quency and Group Processes. 
Toward the end of the Sixties, a notable proportion of 
doctoral students began to conduct research that changed 
the School. Many students, of course, continued to adopt 
technocratic paradigms for studying crime, crime control 
or  managerial  problems,  for  instance.  But  Lynn  B. 
Cooper’s  (1976) dissertation scrutinized  the expansion 
of the “state repressive apparatus,” spurred by the Law 
Enforcement  Assistance  Administration  (LEAA). 
Richard C. Speiglman (1976) studied this expansion in 
California’s  prison  hospital  and  his  access  to  medical 
records exposed “new prison walls” based on the mas-
sive and unjustified use of tranquilizing drugs in treat-
ment of MDOs, i.e., “Mentally Disordered Offenders.”
Doctoral students also produced a penetrating series 
of historical police studies. Virginia Engquist Grabiner’s 
(1976) research documented the repressive police tactics 
used against the militant members of the women’s suf-
frage  movement.  Studies,  by  Joyce  Clements  (1975), 
Robert Mintz (1974) and Charles Keller (1974), investi-
gated the economic and political factors behind the re-
curring  employment  of  police  forces  to  crush  San 
Francisco  maritime  strikes,  mine  workers’ unions  and 
and Tommie Hannigan.
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Native Americans. Discarding a “great man theory” of 
policing, Michael Rustigan (1974) showed that Jeremy 
Bentham was not the sole catalyst for the creation of the 
early 19th century metropolitan police. Instead, the Ben-
thamite movement in London successfully brought the 
first police force into being because London business in-
terests backed it.  Gregory Mark (1978) scrutinized the 
American imperial policies expanding the opium trade 
in  China.  Vast  fortunes  were made as American ships 
(e.g., the “China Clipper”) transported tremendous quan-
tities of opium from the near east to China. After British 
and American warships crushed China’s attempt to block 
the  trade,  the  “foremost  families”  of  the  nation,  the 
Cabot,  Cushing,  Forbes,  Surges,  Peabody  and  Delano 
families, poured their drug fortunes into railroads and in-
dustry. We know from Mark’s study that opium traffick-
ing backed the rise of the greatest industrial power in the 
world.
Significant information about the origins of criminal 
justice  appeared  in  other  dissertations.  James  Brady 
(1974) described the centuries-long evolution of restora-
tive  “popular  justice”  in  China  while  Gregg  Barak 
(1974) probed the origins of the public defender system 
in the United States. Contrary to liberal explanations, the 
movement to establish a public defender system was not 
the outcome of progressive and humanitarian reform but 
rather  part  of  a  larger  regulative  movement  occurring 
both inside and outside the criminal justice system.34 
Some graduate students focused on feminist  topics. 
Frances Coles (1974) examined the experiences of wom-
en lawyers while Julia Schwendinger’s (1975) disserta-
34 It was also created to delegitimize critics of class-biased justice 
and  to  abolish  requirement  of  ‘rotation,’ thereby  unburdening 
corporate lawyers from defending indigents. 
   HOW DOES IT REALLY ADD UP?  | 29 
tion was devoted to the rape victim and her treatment by 
the  justice  system.  Lynn  Osborne  (1973)  and  Drew 
Humphries  (1973) dissected the politics of anti-homo-
sexual and anti-abortion laws as well as the racial, gen-
der  and  social  class  inequities  in  criminal  justice 
agencies.
Race  and  crime  was  another  topic.  David  Dodd 
(1972)  examined  the  formation  and  disintegration  of 
personal identity in urban Afro-America. George Napper 
(1971) researched the African American student move-
ment and Llewellyn (Alex) Swan (1972) investigated the 
causes of race riots.
Tetsuya Fujimoto (1975) adopted ideas from political 
economy rather than social-control theory to explain low 
crime rates among Japanese immigrants who settled in 
California  at  the  end  of  the  19th century.  Unlike  the 
crime rates among European immigrants who settled in 
Northeastern cities, these low rates were determined by 
the widespread involvement of Japanese immigrants in 
family  farming rather  than  in  industrial  labor  markets 
and their surplus labor force. 
Robert E. Meyers (1974) showed how funds for Los 
Angeles  parks  and  recreation  programs  were  used  to 
control  the  poor.  During  economically  and  politically 
volatile  periods,  the  funds  shifted  dramatically  from 
middle-class  communities  to  working-class  communi-
ties. But in “normal times,” the LA government gave the 
lion’s share of these funds to middle class communities.
Examination  of  social  class  and  delinquency  pro-
duced  Anthony  Poveda’s  (1970)  and  Joseph  Weis’ 
(1974) studies of working-class and middle-class com-
munities.35 Unlike  simple-minded  research  encouraged 
35 Stanley  Friedman’s  (1969)  Master’s  thesis  is  another  one  of 
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by  delinquent-subculture  and  social-control  theories, 
their fieldwork focused on complex relations connecting 
social classes, adolescent subcultures and delinquency.
The variety of critical studies at the School was sim-
ply extraordinary. As a result of these and other studies
—such as  Ronald  Glick’s  (1969)  dissertation  on New 
Left  organizers  in  a  southern  community  and  Renee 
Kasinsky’s (1972) study of men who escaped the draft 
by  settling  in  Canada—the  graduate  students  helped 
broaden the research conducted today.
Furthermore,  the  intellectual  achievements  at  the 
School did not end with dissertations. A faculty-student 
collective  created  an  entirely  new journal,  Crime and 
Social  Justice,  devoted  to  radical  criminology 
(Schwendingers 1999). The first edition featured articles 
on  radical  criminology,  political  origins  of  American 
prisons, prison movement in Scandinavia and a pioneer-
ing conference sponsored by European radical criminol-
ogists held in Florence, Italy, which had been attended 
by members of the collective. 
The  journal  published  “The  Garrison  State  in  a 
‘Democratic’ Society” and “Rape Myths in Legal, Theo-
retical and Everyday Practice”—articles addressing the 
unwarranted number of racially biased killings by police 
and the questionable view of rape in criminology. Re-
named  Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict &  
World Order, the journal has continued to be edited by 
people originally associated with the School. The jour-
nal’s 25th Anniversary Edition was published in the Fall 
of 1999.
The radicals published several books. Tony Platt and 
these  important  early  empirical  contributions  to  the  study  of 
subcultures and delinquency.
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Lynn Cooper edited  Policing America,  and radicals  at 
the School who had formed a center for criminal-justice 
research wrote  The Iron Fist and Velvet Glove,  dealing 
with topics rarely covered in criminology, such as the 
police-industrial complex, police brutality, counterinsur-
gency  and  political  repression.36 The  Schwendingers’ 
Sociologists of the Chair37 described the origins of cor-
porate liberalism and the technocratic category, “social  
control,” that dominated theoretical criminology.
The changes produced by the radicals went beyond 
the  school.  Julia  Schwendinger,  Tommie  Hannigan, 
Suzie Dod and other women students joined with local 
Berkeley women to create the first anti-rape group in the 
United  States,  Bay  Area  Women  Against  Rape.  These 
women  forced  Herrick  Hospital  authorities  to  remove 
the  emergency  room  chief  who  treated  victims  like 
“pieces of meat” and pressured the institution to adopt 
medical  protocols  treating  rape  victims  as  human  be-
ings.38 They  established  support  programs  and  a  tele-
phone  hotline  for  victims,  issued  community 
information bulletins and tacked “streetsheets” with de-
scriptions of rapists  and their  modus operandi to tele-
phone poles. After pressuring the Berkeley DA’s office 
and Police Department, they instituted a victim-advoca-
cy program for court cases and created sensitivity-train-
36 Tony  Platt  and  Lynn  Cooper,  Policing  America.  Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Also, Staff of the Research Center on 
Criminal Justice,  Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove: An Analysis of  
the  U.S.  Police.  Berkeley:  Center  for  Research  on  Criminal 
Justice, 1975.
37 Herman  and  Julia  Schwendinger.  1974.  Sociologists  of  the 
Chair:  A  Radical  Analysis  of  the  Formative  Years  of  North  
American Sociology (1883-1922). New York: Basic Books, 1974.
38 To force compliance, the group actually prevented the hospital 
from receiving a federal grant.
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ing sessions for police officers handling rape-victim cas-
es. This vital organization and its programs are still ac-
tive as we write.
Unprecedented  activities  sponsored  by  the  radicals 
created a School that was not limited to producing tech-
nocratically  oriented  professionals.  With  the  help  of 
Cyril Robinson, Takagi and Schwendinger initiated dis-
cussions that led to the first radical criminology sessions 
at annual meetings of the American Society of Criminol-
ogy.39 Some students and faculty were servicing organi-
zations  and  movements  that  were  independent  of  the 
criminal-justice agencies and, in some cases, in conflict 
with them. The School, therefore, was providing assis-
tance to  elements in civil  society that symbolized and 
fostered democracy.
39 Thanks, in part, to Charles Wellford’s cooperation.
3 |  Fighting “Friendly Fascists”
ome criminologists  stereotype the radicals  as “ex-
tremists”  and  “utopians”  with  ultra-left  aims.  But 
most radicals at the School never fit this stereotype.
S
It is simply impossible to understand the radicals ac-
curately without realizing that social movements—anti-
war,  civil  rights,  feminism—pulled  them  together 
despite their diverse positions and professional interests. 
Feminists, anarchists, social democrats, Maoists, left-lib-
erals, moderate-liberals and people with no distinct po-
litical perspective were found among the radicals. And 
they certainly included utopians whose dreams at  that 
time made life bearable.
Although many radicals finally organized themselves 
into  professionally  oriented  task  groups  to  sponsor  a 
conference on prisons, launch a criminology journal and 
write a textbook or model legislation; and although one 
could find the same people drinking beer and dancing 
every Friday at an Irish Pub,  The Star and the Plough, 
their  networks  were  fluid  and expanded or  contracted 
depending upon what was happening outside the School. 
The networks interfaced social and political movements 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. And, until the School it-
self was in peril, most of their activities were character-
33
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ized by short-term—often reactive and spontaneous—re-
sponses to events outside the school. 
Yet a single strand tied these diverse people together. 
Despite their long hair, pony tails, beards, hippie argot, 
cowboy  hats,  Mao  hats,  headbands,  tie-dyed  shirts, 
miniskirts, and bongo drums—despite the revolutionary 
sloganeering (e.g. “Power to the People!”) and postur-
ing, the students and faculty who created the program so 
despised by Bowker,  Sindler and Kadish were  radical 
democrats whose members shared the same hatred of the 
war, political repression, police brutality and social in-
equality.1 They believed their “new criminology” would 
advance equality, justice and “participatory democracy.” 
They really did believe in what America was supposed 
to be. The majority still does.
Todd Gitlin’s autobiography describes factional con-
flicts  and  terrorist  groups  that  allegedly  imploded  the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). But the Crimi-
nology radicals marched to the beat of a different drum-
mer. They did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the 
United States government, and even the few who had a 
“romance with communism” never encouraged anyone 
to form a terrorist group like the Weathermen. Further-
more,  the  Criminology  radicals  were  free  of  factional 
conflict and violence. Their direct actions relied on what 
had become standard forms of civil disobedience, which 
ignored  university  rules  governing  the  conduct  of 
demonstrations but avoided violence.2 For instance, on 
June 6, 1974, The Daily Californian headlines declared, 
“100 Riot Policemen Dispersed Peaceful Haviland Hall 
1  Deeds not words are the criteria behind this judgment.
2  Students violated these rules because they knew that they had no 
chance of getting anywhere with the administration by adhering 
to them.
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Sit-In.”  To protest  the closing of  the School,  students 
pushed campus police aside to gain entrance to Haviland 
Hall but conducted a nonviolent “sit- in.”3 When police 
massed in front of the building the next day directing 
their shot-guns and gas grenade launchers at a crowd of 
about  1,000,  and  commanded  the  students  inside  to 
leave, the students left peacefully.4
The inescapable truth is that the police were primarily 
responsible  for  the  violence  occurring  throughout  the 
Bay  Area.  Granted,  some  vandalism  and  arson  were 
committed by a very small number of Berkeley students 
in the 1969 Third World Strike. Also, “crazies,”5 as they 
were called, in antiwar demonstrations along Telegraph 
Avenue and Shattuck Avenues, indiscriminately smashed 
windows—including  windows  of  merchants  who  sup-
ported the  anti-war  movement.6 But  this  gratuitous, 
spontaneous and disorganized violence pales in compari-
son  with  the  organized  and  systematic  clubbing  and 
beatings by the police. 
For example, two years earlier, on October 18, 1967, 
3 Criminology  students  like  Richard  Schauffler,  in  fact,  stopped 
some students (who were not in the School) from throwing rocks 
or provoking violence. The “crazies” were largely composed of 
homeless youth who were camped in vacant Berkeley lots.
4 An  individual  posing  as  a  Daily  Californian  reporter  entered 
Haviland  Hall  during  the  sit-in;  but  he  was  expelled  after  he 
spread false information that could possibly have caused panic in 
the Hall. This agent provocateur was identified as Brian Meyers 
in the following edition of the Daily Californian.
5 The ‘crazies’ usually lived hand-to-mouth in the residential area 
or streets south of campus near Telegraph Avenue.
6  Some crazies even set fire to a couple of rooms in the basement 
of Stephens Hall because, to them, the words ‘criminology’ and 
‘repression’ may have been synonymous. The basement included 
the Criminalistics laboratory and offices, a few graduate student 
offices and Schwendinger’s data-processing office.
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around 200 police officers in a rapidly advancing wedge 
formation kicked, clubbed and beat 4,000 unarmed and 
nonviolent demonstrators who were blocking the Oak-
land Induction Center. A Wall Street Journal article enti-
tled,  “Blue  Power  and  Control  of  Mobs,”  quoted  a 
policeman  at  the  scene.  He  said  the  demonstrators 
“weren’t allowed enough time to get away.”7 Most of the 
crowd tried to back off as the wedge advanced but could 
not  move  fast  enough  without  trampling  each  other. 
“They handcuffed this guy,” one demonstrator reported. 
“He started to move and they knocked him down. Then 
four policemen got on him and beat him unconscious.” A 
girl who talked back to police “was molested in a most 
disgusting way by five policemen.” A physician called 
the scene a “massacre.” While going to the aid of an in-
jured woman, he was hit by a policeman. After asking 
for the policeman’s badge number, he was struck in the 
jaw. Paul Gorman, a United Press International photog-
rapher, said he was standing on the sidewalk as the po-
lice moved forward; nevertheless, he was clubbed and 
kicked  repeatedly  in  the  head.  The  beating  continued 
even  though  he  pointed  to  his  camera  and  repeatedly 
shouted that he was a press photographer.
Charles R. Gain, Oakland’s Chief of Police, defended 
his  force’s  tactics  even though they had dispersed the 
demonstrators effectively on the previous day by resort-
ing to nonviolent mass arrest.8 Gain remarked, “When 
we were confronted with the problem, it quickly became 
obvious that the only thing that would remove thousands 
of  persons  from  the  street  was  a  wedge-type  tactic.” 
7  Ronald  A.  Buel  and  Richard  Stone,  “‘Blue  Power’ and  the 
Control of Mobs,”  The Wall Street Journal, Friday, October 20, 
1967.
8  The demonstrations had taken place during the “Stop the Draft 
Week” organized nationally by anti-war organizations.
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Governor  Reagan  declared,  “The  police  action—swift 
and effective—was in the finest tradition of California’s 
law enforcement agencies.” “Force will be used without 
hesitation in order to maintain law and order and to al-
low Federal officials to carry out their duties,” applaud-
ed an Oakland Tribune editorial.
But  the  authors  of  the  Wall  Street  Journal article 
questioned the police tactics. They interviewed the Dean 
of the Criminology School, Joseph Lohman, who had a 
Master’s Degree in sociology and who had been Sheriff 
of  Cook County and Treasurer  of Illinois  under Adlai 
Stevenson, and Gordon Misner, an ex-police chief and a 
San Jose State professor who at that time was a visiting 
professor  at  the  School.  The  authors  reported  that 
Lohman was not at the demonstration but he felt that the 
police should have used nonviolent alternatives that had 
at times been used effectively in the “free speech” move-
ment sit-in in 1964.9 Misner also found the tactics ill ad-
vised. He suggested that the demonstration could have 
been easily defused by temporarily moving the Induc-
tion Center to the Oakland Army base. He added, “This 
may have resulted in a loss of face for the police, but 
there could have been less violence and demonstrators 
wouldn’t stay long at any empty Induction Center that 
was suddenly without inductees for a day.” 
These technical criticisms were mild compared to the 
response from four faculty members and a graduate stu-
dent from the Criminology School.10 A letter published 
9  Similar peaceful tactics were used during the initial days of ‘Stop 
the Draft Week’
10 Criminology professors Gordon Misner, Richard Korn, Bernard 
Diamond and Herman Schwendinger as well as David Fogel, at 
that time a graduate student, signed the letter. Also, faculty from 
School of Social Welfare faculty signed the letter.
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in the Daily Californian, signed by these members, con-
demned the police brutality outright.11 It called the po-
lice  “sadists”  and  demanded  an  end  to  police 
“vengeance, brutality and terror.” It said, the justification 
for police brutality “is as old as dictatorship: ‘In order to 
enforce the law we must be free to violate it when our 
opponents violate it’.” Speaking as teachers and citizens, 
the signers added: “The right to engage in law violation 
to  prevent  crime  is  a  contradiction—one  cannot  stop 
crime by committing it. If this is done, crime merely be-
comes the exclusive province of the police and a society 
of law and justice is destroyed from within, by its own 
protectors.”
These statements did not go quietly into the night. An 
outraged response came immediately. Don Fach, Presi-
dent of the California Peace Officers Research Associa-
tion,  fired  off  a  letter  to  Lohman,  claiming  that  the 
Oakland police had conducted themselves professionally 
and that they had been commended because they hadn’t 
confused “necessary force with brutality.” On the con-
trary, he accused the Criminology faculty of being un-
professional because they criticized the police. He said 
their outrageous public statements undermined police at-
tempts to block “government by mob rule” and belied 
“the professional dedication of the School of Criminolo-
gy to the basic tenets of law enforcement.” He informed 
Lohman that he was forwarding his complaint about the 
School to California law enforcement agencies, Gover-
nor Ronald Reagan, University of California’s Board of 
Regents, the International Association of Chiefs of Po-
lice and the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover.12
11 Editorial. “Professors Protest Brutality.”  The Daily Californian, 
Thursday October 19, 1967. p.8.
12 Don Fach, “Letter to Joseph Lohman from the Peace Officers 
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Yet the FBI was as guilty as the Oakland police of ab-
rogating the democratic rights of citizens. For instance, 
the FBI had forged letters and sent undercover agents to 
provoke dissension among these leaders, spreading ru-
mors about Martin Luther King and others to discredit 
them. FBI memos and agents had instigated the Chicago 
police department, which assassinated Fred Hampton, a 
Black Panther leader. In Oakland, the Black Panther Par-
ty had started community self-help programs, a breakfast 
program for children and educational forums and class-
es. But these reformist changes did not safeguard their 
headquarters from FBI-backed police raids that planted 
weapons, stole precinct lists and vandalized offices.13
Constitutional transgressions also occurred in Berke-
ley.  On  one  occasion  Berkeley  high-school  students, 
during lunchtime, joined a peaceful anti-war demonstra-
tion. They marched down University Avenue until a po-
lice  cordon  blocked  their  way.  They  were  ordered  to 
disperse, and tried, but found that police had blocked the 
streets in front, behind and to either side. After milling 
around,  perplexed  and  terrified,  police  bullhorns  in-
formed the teen-agers and adults that they were being ar-
rested  for  refusing  to  disperse.  The  marchers  were 
herded into an empty lot where police fingerprinted hun-
dreds of people en masse. (Busses for these people and 
trucks  for  the  unloaded  fingerprinting  equipment  had 
Research Association of California,” November 24, 1967. (This 
letter  was  distributed  by  Lohman  to  faculty  and  staff  on 
December  5,  1967 to  get  their  reactions  before  he  drafted  his 
reply.) Fach also demanded that Dean Lohman publicly repudiate 
the  statements  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal and  The  Daily 
Californian.
13 For  the  FBI  covert  campaign  against  political  dissidents,  see 
Brian Glick’s War At Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists  
and What We Can Do About It. Boston: South End Press.
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been parked prior to the demonstration on the side of the 
lot.) The teen-agers were then separated from the adults 
and, even though they were bussed to a juvenile deten-
tion  facility  in  another  city,  San  Leandro,  the  police 
made no attempt  to  inform parents  that  their  children 
had  been  arrested,  transported  and  imprisoned  miles 
away.14
Going back in time, we should remember that Uni-
versity demonstrations evolved from “direct-action” tac-
tics adopted by the civil rights movement in the South, 
where the “rule of law” brutally enforced racial segrega-
tion. When Berkeley “freedom fighters” returned. they 
applied  various  “direct-action”  tactics  learned  in  the 
South. The University tried to stop civil-rights and anti-
war organizing on campus after  The East Bay Oakland 
Tribune, targeted previously by student participation in 
an equal-opportunities campaign, denounced the campus 
organizers.15 UCB authorities, goose-stepping behind the 
Tribune’s banner headlines, demanded that political ac-
tivities  cease  and that  tables  with civil  rights  and an-
14 Leni  Schwendinger  was  in  that  demonstration  and  we  were 
terrified when she failed to return from school. Finally, a parent 
whom we telephoned discovered where the children were taken. 
We found on arrival at San Leandro that most of the children had 
gone  home.  Their  parents  were  called  after  their  children  had 
signed a statement promising not to participate in demonstrations 
again.  But  Leni  was  in  a  small  remaining  group  that  bravely 
refused to sign the unconstitutional statement.
15 The direct-action tactics were first used to combat labor market 
discrimination  in  the  San  Francisco  Bay  area.  During  the 
academic year of 1963-64, Berkeley’s CORE launched an equal 
employment  opportunities  campaign.  Students  joined  the 
picketing,  sit-ins  and  ‘shop-ins’ to  force  local  merchants  and 
newspapers to hire racial minorities. These activities culminated 
in  the  SF  Sheraton  Palace  Hotel  demonstration,  when  2,000 
students violated a court order restricting the number of pickets 
and 800 were arrested.
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ti-war literature be removed from the Sather Gate area. 
The  University  is  an  educational  institution,  President 
Clark Kerr pontificated. “It should not be used as a base 
to organize and undertake direct action in the surround-
ing community.” The Regents, of course, backed Kerr. 
Regent Frederick Dutton demagogically declared, “Our 
society believes in law and order but also in freedom.”16
Students defied the ban on political activities. They 
condemned President Kerr for surrendering to business-
men, including the right-wing Tribune publisher, former 
U.S.  Senator  William  Knowland.  Between  1000  and 
1500  people  occupied  Sproul  Hall,  the  administration 
building.  The police  were  called  to  clear  the  building 
and,  when  the  arrests  occurred,  773  students  were 
booked.  A civil-rights  attorney  who  accompanied  the 
students and was arrested indicated that this was the first 
time police also charged students  who had gone limp 
with resisting arrest  because they refused to leave the 
building on their own volition.
After the Sproul Hall sit-in and arrests, the students 
called a university-wide strike. Students laughed defiant-
ly  when  a  fellow-student,  Mario  Savio,  announced, 
“Some of our best faculty were forced to leave during in 
the 1950 loyalty oath controversy. Some of our best stu-
dents may be expelled now.” The administration finally 
relented, even though it had attempted to suspend stu-
dents cited for setting up literature tables and organizing 
around Sather Gate. Refusing to accept the suspensions, 
thousands of students joined the militants. Their added 
support  overrode opposition from fraternity leaders and 
16 University  Bulletin:  A  Weekly  Bulletin  for  the  Staff  of  the  
University of California, Vol. 16, Number 13, October 30 1967, p. 
1. 
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Young Republicans17 and gave birth, in 1964, to the Free 
Speech  Movement  (FSM).  Eventually,  the  authorities 
were forced to accept “time, place and manner rules” al-
lowing students to organize politically,  disseminate in-
formation  and  hold  demonstrations—albeit  with  some 
restrictions.
The Regents, of course,  never accepted the conces-
sions won by the FSM. Nor was the administration will-
ing or able to change its mind. Savio on one occasion 
reported, “We asked Kerr to get something more liberal 
out  of  the  Regents,  and the  answer  we got  from this 
well-meaning  liberal  was  the  following:  ‘Would  you 
ever imagine the manager of a firm making a statement 
publicly in opposition to his Board of Directors?’” 
Earlier, when the conflict between the FSM and uni-
versity authorities began to escalate, Kerr had called a 
press conference on October 6, 1964, and said, “Experi-
enced on the spot observers estimated that the hard core 
group of demonstrators . . . contained at times as much 
as 40 per cent off-campus elements. And, within that off-
campus  group,  there  were  persons  identified  as  being 
sympathetic with the Communist Party and Communist 
Causes.”18 But the FSM was not deceived by Kerr’s red 
herring. McCarthyism simply didn’t work anymore.
Because Kerr’s supporters on the faculty did not con-
trol the Academic Senate, he got the Council of Depart-
ment  Chairmen  to  back  his  decision  to  punish  the 
protesters. He then attempted to use the Council to usurp 
the Senate’s authority: The day before the Senate met, he 
17 Max  Heirich,  The  Beginning:  Berkeley  1964.  New  York: 
Columbia  University  Press.  pp.  198-99.  The  ASUC  Senate 
condemned  the  strike  and  set  up  a  counter-FSM organization, 
called University Students for Law and Order.
18 Heirich, op. cit. p. 196.
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held  a  university-wide  convocation  attended  by  thou-
sands of students at the Greek Theatre, the campus am-
phitheater.19 There, flanked on the Greek Theatre stage 
by all the department heads, he ceremoniously accepted 
a Council resolution urging him to pursue judicial pro-
ceedings against the FSM. Professor Robert Scalapino, 
head  of  the  political-science  department,  chaired  the 
convocation  and  refused  to  allow  FSM  spokesperson 
Mario Savio to speak.20
The FSM supporters, who occupied most of the mid-
dle section and grassy knoll at the top of the huge am-
phitheater,  roared  with  disapproval.  They  booed  Kerr 
when he declared, “The University Community shall be 
governed by orderly and lawful procedures in the settle-
ment of issues; and the full and free pursuit of educa-
tional  activities  on  this  campus  shall  be  maintained.” 
Such liberal platitudes at that point evoked anger rather 
than  applause.  Scalapino  also  inflamed  the  students 
when he expressed his resolute dedication to the preser-
vation of freedom under law. Scalapino’s remarks aston-
ished students because he was a Southeast Asia expert 
who  had  been  repeatedly  implicated  in  servicing  the 
CIA, Department of Defense and State Department—all 
of whose activities appeared to be violating constitution-
al and international laws.
Despite  Scalapino’s  refusal  to  let  him speak as  the 
FSM  representative,  Savio  tried  to  respond  to  Kerr’s 
vows to punish the protesters. But he was arrested as he 
moved toward the stage.  Pandemonium broke out.  He 
was finally released and, to forestall a riot, was allowed 
to tell the audience that a rally would be held immediate-
19 This  resolution  was  submitted  by  a  faculty  group,  called  the 
“Committee of 200.”
20 No one was to speak except Scalapino himself and Kerr.
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ly  after  the  meeting.  Nearly  10,000  people  jammed 
Sproul Plaza for the rally at which FSM leaders urged 
the students to continue the strike.  The Greek Theatre 
convocation had been a disaster for the administration 
and its faculty supporters.
The FSM disbanded after free speech was won; but it 
was  temporarily  reactivated  by  the  administration’s 
attempt  to  repress  a  small  group  of  individuals  who 
insisted on using the campus as an arena for expressing 
their  right  to  use  obscene  words  in  public.  The  FSM 
leaders felt they had to back these students even though 
comparisons with their fight, in that context, belittled the 
gravity of  the  FSM’s  political  aims.  The mass  media, 
however,  had  a  field  day:  It  convinced the  California 
electorate that the FSM, whose name was now converted 
to  the  “Filthy  Speech  Movement,”  was  comprised  of 
irresponsible individuals who defied traditional values. 
The  Regents  entered  the  fray  and  Ronald  Reagan—
known later  as  the  “Teflon”  president,  because  of  his 
ability  to  survive  awful  scandals—capitalized  on  this 
incident  by  promising  the  electorate  to  clean  up  “the 
mess” in Berkeley.
Despite these threats, the FSM movement was repro-
duced  at  other  UC  campuses,  where  students  were 
equally impervious to McCarthyism and the hypocritical 
morality of administrators and politicians. A 1967 Unit-
ed States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee’s report 
on Communist Activity, for instance, attributed the stu-
dent protests at UC Los Angeles to a Communist plot, 
aimed at  undermining troops in Vietnam. Nonetheless, 
the report  “attracted more of a yawn than a yell  from 
leaders on campus,” according to the student newspaper, 
UCLA Daily Bruin.  Ross Altman, leader of the campus 
chapter of SDS, said the government was trying to “de-
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fine all revolution, organizing or protesting out of exis-
tence by calling it Communist.” Mike Zeli, former editor 
of the Daily Bruin, sarcastically added, “As a member of 
the ‘Left’ I’m insulted that the Communists are getting 
all the credit for what we do.”21
As anti-war activities took priority,  a UCB teach-in 
was scheduled to encourage participation in the “Stop 
the Draft Week” demonstrations. To block the teach-in, 
Alameda County supervisors got a court injunction ban-
ning the use of university property advocating draft law 
violations.22 But  the  ban backfired.  Thousands  of  stu-
dents were once more ready to defend the right to orga-
nize  on  campus  to  support  off-campus  activities, 
including civil disobedience. On Monday, the first day 
of “Stop the Draft Week,” 6000 students protested the 
war at an unofficial rally in Sproul Plaza. On “bloody 
Tuesday,”  3,000  students—including  criminology  stu-
dents—joined  other  demonstrators  to  shut  down  the 
Oakland  Induction  Center.  By  Thursday,  more  than 
10,000 demonstrators were defying the police. Up to and 
including  Friday,  students  were  defending  themselves 
against the police violence by showing up with helmets, 
gas masks and shields. They pushed automobiles into the 
streets  leading  to  the  induction  center  and  punctured 
tires  to  block  busloads  of  inductees.23 Police  chased 
“mobile units” of students that would suddenly disperse 
and then reform at  prearranged locations to  renew at-
tempts to halt the Center’s operation.
By 1969, student movement demands at Berkeley had 
21 “Campus Reaction: Reds on Campus Report  –  ‘unsuccessful’ 
‘irresponsible.’”  UCLA Daily Bruin, Summer Edition, Thursday 
23, 1966, p. 1.
22 This law was the Universal Military Training and Service Act.
23 Many shields were made of garbage can lids.
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increased. Feminist, Asian and Black Power movements 
urged the creation of an ethnic studies department and 
implementation  of  affirmative  action  for  women  and 
third-world people in student admissions and faculty hir-
ing,  especially  for  professional  schools.24 The  Black 
Power movement raised the ante, calling for the creation 
of a black college.  The anti-war movement denounced 
the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. It 
discredited faculty who supported nuclear-weapons de-
velopment25 or who were consultants and researchers for 
the CIA, State Department and Department of Defense 
(DOD) such as Irving Teller, Paul Seabury and Robert 
Scalapino.26 The movement demanded an end to DOD-
sponsored research. 
24 For example, in 1970, women comprised only 2.3 percent of all 
full professors at Berkeley. In 1973, the ratio had not improved. In 
fact, “larger proportions of women held lower positions lacking 
both tenure and status.” (Public Affairs Report:  Bulletin of  the  
Institute of  Government  Studies V.  14, December 1973, No.  6, 
p.2). Three years later, in 1976, the Committee on Senate Policy 
reported to the Academic Senate that only a limited number of 
departments  were  treating  the  issue  of  gender  discrimination 
seriously  rather  than  taking  refuge  behind  the  myth  that 
affirmative  action  is  “counter-productive  to  the  quest  for 
excellence.” (Report of the Committee on Senate Policy State of  
the Campus Message, Meeting of the Berkeley Division, Monday, 
April 26, 1976.
25 In Berkeley at War in the Sixties, New York: Oxford University 
Press,  p.  169,  an  historian,  W.  J.  Rorabaugh notes:  “No  other 
university  conducted  so  much  government  sponsored  nuclear 
research,  required  its  regents  to  deal  with  so  many  matters 
requiring  security  clearances,  or  found  it  necessary  to  seal 
permanently  a  room  in  a  campus  building  after  it  was 
contaminated with radioactive material,” 
26 Scalapino  and  Seabury’s  active  support  of  the  administration 
against  the  FSM  was  undoubtedly  motivated  by  anti-war 
denunciations throughout the Vietnam War period.
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A generation that did not live through this historical 
period may not fully understand how horrible and de-
praved the United States leadership was in dragging the 
country into the War. For example, President Johnson’s 
attempt to make North Vietnam the culprit did not fool 
many  students  at  that  time.  Previously,  he  had gotten 
Congress to back his undeclared war because of a sup-
posed attack  by  North  Vietnam on an  American  war-
ship27 He  then  sent  the  first  combat  units—two 
battalions of Marines—into South Vietnam to protect the 
Danang airbase from Northern forces who had allegedly 
infiltrated the South. However, the Tet Offensive in 1968 
showed how deceitful he had been. Over 70,000 Viet-
cong troops—the armed forces of the National Front for 
the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF)—had launched 
the Offensive and had attacked 100 South Vietnamese 
cities.  Although they cooperated with Northern forces, 
these troops were not under Northern command. In fact, 
McNamara eventually confessed that the Tet Offensive 
was actually launched against the advice of North Viet-
nam. 
Since the Tet  Offensive,  despite  its  magnitude,  had 
taken the United States by surprise, it demonstrated that 
the  military  had  grossly  underestimated  its  enemy.  It 
also showed that the United States government had mis-
informed the  public  about  possible  costs  in  American 
lives. While many Americans shared racist and national-
ist sentiments that made them indifferent to Vietnamese 
27 Congress  passed  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  Resolution,  which  gave 
Johnson  defacto  approval  even  though  the  war  remained 
undeclared.  McNamara  later  confessed  that  the  Naval  vessel 
might not have been attacked; its officers may have interpreted 
matters incorrectly. See Robert S. McNamara, Argument Without  
End : In Search Of Answers To The Vietnam Tragedy. New York: 
Public Affairs, 1999, p. 167.
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deaths, they were concerned about American casualties. 
The war no longer appeared winnable without unaccept-
able cost. Furthermore, no quick fix seemed available. 
International  sentiments  and the Soviets  prevented the 
employment of American nuclear weapons, and sending 
Americans into North Vietnam promised to bring China 
into the war. It portended losses as large or larger than 
those incurred in North Korea when the Chinese over-
whelmed  American  troops  and  forced  them  from  the 
Manchurian border back to the 38th parallel.
To understand the increasing outrage felt by anti-war 
students, the government did not stop at this point. In the 
aftermath of the Offensive, the United States military de-
ployed conventional weapons of mass destruction. It re-
sorted  to  massive bombing runs  aimed at  annihilating 
the civilian support for the NLF. American forces target-
ed North Vietnam as well. Because it had unsurpassed 
technological superiority and could employ its air power 
without politically significant losses, the United States 
dropped  more  bombs  on  Vietnam  (a  country  smaller 
than France) than had been dropped in the European and 
Mediterranean  Theatres  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
Second  World  War.28 From 1967 through 1969,  about 
four-and-a-half-million tons of bombs were dropped—
about 500 pounds of bombs for every man, woman and 
child in Vietnam.
28 This estimation does not include artillery.  After analyzing US 
ordinance  reports,  Noam Chomsky says,  “The total  number  of 
artillery  shells  fired  by  US  troops  in  South  Vietnam  in  1966 
exceeded those fired by US forces during the whole of the Second 
World War.” See, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd., 1971, 
Prevent the Crime of  Silence: Reports from the sessions of the  
International War Crimes Tribunal founded by Bertrand Russell. 
(Eds.) Peter Limqueco and Peter Weiss (with additional material 
selected  and  edited  by  Ken  Coates  and  a  Foreword  by  Noam 
Chomsky).
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The devastation wrought by the United States was as-
tounding. According to the Bertrand Russell War Crimes 
tribunal held in Sweden and Denmark, ferocious bomb-
ing in 1966 targeted North Vietnam’s major cities such 
as  Haiphong,  Vinh,  Nam  Dinh,  Viet  Tri  and  Thai 
Nguyen. Against Hanoi, the Northern capital, the Ameri-
cans  dropped countless  antipersonnel  bombs that  each 
released several hundred pellets to kill or wound all liv-
ing creatures within two-thirds of a square mile—even 
in the most densely populated parts of the city. Twenty-
five provincial cities were bombed—six of which were 
completely razed. The city of Dong Hoi—covering an 
area of 3.2 sq. kilometers, and with 16,000 inhabitants—
was bombed 396 times, including 160 night attacks. Of 
the 110 district centers, 72 were bombed, leaving 12 of 
them left in ruins and 25 completely destroyed.
Such bombing, as indicated, was not restricted to the 
North. In the South, civilians and their social and eco-
nomic  infrastructure  were  also  hit.  Schools,  hospitals, 
clinics  and  churches  were  bombed.  High  explosive 
bombs,  fragmentation  bombs,  napalm  bombs  and  an-
tipersonnel bombs pounded regions occupied by the Vi-
etcong. United States forces dropped herbicides and so-
called “defoliants” that destroyed hundreds of thousands 
of  farming acres.  Meanwhile,  United  States  troops on 
the  ground  threw  suffocating  “tear  gases”  and  other 
chemical weapons into shelters and underground tunnels 
where women and children hid from bombs and artillery 
shells. This country’s South Vietnamese allies used poi-
son gas as well. On returning from a session with Presi-
dent Johnson and his advisors in 1967, John Naughton, 
an Assistant Secretary of Defense, admitted: “We seem 
to be proceeding on the assumption that the way to erad-
icate the Vietcong is to destroy all the village structures, 
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defoliate all the jungles, and then cover the entire sur-
face of South Vietnam with asphalt.”29
Unfortunately,  neither  the  Nuremberg  Tribunal  nor 
the Geneva Conventions provided unequivocal standards 
for  determining  whether  the  civilian  casualties  would 
represent collateral damage or war crimes. For example, 
the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, General Telford Tay-
lor (1972: 208), noted in Vietnam an American Tragedy, 
that Nuremberg (and Tokyo) precedents would not have 
prohibited the aerial bombardment of Vietnam. Amazing 
as it may seem, these precedents did not necessarily por-
tray this kind of warfare as a crime. The Allies who ad-
ministered  the  Nuremberg  trials  and  their  victor’s 
justice,  relying on the mitigating standard of “military 
necessity,” had never considered the bombing of Dres-
den,  Tokyo,  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  as  war  crimes. 
How then could Nuremberg justifiably be used to con-
demn the bombardment of Hue or Hanoi, for instance? 
Of course, Taylor granted that military necessity could 
hardly be invoked for Dresden just when the Russians 
were poised to seize the city or Nagasaki when surrender 
negotiations were virtually over.30 But Arthur “Bomber” 
Harris, who ordered the British and American bombers 
to drop 650,000 incendiary bombs and high explosives 
on Dresden (producing a firestorm that immolated or as-
phyxiated more than 35,000 civilians) and the American 
politicians and generals who ordered the atom bomb that 
killed  more  than  100,000  civilians  in  Nagasaki,  were 
never put on trial at Nuremberg. 
29 Quoted in Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, p. 28-29.
30 Both  of  these  were  “open  cities”  and,  because  they  lacked 
military  targets;  were  only  lightly  defended.  Moreover,  the 
railroad yard and Shell Oil tanks in Dresden, which might have 
been considered military targets, were not bombed.
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Still,  during  the  “25  days  of  horror”  inflicted  in 
March  1968  in  response  to  the  Tet  Offensive,  United 
States bombers reduced Hue, a city occupied by the Vi-
etcong, to rubble. Further atrocities—such as the My Lai 
massacre and the systematic torture and execution of po-
litical  dissenters  and  prisoners  of  war—demonstrated 
how far United States troops and their South Vietnamese 
allies were willing to go in violating elementary rules of 
war.  The  “carpet  bombing,”  “free  fire  zones”  and 
“search and destroy” missions employed by the United 
States were comparable to  the genocidal  warfare con-
ducted by Europeans and their descendants against Na-
tive Americans in North America. 
United  States  campaigns  were  also  comparable  to 
crimes committed by Nazi Germany in occupied nations. 
The NLF controlled most of the territory of South Viet-
nam.31 To wrest territorial control, the US forcibly de-
populated NLF regions through so-called “pacification 
campaigns.”  After  investigating  the  “pacification”  of 
Kien  Hao  in  the  Mekong  Delta,  for  instance,  Kevin 
Buckley,  a  Saigon  bureau  chief  for  Newsweek,  dis-
closed:
All the evidence I gathered pointed to a clear 
conclusion:  a  staggering  number  of 
noncombatant civilians – perhaps as many 
as 5,000 according to  one official  –  were 
killed by US firepower to ‘pacify’ Kien Hoa. 
The  death  total  there  made  the  My  Lai 
31 The Pentagon Papers, discussed in Chapter 5, showed that the 
insurgents would have won a democratic election if the US had 
not  sabotaged  the  1954  Geneva  settlement  and  cease-fire 
agreement between the French and Vietminh (which represented 
insurgents throughout Vietnam).
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massacre look trifling by comparison. 32
After terrorizing and killing people in these regions, the 
US forcibly relocated tens of thousands of men, women 
and children in detention camps near urban centers. Si-
multaneously, secret CIA operations such as the Phoenix 
Program assassinated over 20,000 suspected NLF guer-
rillas, many of them innocent civilians.
As these appalling events came to light, the anti-war 
movement  exploded.  The  first  national  “Mobilization 
Against  the  War”  committee  (MOB)  was  formed  in 
1966. In the spring of 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr. led 
nearly  half-a-million  anti-war  protesters  from  Central 
Park to  the United Nations headquarters in New York 
City. Another 145,000 demonstrated outside a New York 
City foreign policy banquet addressed by Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk. Demonstrations erupted in other cities 
as the Defense Department  announced its  plans  to in-
crease the numbers of US troops in Vietnam. By the end 
of  the  year,  more  than  half-a-million  Americans  were 
fighting in Vietnam.
The anti-war movement at UC Berkeley replaced the 
FSM as the chief organizing center of political dissent. A 
student  Mobilization  Committee  Against  the  War  was 
also established that year. This Committee did not con-
fine  itself  to  McNamara’s  “dirty  war”  in  Southeast 
Asia.33 Voices were also raised against crimes committed 
32 Quoted in Hitchens, op cit. p. 31.
33 Anyone  still  convinced  that  the  Vietnam  War  was  justified 
should  read  McNamara’s  recollections,  published  in  1999.  He 
called the war ‘a mistake.’ He said (p.22) it was started by the US 
because he and other government leaders believed in the ‘domino 
theory,’ which never proved true, and because they had  wrongly 
believed North Vietnam leaders were Soviet puppets. What they 
actually  found,  was  “a  war  in  the  South  [Vietnam]  that  was 
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in Africa and other parts of the world. The State Depart-
ment and CIA had created monsters such as Idi Amin in 
Uganda and General Mobutu in Zaire while subverting, 
imprisoning or killing national-liberation leaders includ-
ing Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, Kwame Nkrumah in 
Ghana and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Intelligence 
agencies and United States military policies had propped 
up or installed homicidal regimes in Southern Rhodesia, 
Portuguese  Angola,  Mozambique,  Guinea-Bissau  and 
South Africa. 
Some  links  between  the  Berkeley  faculty  and  the 
harms committed by government agencies turned out to 
be extraordinary. While the United States secretly armed 
the Indonesian military, for instance, one Berkeley facul-
ty member, Guy Pauker, was a consultant for a CIA-sub-
sidized  “think  tank,”  the  Rand  Corporation.  Pauker 
urged his contacts in the Indonesian military to assassi-
nate President Sukarno because his policy of “national 
conciliation” included the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI). The CIA helped destabilize the Indonesian econo-
my as a result  of an official  State Department recom-
mendation in 1962, which Pauker helped write. Then a 
special Military Training Advisory Group was set up in 
Jakarta to set  the stage for the 1965 assassination and 
coup. Finally, Suharto, the dictator installed by the mili-
tary, ruthlessly initiated what the CIA itself  has called 
“one of the worst mass murders in the 20th century.” Al-
most a million Indonesians were massacred. During the 
slaughter, observers reported rivers running with blood, 
filled with corpses of men, women and children, killed 
because they were family or friends of people supporting 
the PKI.34
fundamentally a war among southerners” (p. 418). 
34 Scott, Peter Dale. 1985. “The United States and the Overthrow 
 54 |   WHO KILLED THE BERKELEY SCHOOL?
Furthermore,  other  Berkeley faculties  were accused 
of conducting chemical and biological warfare research. 
In 1969, for example, the UCB Radical Student Union 
(RSU) published  information  on the  Naval  Biological 
Laboratory  (NBL),  which  was  administered  by  the 
School of Public Health (SPH) under terms of a contract 
between the UCB Regents and the Office of Naval Re-
search (ONR). It listed, among other principal investiga-
tors at ONR, Sanford Elberg, Professor of Public Health 
and Dean of Berkeley’s Graduate Division. (Incidentally, 
Elberg  helped  determine  the  fate  of  the  Criminology 
School’s graduate program.)35 In 1961, NBL-ONR had 
sponsored the 1st International Symposium on Aerobiol-
ogy, including artificial airborne transmission of anthrax 
and primary pneumonic plague, which is more infectious 
and virulent than the bubonic plague. The 2nd Sympo-
sium was sponsored by Fort Detrick, the Army Center 
for biological warfare research.
of Sukarno, 1965–67.” Public Affairs, 58 (Summer) pp. 239–264. 
See Gabriel Kolko,  Confronting the Third World: United States  
Foreign  Policy,  1945–1980 (New York:  Pantheon,  1988),  180–
191;  Kathy  Kadane,  “US  Officials’  Lists  Aided  Indonesian 
Bloodbath in ‘60’s,”  Washington Post (May 21, 1990): A5; and 
Roger Kerson, “The Embassy’s Hit List,”  Columbia Journalism 
Review,  29  (November-December  1990):  9–14.  A  leading 
Indonesian  security  official,  Admiral  Sudomo,  has  given  an 
estimate  of  around  500,000.  See  Robert  Cribb,  ed.,  The 
Indonesian  Killings,  1956  (Clayton,  Victoria:  Monash  Asia 
Institute, 1990), esp. 7–14. According to former CIA agent John 
Stockwell,  the  CIA  estimated  the  total  death  toll  from  the 
anticommunist  killings at  800,000;  Harper’s (September 1984): 
p.42.
35 The RSU listed six professors and lecturers from the School of 
Health  who  worked  on  projects  connected  with  the  NBL as 
researchers and administrators. It also noted that NBL conducted 
research for Fort Detrick. See Radical Student Union, The Uses of  
UC Berkeley: Research. Berkeley: RSU 1969, pp. 21-30.
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It may be hard to believe that any faculty member on 
the UCB campus would be involved in this anti-human 
enterprise. Nevertheless, Theodore Rosebury, Professor 
of Bacteriology at the University of Illinois and former 
chief  of  airborne  infection project  at  Fort  Detrick,  re-
portedly observed, “It’s clear to anyone in the field that 
they’re doing Chemical and Biological Warfare research 
at Berkeley.”36
How in the world could the most conscientious Crim-
inology  students  and  faculty,  whose  very  subject  was 
crime, remain silent in the face of these developments? 
These people participated in one demonstration after an-
other,  especially  as  war  crimes committed  in  Vietnam 
came to light.37 One such crime especially stands out. 
The men, women and children inhabitants of My Lai, a 
Vietnamese village, for instance, had been massacred in 
1968 by American troops  who were ordered to destroy 
the village and everything in it. Even though the troops 
landing by helicopter outside the village were never con-
fronted by enemy fire, the villagers were mowed down 
and their homes burned to the ground. Reports noted that 
bodies of men, women and children were lying every-
where. Just outside the village, a correspondent who wit-
nessed the killing, reported, “There was this big pile of 
bodies. This really tiny little kid—he had only a shirt on, 
nothing else—he came over to the pile and held the hand 
of one of the dead. One of the GIs behind me dropped 
36 Ibid.
37 Photographs and descriptions of these atrocities were repeatedly 
disclosed by the mass media. In addition, the Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War in 1972 published an inquiry into American war 
crimes  (The  Winter  Soldier  Investigation,  New  York:  Beacon 
Press)  that  contained  eyewitness  accounts  from  80  Vietnam 
veterans of such things as torture and executions of prisoners of 
war and the rape and slaughter of civilians.
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into a kneeling position,  30 meters from this  kid,  and 
killed him with a single shot.”38
Finally, the radicals were revolted by the hypocrisy, 
corruption and “high crimes and misdemeanors” exhibit-
ed  at  top  levels  of  government.  President  Nixon  was 
guilty of impeachable offenses—not because he had sex 
with an intern—but because he sanctioned illegal sup-
pression  of  political  opponents  and  requisitioned  bur-
glaries, illegal phone taps, money laundering and other 
criminal activities aimed at subverting political dissent 
and democratic elections. Vice President Spiro Agnew, 
who was eventually convicted of bribe taking, repeated-
ly posed with Nixon as a champion of “law and order.” 
As the Criminology School was being set up for the kill, 
the  former  UC Regent,  H.R.  Haldeman,  and Attorney 
General John N. Mitchell were spilling the beans about 
their involvement in the Watergate Conspiracy.39 
Certainly, many at the School were not radicalized by 
these events.  Certainly,  some students  and faculty ob-
jected to those who were because they themselves sup-
ported the war. Still others who were fearful or apolitical 
went no farther than signing a petition or complaining 
that the radicals interfered with their careers or educa-
tion.  Reminded years later  about  their  responses,40 we 
recalled a story told about Ralph Waldo Emerson and his 
friend, Henry David Thoreau, who had been jailed for 
38 The  Army  suppressed  both  the  photographs  taken  by  Ron 
Haeberle (LIFE, December 5, 1969), who also accompanied the 
landing, and an eyewitness account for 12 months before Joseph 
Eszterhas,  a  Cleveland  Plain  Dealer reporter,  exposed  the 
massacre in 1969.
39 Mitchell was Attorney General from 1969-72. He was disbarred 
in 1975 after conviction in the Watergate case.
40 See, for example, Geis, op. cit. and Morn, op. cit.
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opposing the war against Mexico by refusing to pay tax-
es. On seeing Thoreau behind bars, Emerson exclaimed, 
“Henry, what are you doing in there?” Thoreau replied, 
“What are you doing out there?”

4 |  “Pigs Off Campus!”
uring the “Third World Strike,” when the Asian, 
Hispanic and Black Power movements attempted 
to force concessions from the university administration, 
sociologist Rodney Stark wrote, 
D
Police periodicals, pamphlets, and manuals, 
as well as the pronouncements of prominent 
police  spokesmen,  are  unanimous  in 
attributing the student  demonstrations to a 
sinister and subversive conspiracy.1
He observed that the most widely cited and “authorita-
tive” police report on the 1964 FSM activities at Berke-
ley  had  been  prepared  with  the  aid  of  then  Berkeley 
Police Chief Addison H. Fording and published in the 
Police Chief, the official publication of the International 
Association of Chiefs  of  Police.  This  report  attributed 
the FSM demonstrations to the “guiding hand of com-
munists and extreme leftists.”2
Still, to fully appreciate how the police responded to 
1  Rodney Stark, “Protest+Police=Riot,” In (Eds.) James McEvoy 
& Abraham Miller, Black Power and Student Rebellion, Belmont 
California: Wadsworth publishing Co. 1969, pp. 167-96.
2  April 1965, p. 10. 
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dissidents at Berkeley, we can compare it to a case in 
which Cornell President James A. Perkins, at great cost 
to himself, defied Sindler and his coterie. Despite unlaw-
ful  acts  by Black Power Cornell  students,  Perkins did 
everything possible to keep the police off campus. The 
Cornell situation was well known to students on other 
campuses. When this case is kept in mind, it will be easi-
er to grasp student reactions to police at UC Berkeley.
OPERATING PRINCIPLES & MORAL CONFLICTS
While constructing an ideological defense for disciplin-
ing students at Cornell, Sindler and his coterie formulat-
ed  two  important  moral  rationales.  The  first  rationale 
centered  on  the  so-called  threat  to  academic  freedom 
posed by anti-war and Black Power movements. The an-
ti-war movement unintentionally triggered this  type of 
rationale when Averell Harriman, the United States am-
bassador to South Vietnam, came to speak at  Cornell. 
Prior to his appearance, around 3000 students and facul-
ty members had attended Cornell’s first teach-in on the 
war. When Harriman arrived, the anti-war protestors dis-
rupted his speech, deprived him of the microphone and 
insulted him as an imperialist agent. Although students 
did not relate this incident to academic freedom, faculty 
opposed to  the  disruption  justified  their  stand on this 
ground.3 Faculty considered the disruption of Harriman’s 
speech a clear violation of academic freedom.
This faculty added “the rule of law” to their rationales 
for  disciplining  the  protesters.  As  students  (and  some 
faculty) continued to break university rules of conduct 
by disrupting the annual review of the ROTC, blocking 
3 Donald  Alexander  Downs,  Cornell  ’69:  Liberalism  And  The  
Crisis  Of  The  American  University. Ithaca:  Cornell  University 
Press, p. 37.
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Marine recruiters, and so on, the university judicial sys-
tem lost  its legitimacy with many at  the university. In 
light of the great harms committed in the Vietnam War, 
protesters  believed  that  university  disciplinary  actions 
against their “direct actions” were immoral. Still, while 
protesters took this stand to achieve a higher moral end, 
the advocates of law-and-order eventually demanded the 
defense of the rule of law—by police if necessary.
The conflict at Cornell intensified as draft boards vin-
dictively reclassified students who openly protested the 
war.  When  students  burned  draft  cards  in  anti-war 
demonstrations, their names were supplied to the boards 
by Cornell proctors. Bruce Dancis, a Cornell undergrad-
uate, was the first SDS member in the nation to destroy 
his draft card; and his act galvanized resistance to the 
war throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Johnson ad-
ministration began to retaliate on a national level against 
students by removing their draft deferments if they par-
ticipated  in  anti-war  demonstrations.  These  events 
blurred the distinction between preservation of “the rule 
of law” through the enforcement of university conduct 
rules, and suppression of political dissent by government 
agencies.
As the crisis in adjudication of campus misconduct 
deepened, Cornell, ostensibly in the interest of fairness, 
commissioned Sindler and others to reconstitute the stu-
dent  conduct  code.4 The  Sindler  Commission  proudly 
announced, “The University’s primary objective should 
not be law enforcement, which was the proper concern 
of public authority.” Rather, the university should “pro-
4  The “Sindler Commission,” as it  was called,  made pioneering 
changes, according to Donald A. Downs, because it rejected the 
patronizing principle of in loco parentis which had governed the 
previous code. 
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tect the opportunity of all members of the Cornell com-
munity to pursue their educational goals effectively.”5 
The Commission’s revisions, according to Donald A. 
Downs, author of a book about Cornell in 1969, were 
not considered “liberal” or “conservative.” Nonetheless, 
Douglas  Dowd,  a  left-wing economics  professor,  later 
criticized the judicial changes as unfair to students in po-
litical and racial cases. Others were annoyed at the lack 
of concrete guidelines. While the conflict  between the 
judicial  system and the anti-war movement had led to 
the establishment of the Sindler Commission, it provided 
abstract principles and changes in how violations were 
processed.6 Yet, it did little or nothing to ameliorate the 
conflict itself. Cornell counsel Neil Stamp said: “This is 
one  of  the  things  that  really  disgusted  me  about  the 
Sindler  Commission.  There were all  these philosophic 
statements, but it didn’t come down to something specif-
ic that would give us a road map.” 
Ironically, the Black Power movement intervened and 
kicked  the  Commission’s  innovations  and  its  “rule  of 
law” overboard. The time was ripe, and student activists 
ignored the Commission’s abstractions. Resonating with 
civil-rights  movements  throughout  the  nation,  the  stu-
dent-run African American Society (AAS) set off events 
culminating in the 1969 occupation of Willard Straight 
Hall.  Demanding  the  creation  of  a  black-studies  pro-
gram,  the  AAS  became  increasingly  impatient  as  the 
work of the Committee responsible for a black-studies 
program dragged on. Several AAS members attended a 
black-power conference at Harvard and concluded that 
5  Downs, op. cit., p. 67-8.
6  It is reminiscent of Tocqueville’s comment about an American: 
“His ideas are all either extremely minute and clear, or extremely 
general and vague: what lies between is a void.”
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only  an  autonomous  black  college  would  meet  their 
needs. Forty AAS members then raised this demand and 
refused to recognize the committee already charged with 
organizing a black-studies program. They formed a new 
committee consisting of themselves, and forcibly evicted 
personnel from the building slated to house the black-s-
tudies program. Subsequently, black students were cited 
for  waving  toy  guns  in  the  cafeteria  and  overturning 
vending machines,  for conducting a sit-in at  President 
Perkins’s office, for running through the medical clinic, 
dancing on tables  in  the  Straight’s  main  dining  room, 
and removing books from library shelves and dumping 
them at  circulation  desks.  Some AAS students  moved 
cushions from another building to the building assigned 
to house the black-studies program. The cushions were 
eventually  returned  and  restitution  was  made  for  the 
cafeteria  vandalism;  nevertheless,  the  Cornell  student 
Conduct Board cited the students for improper conduct.
After  negotiating  for  days,  President  Perkins,  who 
seemed to have the patience of Job, convinced the AAS 
that an autonomous black college was not possible.7 Fur-
thermore, by the time the Willard Straight incident oc-
curred,  only  five  student  reprimands  were  being 
contested,  due  to  the  remarkable  forbearance  and  pa-
tience of the university administration. 
Toward the end of 1968, the AAS finally agreed to 
work with an administrative spokesman who headed a 
new committee on black studies. With the failure of the 
black college strategy, a moderate faction took command 
of the AAS, hoping to unite the black students behind a 
less confrontational posture. Still, while a blow-up was 
7  A black student on one occasion grabbed Perkins by the collar 
during  negotiations  but  this  student  and  his  companion  were 
expelled for this assault from the AAS.
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for the time being averted, the AAS continued to hold 
demonstrations  for  an  autonomous  black-studies  pro-
gram.8
In March 1969, the university judicial board affirmed 
the principles of the judicial system and stated its ratio-
nale for adjudicating the AAS students. Thereupon, five 
students were ordered to appear at a judicial hearing or 
face possible suspension; but they failed to appear.
White student protesters now complicated the scene. 
They disrupted on-campus recruiters for Chase Manhat-
tan Bank to protest its dealings with South Africa. A spe-
cial administration committee declined to charge these 
students and, although its decision was actually driven 
by  faculty  outrage  toward  the  policy  of  apartheid  in 
South Africa, the AAS denounced the committee’s deci-
sion as racial favoritism toward whites.
The AAS denunciation was ignored, and the adminis-
tration, at an emergency meeting, called for faculty sup-
port  in the face of a breakdown of order.  The faculty 
voted 306–229 to support the judicial board’s citations 
of the five AAS members. Thereupon, 150 students ap-
peared  in  place  of  the  cited  students  before  a  student 
Conduct Board and protested its legitimacy. The Board 
announced  that  the  suspensions  of  the  cited  students 
would  be  held  “in  abeyance”  and  asked  the  Faculty 
Committee  on  Student  Conduct  (FCSC),  which  re-
viewed  cases  decided  by  the  Board,  for  assistance  in 
reaching a final decision. The FCSC published a lengthy 
report supporting the Board that again asked the defen-
dants to appear after the spring break. At this point, in a 
possibly unrelated occurrence, three white students were 
8  Autonomy in this context seemed to mean greater student control 
over  the  selection  of  its  Chair  and  the  organization  of  the 
program.
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assaulted on campus  at  night.  Two identified their  at-
tackers as black.  The third remembered nothing about 
the  attack  because he  was beaten  unconscious;  he  re-
mained  comatose  for  several  days  and  suffered  brain 
damage. The culprits were not identified and may not 
have been students.
A month  later,  Cornell  Trustees  voted  to  fund  an 
Afro-American studies center in which students would 
have  considerable  decision-making  power.  Regardless, 
in that same month, the AAS published a statement pre-
senting  its  case  against  the  judicial  system.  The AAS 
student defendants were finally tried in absentia and the 
Conduct Board issued reprimands to three students. (The 
other  two  had  left  the  university.)  Shortly  thereafter, 
false alarms broke out in dormitories. Within an hour a 
cross was burned in front of Waring House,  the black 
women’s residence. The relations between the AAS and 
university authorities had broken down, and the occupa-
tion of Willard Straight Hall followed.
During the evening of the occupation, Delta Upsilon 
fraternity members broke into the Straight from a side 
window,  but  were  repelled.  AAS  allies  outside  then 
brought weapons into the building, transforming the oc-
cupation into a completely new ballgame.
Despite the AAS “resort to arms,” thousands of Cor-
nell  students  supported  the  black  students.  At  a  mass 
meeting,  six thousand students  raised their  fists  in  re-
sponse to a black leader, asking them who would sup-
port  black students that night if  they occupied Barlow 
Hall. However, other leaders informed the assembly that 
the  faculty  council  had  asked  the  Senate  to  hold  an 
emergency meeting the next day to provide an opportu-
nity to reverse the previous faculty approval of the repri-
mands  against  the  black  students.  In  light  of  this 
 66 |   WHO KILLED THE BERKELEY SCHOOL?
information,  the  student  assembly  decided  to  delay 
“moving in on the university” en masse led by the AAS. 
By delaying that move, they gave the faculty an opportu-
nity to forestall dangerous consequences such as inter-
vention by police and state troopers—and a riot in the 
Cornell ghetto.9
The following day, thousands of students stood out-
side the Arts quadrangle, awaiting the faculty decision. 
Some of the faculty who were against the student move-
ment  pointed  to  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  students. 
They declared that if guns, and threats to occupy build-
ings, were used to force the faculty to reverse itself on 
matters affecting the judicial system, they might be used 
to similar ends on matters affecting academic freedom. 
Other  faculty  members,  however,  felt  that  academic 
freedom had nothing to do with nullifying the Conduct 
Board’s reprimands.  Professor Eldon Kentworthy, who 
specialized  in  Latin  American  politics  and  who  wit-
nessed events as they unfolded, cynically observed:
There  is  certainly  truth  to  the  claim  that 
tactics  successful  in  one  arena  may  be 
transferred to another, or that once the hiring 
and firing of teachers or the choice of course 
content area [is] decided by plebiscite, the 
university  is  finished.  But  weren’t  the 
students trapped in a guilt-by-anticipation? 
How  did  the  faculty  know  they  couldn’t 
distinguish  academic  freedom issues  from 
others? Was this, in fact, not a sophisticated 
put-down,  a  way  of  preserving  faculty 
prerogatives on the whole range of issues in 
which academic freedom is not implicated 
or, if implicated, implicated in ways capable 
9  According to black students’ accounts.
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of more than the faculty’s interpretation?10
Students were angry, Kentworthy said, at the intrusion of 
the  academic  freedom issue  into  the  faculty  delibera-
tions. To justify this intrusion, he observed, several polit-
ical science and history professors claimed that they felt 
compelled to edit lectures or to avoid teaching certain 
subjects. However, these men seemed unable, according 
to Kentworthy, “to separate the essential  conditions of 
academic freedom from the more  nebulous  conditions 
for good teaching from the still broader conditions for 
faculty comfort.” Kentworthy, scornfully added,
What  we  on  the  faculty  failed  to  do,  I 
believe, was make clear our preference for 
not having to act heroically, as well as to 
convince  students  that,  given  this 
preference,  most  of  us  are  not  effective 
teachers  under  heroic  conditions.  These 
personal  and  pedagogical  needs,  however, 
were  swathed  in  the  glowing  rhetoric  of 
academic  freedom.  ‘Self-censorship’ 
provided the link between the two. Consider, 
for example, this statement by Alan Sindler 
in  a  paper  delivered  to  the  American 
Political  Science  Association  the  fall 
following the crisis:
Kentworthy  then  quoted  the  following  from Sindler’s 
paper:
When  the  environment  for  academic 
freedom  is  insufficiently  supportive,  as  it 
10 Eldon  Kentworthy,  “The  Non-Militant  Students.”  In  (eds.) 
Cushing Strout and David I. Grossvogel, Divided We Stand. New 
York: Doubleday, 1970, pp. 75-89. See p. 86-9.
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recently has become at Cornell, the typical 
accommodation of a faculty man will be to 
play it safe, to teach students what they want 
to hear and will accept. Such faculty self-
censorship  undercuts  academic  freedom 
more pervasively and effectively than do the 
more  dramatic  incidents  of  disrupting 
classrooms,  interrupting  speakers,  and  the 
like.
Sindler’s rationale was a coward’s gambit, because it le-
gitimated the intrusion of academic freedom into the fac-
ulty deliberations by appealing to cowardly sentiments. 
Granted,  the widespread self-censorship that accompa-
nies academic repression is appalling. And certainly, the 
terrorist tactics employed by Jones and Garner—who as-
saulted  Perkins  and  threatened  Sindler  and  his  col-
leagues with violent retribution—cannot in any setting 
be condoned.11 But appealing to cowardly sentiments to 
defend academic freedom has an unpleasant odor, espe-
cially in the context in which this appeal was made.
For example, Kentworthy suggested that Sindler was-
n’t truly addressing the situation at Cornell.  Instead of 
talking  realistically  about  teaching  conditions,  he  be-
lieved faculty members like Sindler
...either called up memories of the embattled 
leftist teachers of the McCarthy era or spun 
out  images  of  some  Newmanesque 
university  that  Cornell  never  was,  at  least 
not in the years I have known it. Forced to 
define the conditions for academic freedom, 
faculty  members  fell  back  on  elaborate 
abstractions which translated as “whatever 
11 Refer to the radio broadcast and threats.
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makes the faculty man comfortable.”
Kentworthy also noted that Sindler and others repeatedly 
resurrected  an  incident  involving  Professor  McPhelin, 
which occurred a year before the sit-in at Straight Hall, 
to prove the existence of a “fateful trend” opposing aca-
demic freedom and leading to the April events. McPhe-
lin  had  taught  an  introductory  economics  course  and 
black students had accused him of making racist inter-
pretations  and  remarks  while  referring  to  urban  poor 
people  and  conditions  accompanying  poverty.12 Also, 
when one of the black students questioned the relevance 
of a comparison of educational levels over time, McPhe-
lin ignored the question.13 After the class, the black stu-
dents demanded and received an apology from McPhelin 
that was expressed publicly at the next session but they 
also prepared a formal rebuttal that was read aloud over 
McPhelin’s objections. 
Escalation of this issue, which included the demand 
for a black speaker who could present the “other side,” 
led to the occupation, by about sixty mostly black stu-
dents, of the Department of Economics office, and to ne-
gotiations  with  the  administration  for  a  black-studies 
program.  When  McPhelin  resumed  lecturing  his  topic 
after the sit-in, racial aspects of poverty—which had ap-
peared in his original course outline—were omitted, os-
tensibly because he “was advised to stay off it.” 
The  McPhelin  incident  was  repeatedly  used  by 
12 In a lecture on poverty, Professor McPhelin reportedly referred 
to social conditions in slums, including a passing characterization 
of children’s games as “sick and perverse.”
13 After the session, Prof. McPhelin promised to publicly apologize 
for not answering the question to the entire class the next meeting. 
But this did not end the matter.
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Sindler and others to demonstrate the self-censorship ac-
companying the black students’ threat to academic free-
dom as well as the “fateful trend” leading to the April 
events.  But was this  incident  an appropriate example? 
Kentworthy didn’t think it was; he noted that while fac-
ulty  claimed  the  students  had  threatened  McPhelin’s 
freedom, they “failed to consider in that unhappy situa-
tion the academic freedom of McPhelin’s students had 
been as much at issue as that of the professor.”14
Indeed, a point can be made on the McPhelin incident 
by way of returning for just a moment to Berkeley and 
recalling teaching experiences at  the School of Crimi-
nology. During the rise of the Black Power movement, 
black  students  challenged  instructors  whenever  they 
sensed a racist comment—regardless whether they were 
right or not. On one occasion, a black student in one of 
Schwendinger’s  seminars  furiously  stalked  out  of  the 
room but returned after Schwendinger ran after him and 
convinced him to calm himself, and to return and contin-
ue the debate. On another occasion, a black student and 
Schwendinger  almost  came to blows over their  differ-
ences. But Schwendinger never believed these incidents 
ever threatened his freedom to speak his mind. He had 
obtained his bachelors toward the end of the Forties at 
The College of the City of New York, where students 
would  rush  to  the  library  to  get  information  to  argue 
with their professors the next day. The Berkeley School 
had  recaptured  the  vigorous  interactions  between  stu-
dents and teachers that made learning an extraordinary 
experience. In our opinion, McPhelin could have coura-
14 Kentworthy  added,  “Not  unsurprisingly,  the  Williams  poll 
discovered  that  62%  of  the  Cornell  faculty  defined  academic 
freedom in terms applicable to  the faculty alone,  while  only a 
fourth  included  a  more  than  token  student  component  in  their 
definition.”
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geously  affirmed  his  right  to  think  as  he  pleased.  He 
could  have stood up for  academic freedom, given the 
lecture  as  originally  planned and engaged in a  debate 
with the black students. 
Certainly, the 6000 or 7000 students, who had raised 
their fists in support of the black students the night be-
fore the faculty vote on nullification was taken, did not 
believe Sindler’s gambit was credible. They gave sup-
port because they sympathized with black students who 
had  become  fed  up  with  other  incidents:  the  burning 
cross placed in front of Waring House, a black women’s 
campus residence;15 the slow progress made toward the 
establishment of the black-studies program; and the Phi 
Delta Theta dance, which featured a black band but kept 
blacks out by requiring black students and blacks from 
the ghetto to pay while allowing whites to enter freely. 
When  students  compared  these  incidents  with  the  so-
called threat to academic freedom posed by the nullifica-
tion of three minor penalties, Sindler’s gambit lost  all 
credibility.
As  indicated,  Kentworthy  also  viewed these  events 
differently  than  Sindler.  When  Sindler  and  his  crowd 
employed the coward’s gambit, he wrote,
Confronted with the faculty’s inability either 
to  talk  convincingly  about  the  real 
psychological  conditions  for  effective 
teaching  or  to  include  in  the  abstract 
discussion of academic freedom recognition 
of  student  rights,  many  students  came  to 
view the whole issue as a red herring,  as 
merely  a  part  of  the  ideological 
15 Analysis  of  the  four  feet  by six  feet  cross  found that  it  was 
composed  of  the  same  type  of  wood  sold  in  the  College  arts 
supply store.
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superstructure  faculty  use  to  dismiss 
effective student pressure on any important 
issue.  Representative  of  this  view  is  a 
column [written by Mark Goldman] in the 
student newspaper, taking up this aspect of 
the April crisis from the perspective of ten 
months elapsed time.
After noting Goldman’s column, Kentworthy states,
Couched  in  classic  liberal  polemic, 
[Goldman’s]  arguments  reaffirming  the 
inviolability  of  academic  freedom  were 
attempts to defend and legitimize the power 
and position of the medieval oligarchs of the 
university—the  faculty.  Academic 
freedom ... represented an attempt to defend 
the  concept  of  privilege,  of  class  and  to 
perpetuate a basically autocratic view of the 
world  still  endemic  to  much  American 
thinking.16
The liberal rhetoric employed by Sindler touched on the 
final ambiguity of this affair. Sindler acclaimed, in the 
abstract, the rule of law and the principle of academic 
freedom.  But  were  these  abstractions  compatible  with 
his  take  on  the  Vietnam War  or  on  racial  inequality? 
What  would he say if  he were ordered to reconnoiter 
along Vietnamese trails trying hard not to step on our 
land mines  or  how would  he  justify  killing  a  peasant 
who is  encountered  along the  way? Would  an  ethical 
phase rule like “kill or be killed,” that most egotistical 
justification, be enough to assuage his guilt in the act of 
gutting a peasant with a bayonet or blowing him away? 
16 Mark Goldman, “On Academic Freedom,”  Cornell Daily Sun, 
February 20, 1970.
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Where  is  Sindler  as  a  human  being  who  talks  about 
moral absolutes and individual freedom when defending 
his  position,  but  says  nothing about  the  possibility  of 
their  negation  when  opposing  values—such  as  being 
forced to face death or killing Vietnamese in an unjust 
war—outweigh his professed principles? The defense of 
Sindler’s conduct at Cornell failed to depict him as a real 
human  being  whose  invocation  of  abstract  principles 
could never be taken at face value.
Donald A. Downs, in his book, Cornell ’69: Liberal-
ism & the Crisis of the American University,  comfort-
ably states,  “The abandonment of liberal  principles  of 
freedom by the majority of liberals  (for whatever rea-
sons) was a powerful subplot of the Cornell story.” In 
his scenario, “the chair of the Government Department, 
Allan Sindler, who became perhaps the most important 
faculty member in the entire yearlong affair” was among 
the small number of liberals who were willing to fight 
for academic freedom.” Yet we know very little about 
Sindler’s political attitudes. In Downs’ account, he is a 
tintype, portrayed as a heroic one-dimensional man con-
vinced about the sanctity of academic freedom. He ap-
pears to have no opinions that may moderate his belief 
in liberal  absolutes.  What about an equivocal commit-
ment? Would he defend academic freedom if the quin-
tessential  bureaucrat,  Adolph  Eichmann,  spoke  about 
genocide  at  Cornell?  How about  Joseph Stalin?  What 
about  the  ambassador  to  Vietnam,  Averell  Harriman? 
Should he be heard without protest when students who 
burned their  draft  cards  were being forced to  become 
cannon fodder in an imperialist  war? In the formulaic 
scenario presented by scholars who have depicted events 
at Cornell, everything is unambiguous because their pro-
tagonists are never fleshed out and the relative weight-
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ings of contradictory ethical mandates that resolve moral 
conflicts in the real world, however changeable by cir-
cumstance, are not exposed. 
Sindler,  according to Downs, predicted that Cornell 
‘69 “comprised a watershed event because of the intro-
duction of firearms.” It represented “the malaise of high-
er education, the declining self-confidence of academic 
men,  the  shattered  consensus  on  academic  values  and 
the relation of the university to society, the bias of facul-
ty in favor of the political Left, the conversion of white 
racial  guilt  and empathy to blacks to a  quite different 
posture  of  abdicating  judgment.”17 This  list  of  indict-
ments sounds so tragic a Homeric poet could have set it 
to verse. However, the real tragedy in Cornell’s so-called 
“capitulation” to armed rebels involved the dismissal of 
the President, Perkins, whose unbelievable patience and 
gentle manner had led Cornell through an extraordinari-
ly difficult time. He refused to expose the campus to the 
dangers of allowing law enforcement authorities to con-
trol student conduct on campus. In Berkeley, on the oth-
er  hand,  violent  encounters  with  police  in  1968–1969 
were even greater than before.
BACK TO B ERKELEY
While local police and state troopers were kept off the 
Cornell  campus,  nationally,  in 1968-1969, police were 
used on nearly 100 campuses, the National Guard on six. 
More than 4,000 demonstrators were arrested. At Texas 
Southern University and in Orangeburg, South Carolina, 
black students were shot and killed. The National Guard 
occupied the black ghetto of Wilmington, Delaware, for 
nine months. Over a thousand Black Panther Party mem-
17 Downs, op. cit., p. 306.
   “PIGS OFF CAMPUS!”  | 75 
bers were arrested in a nationally coordinated roundup. 
The two central events that year in Berkeley were the 
student strike led by the Third World Liberation Front 
(TWLF),  spearheaded  by  the  Asian  students  and  the 
Black  Student  Union,  which  demanded  the  establish-
ment of a Third World Studies department; and secondly, 
the destruction of People’s Park. Massive retaliatory vio-
lence  against  demonstrators  was  employed  in  both  of 
these events.
Rodney Stark, author of “Protest + Police = Riots,” 
concluded  from  on-the-scene  interviews  and  observa-
tions of the TWLF strike that police provoked the vio-
lence. His interviews indicate students were so enraged 
by the police brutality committed for years against stu-
dents that any incident bringing “the pigs” on campus 
would produce massive demonstrations regardless of the 
reasons police were summoned. Whatever the issue, the 
angry students threw stones, bottles and cherry bombs or 
picked up gas grenades and tossed them back at police. 
Stark observed, “Time and again the police were used 
with very little reason, and time and again their arbitrary, 
massive and too often brutal performance spread and in-
tensified the student discontent.” 
Stark illustrated this process with the strike called in 
January  1969  by  the  TWLF.  Composed  of  non-white 
students, the TWLF struck to protest delays in the cre-
ation of a black studies program. In the following days, 
an  ethnic  studies  program  and  an  autonomous  Third 
World College were added to the demands. Chancellor 
Heyns—like  President  Perkins  at  Cornell—met  the 
TWLF part  way, promising that the ethnic studies de-
mand would receive  positive  action  but  he refused  to 
speed up this process by altering normal committee pro-
cedures.
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Reportedly,  since the majority  of Berkeley students 
felt the administration was accommodating to the TWLF 
(and the strikers excluded whites from their meetings), 
campus-wide support  was minimal.  At most,  300 per-
sons  were  on  the  picket  lines  when  the  strike  began. 
Campus routines were not disrupted; many students en-
tered and left the campus without seeing a picket. Most 
students believed that the strike was primarily symbolic, 
merely showing solidarity with San Francisco State stu-
dents who were still supporting the TWLF in a long, bit-
ter  strike against  an implacable administration,  headed 
by President Hayakawa.
During  the  night  of  the  first  day  of  the  strike,  the 
largest  lecture  room on campus,  Wheeler  Auditorium, 
was torched. TWLF leaders denounced the arson and de-
nied all responsibility for it. Despite their anger, students 
were inclined to accept TWLF denials and put the blame 
on “crazies” among Telegraph Avenue “street people.” 
Still, the strike suffered from the Wheeler Hall fire. The 
number of pickets dropped off and the strike was sus-
pended for the weekend. It resumed on Monday; howev-
er, at this point, Stark exclaimed, “the incomprehensible 
occurred and a recurrent pattern was begun.” The TWLF 
adopted a more militant tactic, refusing to allow students 
or  faculty  to  pass  through  their  picket  line  at  Sather 
Gate.  Technically,  even  though  people  could  walk 
around the line rather than through it, this represented an 
obstruction of a public thoroughfare. So the picket line 
was declared illegal and off-campus police were sum-
moned.
Summoning the police reinvigorated the strike.  The 
following day, a thousand students marched around cam-
pus and joined the picket line. Summoned once again, 
the police dispersed the line. The next day, student sup-
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port doubled. More than 2,000 students joined the line. 
Again, the police were called. Now, however, two black 
students were arrested, including a black student leader, 
Jim Nabors, who, according to the TWLF, was simply 
walking from class carrying his briefcase. According to 
Stark, this arrest “created an odor of police bigotry.” (In 
the opinion of the authors of this study, it suggested that 
police were using information provided by the university 
administration  or  FBI  to  spot  and  arrest  TWLF lead-
ers.)18 
In the following days, the students fought back with 
rocks and bottles. They overturned two police vans and 
hurled tear gas canisters back at the police who also used 
pepper  foggers:  buzzing  machines  emitting  enormous 
clouds  of  gas.  Even  motorists  on  roads  adjoining  the 
campus were affected as they left their cars after being 
stopped by the gas and rioting. Students ran from the gas 
and  the  police  but  re-formed  and  demonstrated  else-
where on campus.
As the conflict went out of control, both strike leaders 
and the university tried to cool down the situation. Stark 
observed, 
But  unlike the University  of Chicago,  the 
Berkeley administration was not able to take 
many risks to preserve campus peace. The 
Regents,  led  by  Governor  Reagan,  an 
outspoken advocate of running campuses at 
‘the point of a bayonet,’ had been for some 
time  reducing  the  discretion  of  campus 
executive  officers  to  deal  with  protest—a 
process which was further accelerated later 
in the course of the crisis. One presumes that 
18 On another day, Nabors was again singled out, pinned to a bench 
and viciously beaten by several policemen.
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Chancellor  Heyns  was  under  terrific 
pressure to get tough and to use the police. 
To  make  matters  worse,  Heyns  had  no 
authority over outside police. He only had 
the power to decide whether to call them for 
aid in a given situation, but once called they 
were  completely  independent.  As  one 
campus  official  put  it,  ‘we  have only the 
power  of  persuasion  over  the  police,  but 
they’re not in much mood to be persuaded.’
Differing from The University of Chicago and Cornell, 
Berkeley was a  public  institution  where the  Governor 
could initiate police intervention. Even though the uni-
versity  administration and TWLF leaders  tried to  cool 
things down and the campus had become peaceful with-
out a police presence, Stark reported: “Alameda County 
Sheriff Frank Madigan publicly released a letter to Gov-
ernor Reagan, in which he threatened to refuse to contin-
ue furnishing police to the campus unless he was given a 
free hand to crack down.” Madigan alleged the universi-
ty had refused to take action against violators and called 
for the declaration of a “State of Extreme Emergency.” 
Reagan responded by declaring an emergency and acti-
vating the National Guard.
THE P EOPLE ’S PARK PROTESTS
The  second  attempt  to  suppress  massive  protests  in 
1968–1969 involved both students and Bay Area resi-
dents who responded to the brutal attack on the “Peo-
ple’s Park” demonstration.  A large partly unpaved and 
much neglected lot used for parking a few blocks south 
of main campus—just off  Telegraph Avenue had been 
taken over by “street people” and radicals. These people 
graded the lot, planted a vegetable garden and erected a 
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children’s  playground from donated  materials.  The lot 
was used by residents in the area but street people pass-
ing through Berkeley often slept there. Because of this 
public  use,  the  park  was  called  “People’s  Park”  even 
though it was university property.
Although  South  campus  residents  sorely  needed  a 
park, neither the Berkeley City Council nor the universi-
ty administration had been receptive to park proposals 
from citizens and the College of Environmental Design. 
When People’s Park was constructed, however, the uni-
versity administration, despite public criticism and after 
neglecting the lot, suddenly announced it had obtained 
funds to construct a soccer field there. Although every-
one knew this plan was a ruse to reassert university con-
trol, attempts were made to negotiate the issue, but the 
negotiations collapsed.19 
After the perimeter of the lot was bulldozed, several 
thousand students, faculty and community residents left 
a noon protest rally and marched down Telegraph Av-
enue toward the lot. But they never reached their desti-
nation. Police armed with gas, clubs, rifles and pistols 
attacked them.  An historian,  W. J.  Rorabaugh reports, 
“The San Francisco Chronicle published a photograph 
of one demonstrator being shot in the back while fleeing 
down a side street.” Officers for some unexplained rea-
son released gas on campus; in fact, some officers threw 
gas into Tolman Hall, the School of Education building, 
and held the doors shut to prevent people from escaping. 
More than 100 people in the demonstration were shot 
with birdshot, buckshot, and rock salt fired from police 
shotguns. No protester fired at the police. Yet the police 
19 Depending  on  the  “spin”  required,  university  public  relations 
said the lot was slated to become a soccer field, student dorms or 
parking lot. Eventually, it was turned into a parking lot.
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killed one man and blinded another.20 An officer, pulled 
from a burning vehicle, was almost killed by the enraged 
crowd.
For more than a week, tens of thousands of people 
from the San Francisco Bay Area reacted to this event 
with  massive  demonstrations.  Governor  Reagan called 
out the National Guard. Berkeley was occupied for al-
most two weeks by 2700 Guardsmen and thousands of 
police. During this military siege, the Governor suspend-
ed  constitutional  rights.  A bright  undergraduate,  Steve 
Wasserman,  in  a  monograph  entitled  History  of  the 
School  of  Criminology:  From  1915  to  the  Present, 
avowed, “A reign of terror, with heavily armed police 
tear gassing and smashing into homes and dormitories 
hit Berkeley and especially the student community with 
a vengeance.”21
The siege,  hundreds  injured,  one person killed  and 
another blinded, and almost one thousand arrests galva-
nized moderates and radicals at the university. “Mean-
while  over  three  hundred  faculty  members  including 
Nobel laureates signed a petition pledging not to teach 
while the city was under military occupation22 and some 
20 A member of  the School  of  Criminology’s  Advisory Council, 
Alameda County District Attorney Frank Coakley, declared that 
his office would make a “complete and thorough investigation” of 
events in Berkeley and that “appropriate action” would be taken 
“as  has  been  done  in  other  episodes  of  mass  violence  and 
criminality,”  according  to  Steve  Wasserman,  History  of  the 
School  of  Criminology:  From 1915 to  the  Present.  May 1973, 
unpublished monograph, p. 49. 
21 Ibid.
22 The  Daily  Californian,  “Faculty  Members  Won’t  Teach” 
Wednesday,  May21,  1969 contains  the original  call  for  faculty 
signatures  and  demonstrations  against  police  on  other  UC 
campuses.
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verbally confronted Reagan in his office in Sacramento. 
Statewide actions of solidarity with Berkeley involved 
thousands of students in San Diego, Riverside, Los An-
geles, Santa Cruz, San Jose, and Stanford. Faced with a 
statewide crisis, and an outraged outburst from liberals 
influential in the state (some of whose children, while on 
a picnic near the campus, had been inadvertently gassed 
by the National Guard), Reagan was forced to lift  the 
citywide curfew and withdraw most of his troops.”23
Faculty and other employees in the School of Educa-
tion, Sociology Department and other departments con-
demned the UCB administration and Sheriff  Madigan. 
Labor organizations including AFT locals 1470 (faculty) 
and 1570 (graduate teaching assistants), Alameda Coun-
ty Central Labor Council,  and American Federation of 
State  Council  and  Municipal  Employees  (AFSCME) 
joined  the  condemnation.  Student  associations,  World 
Peace  Committee  of  the  Unitarian  Church,  Unitarian 
Lutheran  Chapel,  over  130  civil  service  employees 
largely  at  the  county  level,  Committee  of  Concerned 
Asia Scholars, and other organizations added their voic-
es.  They asked the university  administration to  parley 
once again with The People’s Park Negotiating Commit-
tee for a reasonable solution, such as that proposed by 
the College of Environmental Design.24 But the universi-
ty dug in its heels and stood its ground.
Still, the university’s right to determine the fate of the 
park  had  been  challenged.  A poster,  Who  Owns  the  
Park?, exclaimed, “Someday a petty official will appear 
with a piece of paper which states that the University of 
California owns the land of the People’s Park. Where did 
23 Wasserman, op. cit. p. 49.
24 The College recommended a representative body would control 
the use of the park.
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that piece of paper come from? What is it worth?” The 
poster answered these questions. It said, 
A long time ago the Costanoan Indians lived 
in the area now called Berkeley. They had 
no  concept  of  land  ownership.  They 
believed that  the  land was under  the care 
and guardianship of the people who used it 
and  lived  on  it.  Then  the  Catholic 
missionaries  took the land away from the 
Indians. The Mexican Government took the 
land away from the Church. The Americans 
beat the Mexicans and forced them to sign 
away  their  property.  The  US  government 
then sold the land to white settlers and gave 
them a  land  title  in  exchange  for  money. 
While  there  were  still  some  Indians  who 
claimed the land, the American army killed 
them. Finally, some very rich men, who run 
the University of California, bought the land 
and, after a boarding house that  had been 
built on the land was destroyed, it became a 
parking lot.
The poster declared:
We are building a park on the land. We will 
take care of it and guard it, in the spirit of 
the Costanoan Indians. When the University 
comes with its land title we will tell them: 
‘Your  land  title  is  covered  in  blood.  We 
won’t touch it.  Your people ripped off the 
land from the Indians a long time ago. If you 
want it back now, you will have to fight for 
it again.’
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PROTESTING THE CAMBODIAN INVASION
The people symbolized by this poster lost the fight for 
People’s Park. Still, even their defeat did not stop further 
protests. In 1970, after the Cambodian invasion showed 
President  Nixon  and  Henry  Kissinger  had  lied  about 
deescalating  the  war,  the  demonstrations  started  up 
again. As millions of people throughout the country took 
to the streets, thousands of Berkeley students called for 
an immediate end to the war, the cessation of war-related 
university research and the release of imprisoned dissi-
dents,  including  Black  Panther  Party  leader  Bobby 
Seale.
The Cambodian invasion provoked the greatest crisis 
in the history of the university. Over 2000 activists met 
on campus, elected a strike committee that formed “ac-
tion groups” to campaign for the cancellation of classes 
and their  replacement  with  “reconstituted”  student-run 
classes, supporting opposition to the war and “democra-
tizing” the university.25 This “reconstitution,” as Wasser-
man  observes,  “represented  the  climax  of  nearly  a 
decade  of  student  struggle  in  terms  of  the  scope  and 
quality of student initiative, collectivity and social con-
sciousness.”26 
An unprecedented number of faculty joined students 
protesting the war. Despite threats from Governor Rea-
gan and administration, the great majority of the UCB 
faculty,  in  an  emergency  Academic  Senate  meeting, 
25 A national  strike  and  informational  center  was  established  at 
Brandeis University. On May 11th, over 500 students attended a 
National Student Strike Conference in San Jose, California. On 
virtually  every  campus,  a  strike  coordinating  committee  was 
spontaneously  formed  and  linked  up  with  the  newly  created 
national center.
26 Wasserman, op. cit., p. 53.
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passed a resolution on May 4th calling for the university-
wide cessation of classes. The next day, the Criminology 
Students Association (CSA) voted unanimously to back 
a general strike and asked the School faculty to suspend 
academic activity in accordance with the Senate resolu-
tion. Voting 15 to 2 in favor of the strike, the Criminolo-
gy faculty overwhelmingly assented.27
After a meeting attended by 17,000 students in  the 
Greek Theater approved the “reconstitution” of the uni-
versity, Governor Reagan suddenly broke his 16-month-
old promise to keep the University of California open 
“at the points of bayonets” if necessary. He ordered all 
colleges  and  universities  in  California  to  be  closed 
down.  Yet,  despite  his  order,  thousands  of  students 
swarmed on campus to hold teach-ins, rallies and orga-
nizing sessions devoted to ending the war and to curbing 
the bureaucratic organization of the university. 
The student movement met with partial success. Not 
surprisingly, the attempt to reconstitute the bureaucracy 
failed. Still, the seemingly endless leaflet writing, teach-
ins and agitation among students reinforced popular out-
rage occurring throughout the country. It amplified the 
popular  outrage  that  forced  Nixon,  three  months  after 
the  invasion,  to  withdraw US troops  from Cambodia. 
The  invasion  had  turned  into  a  military  and  political 
catastrophe.
27 Diamond,  according  to  Wasserman  (p.  52-53),  on  June  2nd 
reported  “There  is  considerable  pressure  on  the  administration 
from .  .  .  higher levels of  administration regarding the current 
situation on campus. It is expected that some punitive measures 
will be taken by the state which would effect whole segments of 
the University population (such as all faculty).” Diamond went on 
to  say  that  individuals  who  failed  in  all  or  part  of  their 
professional duties would be financially penalized.
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The military withdrawal,  however,  did  not  turn the 
clock back and remove the harms done to student protes-
tors. 
At  Kent  State  4  students  were  shot  and 
killed, and 10 were wounded by gunfire; at 
Jackson  State  2  students  were  shot  and 
killed and 12 wounded. In Augusta Georgia 
6 black students were killed and the police 
and National Guard wounded 20, while at 
the University of New Mexico 11 students 
were  bayoneted.  Altogether,  during  the 
movement’s highpoint in May of 1970, over 
100  people  were  killed  or  seriously 
wounded by police or National Guardsmen 
and more than 2000 people were arrested for 
political reasons in the first  two weeks of 
May alone. A demonstration called by the 
anti  war  New  Mobilization  Committee 
brought  out  over  100  000  people  to  the 
nations capital in a weeks notice, only to be 
faced with over 25 000 police and soldiers 
armed with live ammunition.28 
Among college and university students, the never-ending 
strikes, demonstrations and occupations of buildings cre-
ated an historically unprecedented crisis of legitimation. 
On June 15th, 1970, the New York Times reported that 42 
percent of all students believed the American Constitu-
tion needed major changes. As early as 1968, the pollster 
Daniel Yankelovich reported that at least 368 000 people 
strongly  agreed on the  need of  a  “mass  revolutionary 
party” in the US and that after the student strike of 1970, 
over  a  million  students  considered  themselves  to  be 
28 For this list of atrocities, found in “The Fire Last Time” by Tom 
Keefer in the Peak, U.of Guelph’s Alternative Student Newspaper.
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“revolutionaries.” In early 1971 the New York Times dis-
covered that four out of ten students (more than 3 mil-
lion people) thought that a revolution was needed in the 
United States.29
COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE
Confrontations  between  anti-war  protesters  and  police 
continued  into  1971  when  Bowker  was  selected  as 
Chancellor to replace Heyns who resigned because Rea-
gan and the Regents’ repeatedly attacked him for not be-
ing tough enough at coping with the students.
But the confrontations were not merely expressed in 
violent encounters. In fact, to stop the cycle of violence 
in Berkeley, some radicals at the School of Criminology 
began to work with the Black Panther  Party and Ron 
Dellums,  the  black  Congressman  who  represented 
Alameda County, at finding peaceful solutions. This at-
tempt, however, only deepened the antagonism between 
the radicals at the School and the police.
As  indicated,  police  had  repeatedly  attacked  UCB 
protesters with fists, kicks, clubs, cattle prods, tear gas, 
pepper  foggers,  pistols  and  shotguns.  From  the  FSM 
movement  onward,  Berkeley  students  were  enraged 
whenever “the pigs” entered the campus. In addition, ev-
ery major black protest movement in Berkeley and Oak-
land experienced repeated police provocation. In many 
black communities,  they were regarded as an army of 
occupation.
Yet, efforts to reform the police failed. Citizen police-
review boards were rendered powerless. Major recom-
mendations for police reform produced by national and 
29 Ibid.
   “PIGS OFF CAMPUS!”  | 87 
state commissions were never implemented.30 Racial in-
tegration of police departments materialized at a snail’s 
pace while federal funds were poured into riot control, 
fire power and communications equipment. The police 
remained an ultra-conservative political force.
In 1971, over 15,000 Berkeley citizens petitioned the 
City to place a “Community Control of Police Amend-
ment”  before  voters  in  City  elections.  Work  on  this 
amendment had been initiated by the Black Panther Par-
ty but radicals at the School helped formulate it in an at-
tempt to decentralize the police department and to place 
power in the hands of grass-roots councils. City officials 
reacted  hysterically  and  the  city  attorney  deceitfully 
branded the Amendment “unconstitutional” even though 
the State Constitution gave citizens the right to alter city 
charters through referendums. The city manager threat-
ened to resign if the Amendment passed and the ultra-
conservative  Berkeley Daily Gazette, repeatedly carried 
headlines warning that  if  the radicals  were successful, 
they would destroy Berkeley’s fabric of life.
The Berkeley Police Department, ninety of whose of-
ficers had signed a petition calling for a “crack-down” 
on  radicals,  misused  public  funds  and  time  to  agitate 
against the Amendment at meetings throughout the city. 
This opposition reflected the reality described by Joseph 
Lohman before he died. He wrote: “The police function 
[is] to support and enforce the interests of the dominant 
political, social and economic interests of the town, and 
only incidentally to enforce the law.”31 
Within the School, the amendment was hotly debated. 
On January 14, 1971 the Criminology Students Associa-
30 Kerner, Walker, and Scranton
31 Quoted in A. Niederhoffer, Behind the Badge, p.12.
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tion (CSA) became the first student organization to en-
dorse  the  measure.  It  passed  a  resolution  recognizing 
“the urgent need for new alternatives to the present insti-
tutional structures of law enforcement, and the need for 
the development of more responsive community orient-
ed police programs.”
By March, some faculty, including Platt, Takagi and 
Schwendinger, publicly asked Berkeley citizens to back 
the Amendment.32 They stated,
As  criminologists  at  the  University  of 
California  and  citizens  who  work  in 
Berkeley concerned about creating a police 
department  which  respects  and  acts  upon 
democratic  principles  of  government,  we 
urge your support of this amendment . . . For 
citizens, it will provide participation in the 
governance  of  an  important  public 
institution,  fair  and  independent  grievance 
procedures and more efficient protection of 
the  public  from  serious  crimes:  For  the 
police, it will mean community respect and 
support as well as a truly professional role 
which emphasizes a commitment to legality. 
And  finally,  it  will  help  to  transform 
policing  from  a  quasi-military  role  of 
repression to  one which encourages  equal 
protection  under  the  law  and  conflict 
resolution.  Community  control  offers  an 
opportunity to minimize police illegality and 
to fully protect constitutional rights of free 
speech, assembly and political expression.
Platt  supported the Amendment in  a  letter  to  the  San 
32 Others signing the statement included Menachim Amir, Nathan 
Adler, Vonnie Gurgin and Richard Korn. 
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Francisco Chronicle, August 25, 1970. He wrote: 
The  proposed  initiative  .  .  .  is  aimed  at 
making  government  representative  and 
democratic. The police are an important and 
powerful institution; they are supposed to be 
‘public  servants.’  The  initiative  seeks  to 
restore popular and civilian government of 
the police . . . The initiative is also supported 
in  theory  by  a  considerable  body  of 
criminological  literature  urging  civilian 
controls  of  the  police.  The  initiative  is  a 
thoughtful proposal, based on careful study 
and consultation with community groups. It 
seeks  much  needed  democratic  change 
through the electoral process.
The Chronicle responded  immediately  to  Platt’s  letter 
with an August 27th editorial disingenuously and dema-
gogically proclaiming its astonishment that “a criminol-
ogist,  of  all  people,  would  advocate  what  amounts  to 
ghettoization of the police and the abandonment of the 
many pioneering programs for better race relations for 
which Berkeley has taken pride.”
Of the faculty who signed the endorsement, only one 
person, Paul Takagi, had tenure. Furthermore, on March 
7, 1971, Takagi, in a separate statement entitled “Tech-
nocrats vs. Public Servants,” clarified his endorsement. 
Identified as the Associate Dean of the School of Crimi-
nology,  a  former  deputy  probation officer  in  Alameda 
County, a former state parole officer in Los Angeles and 
a  correctional  classification  officer  in  San  Quentin 
Prison, he stated,
The social problems in this community are 
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so serious that I feel the Charter amendment 
addresses itself to the question of whether 
bureaucratic  elites  and  technocrats  and 
political  officials  who,  for  the  most  part, 
serve special economic and political interest 
groups should continue to govern the affairs 
of the people in the community. Shall  we 
have that kind of government, or should the 
people  in  the  community begin  to  play  a 
larger role in determining how the agencies 
should meet the needs of the people?
The genius of this proposal is that it does 
recognize  that  conflicts  exist  within  a 
community.  Instead of trying to deal  with 
these  conflicts  on  the  basis  of  threat  of 
penalty or coercion, it begins to recognize 
that differences do exist and that conflicts do 
emerge,  and  rather  than  attempting  to 
bludgeon people into conformity, it provides 
for an opportunity to explore the source of 
these conflicts and then to begin to attack 
the problem.
Because  the  acceptance  of  this  legislative  proposal 
meant  the  decentralization  of  the  police  and  placing 
them under direct  control  of community residents,  the 
police reacted swiftly. In the closing hours of the cam-
paign,  Wasserman  observed,  O.  W.  Wilson,  who  was 
once Dean of the School, unheard from in years and liv-
ing in retirement in San Diego, sent a telegram repudiat-
ing  community  control  of  the  police.  The  telegram 
published in the April 5, 1971 edition of the Daily Cali-
fornian in the form of a capitalized advertisement spon-
sored  by  the  “One  Berkeley  Community,”  an 
organization formed to defeat the radical police proposal 
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read:
THE CHARTER PROPOSAL FOR 
‘COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE’ 
COULD DESTROY THE BERKELEY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, A FINE AND 
FAIR ORGANIZATION OF MEN AND 
WOMEN REPRESENTING CITIZENS 
OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
PROPONENTS OF THE 
ILL-CONCEIVED MEASURE INCLUDE 
SEVERAL NON-TENURE FACULTY 
MEMBERS OF THE SCHOOL OF 
CRIMINOLOGY WHO ARE NOT 
QUALIFIED TO SPEAK FOR THEIR 
COLLEAGUES NOR THE UNIVERSITY 
OF CALIFORNIA
I URGE MY ACADEMIC ASSOCIATES 
AND FELLOW CALIFORNIANS TO 
VOTE NO TO DECISIVELY DEFEAT 
CHARTER AMENDMENT ONE IN THE 
APRIL ELECTIONS
O. W. WILSON, DEAN EMERITUS,
SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY
The  majority  of  registered  voters  voted  against  the 
Amendment. Platt, who was a leader in the struggle for 
community control, became a target. The university ad-
ministration had the pretext it needed to punish Platt for 
his participation in democratic politics. The University 
police, as we will see in Chapter 7, were used as the in-
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strument of retribution.
For understanding this phase in the School’s history, 
the radical effort to formulate model legislation and fight 
for  its  adoption  in  a  democratic  election  is  important. 
The so-called “radical impossibilism” cited by Geis, in 
this case, involved an attempt to work within the system 
and stop the police brutality and cycles of violence that 
overwhelmed students and citizens in the San Francisco 
Bay Area.
Ironically, neither the police nor the National Guard 
ever  stopped  the  demonstrations  at  the  University  in 
Berkeley. The violence over the TWLF demands ended 
when university concessions were in place. And the vio-
lence between police and the anti-war movement ended 
when  the  Vietnam War  ended.  These  elemental  facts, 
however,  are  conveniently  ignored by academic hacks 
who have blamed the “usual suspects” when explaining 
why the School was closed.
5 |  The Counter-Reformists
et’s start with a comparison from two disparate mo-
ments  in  history.  There are  parallels  between the 
anti-reformist campaign against the School of Criminol-
ogy radicals in Berkeley and the counter-reformation led 
by 16th-century Jesuit scholars at Collegio Romano, in 
Rome. The scholars campaigned against scientists who, 
they believed, undermined their dogmatic interpretation 
of biblical events. Working covertly at first, they gradu-
ally mounted a campaign that convicted Galileo Galilei 
as a heretic and, for all practical purposes, put him in 
solitary confinement by sentencing him to a lifetime of 
house arrest.1 More recently, and closer to home, around 
1971,  a  counter-reformist  faculty  network  at  Berkeley 
worked covertly with the university administration and 
state government to repress the “heretics” in the School 
of  Criminology.  Eventually,  they  succeeded in  exiling 
the radicals and destroying the School the radicals had 
helped create.
L
This  repression  was  duplicated  across  the  country. 
Michael Miles reported in 1972 that as “student unrest” 
dropped off nationally, university authorities carried out 
1  Pietro  Redondi,  1987.  Galileo  Heretic.  (trans.,  Raymond 
Rosenthal) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 135.
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“more firm action” against the student movement than at 
any other time. These authorities had learned from bitter 
experience in the late 1960s that “direct engagement in-
volving the use of police force, summary dismissals and 
the like did what the radical issues of imperialism and 
racism by themselves could not: they mobilized a major-
ity of students and a significant minority of the faculty to 
the  radicals’  defense.”  Their  new  repressive  strategy 
therefore recommended avoiding the radicalizing effect 
produced by police crackdowns. It urged the patient and 
careful  choice  of  the  “right  moments”  to  remove  the 
“hard  core”  students  and  faculty  who supposedly  had 
“manipulated” the “concerned masses.”2 While the “hard 
core” was being removed, the authorities would accom-
modate  to  movement  demands,  making  moderate  re-
forms that would co-opt the remaining dissenters. 
Such counter-reformist alliances at Berkeley usually 
relied on networks that formed and reformed depending 
upon  circumstances.  In  1969,  for  instance,  a  group 
called The Council for an Academic Community (CAC) 
appears  to  have  been  established  during  or  after  the 
Third  World  Strike  to  “work  informally  toward  the 
preservation of rational discourse in the face of violent 
and coercive confrontation.”3 In 1970, the CAC had 29 
members and most,  like Paul Seabury, a public policy 
professor  targeted by the  anti-war  movement,4 Melvin 
2  Miles, Michael. 1972-73. “The Triumph of Reaction.”  Change: 
The Magazine of Higher Learning 30-36 (Winter) p. 30.
3  The date of its formation and its subsequent 1970 “statement of 
purpose,” entitled “CAC Principles,” was obtained from the UCB 
Bancroft Library archives. (The faculty club may have required a 
note about CAC’s aims to provide a meeting room in 1969 and 
the right to use the club’s name on the ‘letterhead’ of declarations 
issued in 1970.)
4  Seabury  was  a  former  member  of  the  President’s  Foreign 
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Webber, who taught naval architecture, and Charles To-
bias from Engineering and Lawrence Radiation Labora-
tory, a research center linked with the war machine, were 
not administrators or aspiring administrators. However, 
some like Robert Scalapino during the free-speech crisis 
had  been  the  Political  Science  Department  Chairman. 
George  Maslach,  as  Provost,  monitored  undergraduate 
enrollment in the School of Criminology during its final 
years. Earl Cheit had been an Executive Vice Chancel-
lor5 while others, such as Martin Trow functioned, in the 
1960s and 1970s, as directors of research centers. Alan 
P. Sindler,  who has been introduced previously,  joined 
the CAC shortly after he quit Cornell. At Berkeley, he 
was employed as a public policy professor but, in later 
years,  became Dean of the Graduate School of Public 
Policy.
Still another member, Lincoln Constance, had been a 
Department Chairman, Dean and Academic Vice Chan-
cellor.  During the free speech conflict,  he represented 
the Chancellor’s office to the faculty.  In an interview, 
Constance  confessed  when  he  first  met  with  Mario 
Savio, 
Intelligence  Advisory  Board.  He  was,  among  other  things,  a 
member of the board of directors of the Committee on the Present 
Danger,  a  militantly  anti-Soviet  pro-defense  lobby  of  which 
President  Reagan  was  formerly  a  member.  He  edited  “The 
Grenada Papers”  for  the  Institute  for  Contemporary  Studies,  a 
group founded by Edwin Meese.  (See Richard Hatch and Sara 
Diamond,  “The  World  Without  War  Council,”  Covert  Action 
Information Bulletin, #31, Winter 1989. Also, #45. Sara Diamond, 
“Shepherding,”  Covert Action Information Bulletin, #27, Spring 
1987.)
5  Cheit in later years became Dean of the School of Business. He 
also became a Senior Advisor to the Asia Foundation, which had 
been a CIA conduit. In the 1990s Scalapino was honored at Asia 
Foundation and Kissinger was member of the award committee.
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I had to control myself because I wanted to 
reach across the table and smack Savio right 
in  the  face  because  he  was  insolent  and 
brash, and frankly I thought he was off his 
rocker. . . . I’d have loved to punch him in 
the nose, and I think it might have been an 
historical favor if I had.6
As the prior chapter indicated, a number of faculty had 
responded to the 1970 Cambodian invasion by refusing 
to teach. (Also, Governor Reagan was actually forced to 
shut down the university temporarily.) When classes re-
sumed,  some of these faculty members,  depending on 
their courses and expertise, devoted classroom time to 
ethical, legal, social, economic or political factors affect-
ing the course of the War. Since the invasion further ex-
posed  the  criminal  policies  behind  the  War,  radical 
faculty at the School felt obligated to devote classroom 
sessions to such topics as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
But such faculty responses to the Cambodian inva-
sion galvanized the counter-reformists. In 1969 the CAC 
had intended to achieve its aims unofficially. A year lat-
er, however, the faculty response to the invasion brought 
it out of the closet. The CAC informed the UCB faculty 
that while the university provides room for intellectual 
dissent it should remain free of political advocacy and 
action.  Academic  freedom,  the  CAC  added,  depends 
6  Lincoln Constance “Versatile Berkeley Botanist: Plant Taxonomy 
and University Governance.” Interviewed by Ann Lage in 1986. 
Regional  Oral  History  Office,  The  [University  of  California, 
Berkeley]  Bancroft  Library,  1987.  These  remarks  are  in  the 
section  incredibly  entitled,  “Chancellor  Strong:  Liberal, 
Contemplative, Principled.” (This information was obtained from 
Web  pages  of  UCB’s  oral  history  documents,  which  are  not 
numbered.)
   THE COUNTER-REFORMISTS  | 97 
upon “the rejection of all efforts to politicize the Univer-
sity,  and  especially  to  transform  it  into  a  political 
weapon.” Even though “the faculty alone” has the right 
to decide what happens in the classroom, the content of 
their  courses  must  not  be  compromised  by  political 
aims.7
“After U.S. intervention in Cambodia in May 1970,” 
CAC  continued,  “many  classes  were  dismissed  and 
some were interrupted by dissidents seeking to coerce 
professors  and students,  who wanted to  carry on aca-
demic  pursuits,  into  quitting.”  To  support  faculty  and 
students who rejected efforts to politicize the university 
and transform it  into a political  weapon, the CAC an-
nounced  that  it  took  a  full-page  advertisement  in  the 
Daily Californian and  nearly  500  signatures  were  re-
ceived showing agreement with its principles. The CAC 
expressed its intention to resist attempts to politicize the 
university  perpetrated by “members  of  the university” 
(i.e., students and faculty) as well as public officials and 
people at large. It concluded,
To protect the foundations of this University, 
open membership in CAC is now proposed. 
If  academic responsibility  is  not  taken by 
faculty now it  will  be  assumed by forces 
outside the University. A larger organization 
is planned and duly elected officers will take 
over  for  the  calendar  year  1971. 
Membership  is  free  and  all  members  of 
Academic senate are invited to join.
7  Council  for  an  Academic  Community.  1969-1970.  “CAC 
Principles  &  Statement  of  Purpose.”  UCB  Bancroft  Library 
archives. This document appears to have been issued during the 
1970 fall semester.
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The CAC’s  late  1970 campaign was  in  part  aimed at 
closing a breach opened by the faculty trade union, Lo-
cal 1474 of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). 
During the summer of 1970, thousands of students left 
Berkeley and support  for  anti-war  protests  was scaled 
down. But the Chancellor’s office took advantage of this 
circumstance to harass faculty members concerning al-
leged “excesses” generated by the anti-war protests. For 
example,  in  August  1970,  Professor  of  Mathematics 
Morris W. Hirsch was reprimanded and docked a week’s 
pay. But a memo issued by Local 1474 asserted that the 
most elementary forms of due process were violated in 
Professor  Hirsch’s  case and that  the Chancellor’s  evi-
dence appeared to be either irrelevant or insubstantial. 
Local 1474 backed Hirsch’s appeal to the Senate’s Com-
mittee on Privilege and Tenure and called upon faculty 
to inform the Union immediately if they received calls to 
discuss teaching with Vice Chancellor Connick. To fore-
stall additional administrative actions, Local 1474 asked 
support for the AFT’s efforts to incorporate the existing 
disciplinary powers of the Administration into a contract 
between the Regents  and the faculty,  to  be negotiated 
through collective bargaining.
During the 1970 fall semester, however, the restored 
administration-faculty alliance finally recovered control 
of the Academic Senate, which had been lost five years 
earlier  in  the  debate  about  the  FSM. The  alliance,  of 
course,  was  not  interested  in  negotiations  that  would 
help protect opposition professors like Hirsch. Instead, it 
moved aggressively to toughen the disciplinary rules in 
order to shield its own members and to curb the anti-war 
movement.
But its reliance on the Academic Senate rather than 
AFT collective bargaining meant traversing the Byzan-
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tine corridors  of  faculty self-governance.  To a degree, 
the faculty policed itself and this policing was channeled 
through the Senate and its committees. Consequently, to 
neutralize, threaten or punish the opposition faculty, the 
CAC had to manipulate the Senate and stack the com-
mittees.
Also, a successful campaign was not assured just by 
Machiavellian politics on a local level. It required simi-
lar  efforts  by  administrative-faculty  alliances  on  all  9 
campuses  of  the  University  of  California  system,  be-
cause the Assembly of the Academic Senate, composed 
of  delegates  from  each  one  of  these  campuses,  was 
charged with the task of incorporating revisions into a 
single code for the entire system.8
In  November  1970,  in  Berkeley,  the  Senate  Policy 
Committee opened the door to local  recommendations 
for changes in the code. It got the Senate to approve a 
resolution  asking  the  Academic  Freedom  and  Policy 
Committees to jointly prepare a statement on profession-
al conduct and faculty discipline. The Privilege and Ten-
ure  Committee  was  also  asked  to  add  its  opinion 
especially regarding disciplinary procedures.
On January 11, 1971, the three committees—Senate 
Policy, Academic Freedom and Privilege and Tenure—
reported back to the Senate, submitting a draft of their 
revisions to the code.9 The joint report submitted on Jan-
uary 11 said the Committees were “mindful” of the ne-
cessity  to  formulate  “broad  outlines  of  punishable 
8  The  9  UC  campuses  were  at  Berkeley,  Davis,  Irvine,  Los 
Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Barbara and 
Santa Cruz.
9  The final draft is in the joint reports of the Committees to the 
Academic  Senate  circulated  on  February  4  and  presented  for 
approval at the February 16th Senate meeting.
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misconduct”  rather  than  a  “detailed  criminal  code.”10 
Apparently,  the  new rules  were  designed  to  cover  all 
possible  contingencies  created  by  faculty  that,  in  the 
Committee’s view, “significantly impaired the Universi-
ty’s particular interests as an institution of higher learn-
ing.”
On  June  29,  1971,  the  statewide  Assembly  of  the 
Academic Senate adopted a revised faculty conduct code 
for the 9 University of California campuses.11 The justi-
fications for the revisions crammed with platitudes, in-
voked  supposedly  “mutually  supportive  relationships” 
between academic freedom and the mission of the uni-
versity. Embedded in its decorous verbiage were prohi-
bitions against faculty intrusion of material unrelated to 
their courses, their failure to meet class, their participa-
tion  in  disruptions  or  interference  in  the  classrooms, 
their unauthorized use of University resources or facili-
ties for political purposes, their intentional disruption of 
functions or activities authorized by the University, their 
intentional disobedience of University rules and incite-
ment of others to disobey these rules, especially “when 
such incitement constitutes a  clear and present  danger 
that violence against persons or property will occur.” 
Disciplinary  consequences  were  coupled with these 
prohibitions.  Violations could be punished by censure; 
docking of pay; deferral of an impending promotion or 
10 The Senate Policy Committee in November 1970 had objected to 
the administration’s plans to adopt the criminal code as a model 
by  preparing  a  “precise  delineation”  of  punishable  faculty 
offenses. Employing this model for revising the code, in its view, 
would be “insufficiently inclusive” as well as “rigid.”
11 University  Bulletin.  1971,  June  28.  “The  Faculty  Code  of 
Conduct as Approved By the Assembly of the Academic Senate.” 
in  University  Bulletin:  A  Weekly  Bulletin  for  the  Staff  of  the  
University of California.
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merit increase; suspension without pay; demotion in pro-
fessorial rank or in salary; and dismissal from the em-
ploy  of  the  University.  While  enforcement  of  these 
prohibitions  required  judicial  procedures  administered 
by faculty committees, the Chancellor was permitted to 
impose an interim suspension, with full pay, on a faculty 
member,  without  following  these  procedures  when he 
deemed it probable that keeping a faculty member on the 
job would be harmful to the University community.
Some of these prohibitions and punishments in-them-
selves seem reasonable—including the rule against  in-
citement of violence even though no faculty member had 
ever been accused of such incitement and even though 
this rule ignored the fact that the criminal law prohibited 
such incitement. Nevertheless, when faculty opposition 
to  the  Cambodian  crisis  is  kept  in  mind,  the  political 
conformity  that  could be served by this  conduct  code 
seems ominous.
In February 1971, a month after the three committees 
had submitted their joint report, the Berkeley Senate was 
confronted with a request to expand the mission of the 
Academic  Freedom Committee.  Carefully  orchestrated 
speeches, memos and bulletins about “alarming threats” 
to academic freedom were being circulated during the 
time of this request. The CAC, for instance, had issued a 
bulletin,  entitled  “THE  INTERNAL  THREATS  TO 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM.” It  urged the  Committee  to 
gather information about the sources of these threats that 
could  hold  opposition  faculty  liable  for  violating  the 
code of conduct. This bulletin observed,
Berkeley has experienced a series of serious 
internal  attacks  on academic freedom:  the 
so-called  ‘War  Crimes  Commission,’  the 
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threats  and  attacks  against  Profs.  Glaser, 
Jensen, Scalapino, Searle, Teller, and others, 
and  the  recent  efforts  to  disrupt  Profs. 
Jensen’s  and  Scalapino’s  classes.  These 
actions  are  part  of  a  pattern  of  efforts  to 
coerce and intimidate faculty members,  to 
punish them for their views, and to serve as 
a  warning  to  others  who  might  hold  or 
express similar views. These are attacks on 
the intellectual and academic freedom of our 
colleagues by self-appointed censors in the 
community, in the student body, or on the 
faculty.12 
The CAC did not identify the culprits among the faculty. 
In fact, it granted, “some members of the faculty have 
felt that we should take no notice of these attacks on our 
colleagues.” However, it claimed, 
. . . our silence in the face of these attacks 
would lead to a gradual callousing of our 
sensibilities,  and  a  readiness  to  accept  as 
‘normal’ actions  that  only  a  little  earlier 
would  have  provoked  shocked 
condemnation. Already there are signs that 
we  are  accommodating  ourselves  to  a 
situation  in  which  faculty  members  can 
associate themselves with groups such as the 
‘War  Crimes Commission’ whose avowed 
intention  is  to  intimidate  colleagues  (our 
emphasis). 
12 The  February  1971  bulletin  is  entitled,  “THE  INTERNAL 
THREATS TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM.” The bulletin heading 
also  contains  these  words:  “Faculty  Center:  Occasional  notes 
from the Council for an Academic Community, Published six or 
more times a year by CAC at Berkeley, Calif.”
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Adding that these attacks on highly visible teachers ex-
erted “a subtle pressure on others who teach in sensitive 
areas,” the CAC urged the Academic Senate Committee 
on Academic Freedom to investigate reported violations 
without waiting, as has been its practice, for a request 
from an “aggrieved” faculty member.13
Importantly, a few days later, a speech by Chancellor 
Heyns on academic freedom was printed in Campus Re-
port, published by the UCB Office of Public Information 
on  February  19,  1971.  Heyns  thought  the  Academic 
Freedom Committee should make a “searching study” of 
instances in which the freedoms of faculty and students 
have  been  “interfered  with.”  The  Chancellor  asserted, 
“The stand that it takes will have a major impact on the 
quality of academic life here.” But, curiously, the Aca-
demic Freedom Committee’s stand and the results of the 
study were already widely known by the faculty before 
Heyns made his speech. They had been expressed in a 
formal  statement  circulated on February 8,  which like 
the CAC bulletin was subtitled, “Internal Threats to Aca-
demic Freedom.”14 Because Sindler, too, was a member 
of  the  Academic  Freedom  Committee,  his  name  ap-
peared  at  the  end  of  the  statement  below  that  of  the 
Committee Chairman,  who also was a  Chairman of  a 
Law School Department.
The  Committee  statement  described  the  following 
“threats”  to  freedom.  It  reported  that  “several  faculty 
13 In  addition,  the  bulletin  condemned  “efforts  at  coercion  or 
intimidation  of  faculty  members  or  students,  from  whatever 
source” and announced the university administration and Senate’s 
Committee on Academic Freedom were undertaking “a broader 
inquiry into this whole problem.”
14 Academic Freedom Committee, February 8, 1971, “A Statement 
of  the  Committee  on  Academic  Freedom:  Internal  Threats  to 
Academic Freedom.” Academic Senate, Berkeley Division.
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members and administrators had been the object of in-
vestigation by a  self-appointed ‘war crimes tribunal’.” 
Students  and  non-students  had  even  marched  to  the 
home of one professor denouncing him as a war crimi-
nal, but the police had turned them back. An anonymous 
handbill distributed at the edge of campus listed another 
professor’s address, sketched a map pinpointing his resi-
dence and urged readers to challenge his actions by call-
ing  his  residence  to  discuss  matters  with  him.  Still 
another professor, the statement said, had been called a 
racist and made the subject of a campaign aimed at ex-
posing  his  “controversial”  research  findings  and  pub-
lished  opinions.  Research  institutes,  it  said,  had  also 
been targeted because their work was “objectionable to 
some persons.” A prominent guest speaker had cancelled 
his lecture out of fear, and others had been subjected to 
heckling and ridicule.
The Committee appeared deeply troubled. It said “ev-
ery person,” engaged in “similarly controversial research 
or whose ideas may be abhorrent to some,” was being 
threatened by this harassment. It also frighteningly de-
clared,  “The victims of  campus vigilante  activities in-
clude  not  only  those  who  are  identified  publicly  as 
targets or symbols but many who may fear that they too 
will  become  objects  of  future  attacks.”  This  fear,  the 
Committee alleged, reached beyond the handful of facul-
ty being harassed. “It matters not that the ultimate threat 
may be averted—that the classroom may not actually be 
disrupted, the lecture stopped, the house burned or the 
laboratory bombed; the hazard to academic freedom ad-
heres in a climate of fear that may be caused by such 
forces,” the Committee concluded.
The Committee finally requested “cooperation” from 
the  faculty while  inquiring  into all  of  these  threats  to 
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academic  freedom.  But  what,  precisely,  did  “coopera-
tion”  really  mean? Joining  the  network  of  counter-re-
formists?  Supporting  administrative  measures  against 
“hard core” radicals? Providing new informants for the 
FBI?  Or  contributing  to  the  Committee’s  own intelli-
gence-gathering mission? 
But, first, how real was the threat to freedom in Feb-
ruary 1971, when the statement was circulated? Was the 
Committee—in collusion with the CAC and university 
officials— creating a panic through the pretense that the 
“threats” were increasing alarmingly? After all, the num-
bers of students involved in demonstrations had dimin-
ished significantly in the 7 months since the troops were 
withdrawn from Cambodia. Also, the Committee state-
ment had been preceded by seven or eight long years of  
protests directed against faculty who justified racial in-
equality or served the government war machine. Every-
one knew the identities of the professors being targeted 
by students or non-students— regardless of whether they 
read the CAC bulletin.
Arthur  Jensen,  for  instance,  had  been  under  attack 
ever since his article, “How Much Can We Boost IQ and 
Scholastic  Achievement?”  appeared  almost  two  years 
earlier in the 1969 issue of the Harvard Educational Re-
view,  claiming  that  the  differences  in  I.Q.  scores  be-
tween whites and blacks are primarily due to the genetic 
inferiority of the blacks.15 It is worth noting that his arti-
cle consumed almost all of the winter 1964 edition of the 
Harvard Educational Review. Furthermore, if anyone at 
Berkeley missed his article, they could read essays that 
treated  it  seriously  in  U.S.  News  and  World  Report,  
15 Jensen,  Arthur,  1969.  “How  Much  Can  We  Boost  IQ  and 
Scholastic  Achievement?”  Harvard  Educational  Review 69 
(Winter) pp. 1–123. 
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Time, Newsweek  and  Life,  along with 14 million other 
readers who bought these publications—not to mention 
the millions who read it in their doctors’ offices.
Also,  in  1971,  Richard  Herrnstein,  a  Harvard  psy-
chology professor well known by criminologists for his 
notoriously racist theory of crime,16 agreed with Jensen’s 
article  and  wrote  about  its  policy  implications  in  At-
lantic  Monthly.  He  said  that  special  government  pro-
grams to assist  in the health and education of African 
Americans were ill advised. Shortly thereafter, Eric Se-
vareid, the CBS prime-time news commentator, went on 
national television to say that it had been shown scientif-
ically how some people were less educable than others, 
and that we should rethink federal policy and priorities.
In addition, Berkeley faculty and students who didn’t 
read the national magazines or hear Eric Sevareid must 
have seen the front page of  The Daily Californian, on 
May 11, 1969, after Jensen’s article had been published. 
The front-page story, “Prominent Psychologists Oppose 
Jensen,” printed a statement signed by notable psycholo-
gists, including the president of the American Psycho-
logical  Association,  attacking the  scientific  validity  of 
Jensen’s work.
Moreover, Scalapino and Teller had been denounced 
throughout the late Sixties. And, again,  if  anyone was 
still  uninformed,  The Daily Californian, only days be-
fore the Academic Freedom Committee’s complaint was 
16 The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American  
Life  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1994),  coauthored  with  Charles 
Murray, is the most well known publication based on Herrnstein’s 
theory.  Many  articles  indicated  this  work  is  methodologically 
unsound.  For  a  definitive  refutation  of  The Bell  Curve,  see 
Stephen Jay Gould,  The Mismeasure of Man.  New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1996.
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circulated,  had  reported  that  members  of  a  self-styled 
“War  Crimes  Commission”  had  leafleted  Scalapino’s 
class,  accusing him of war crimes.  Yet even though a 
Commission member demanded that Scalapino answer 
the charges when he entered the classroom,  The Daily  
Californian reported that the members left the class and 
did not disrupt his lecture.17
The San Francisco Bay Guardian, on June 11, 1970
—during the Cambodian crisis and eight months prior to 
the 1971 memo about threats to academic freedom—had 
devoted a section to “The Bay Area War Machine,” list-
ing  Scalapino  as  the  head  of  “the  most  notorious 
project” devoted to third-world counter insurgency. The 
Guardian quoted a letter of resignation protesting “Pen-
tagon involvement,” written by Gerald O. Berreman, a 
UC Berkeley anthropologist who had also served on the 
project. Berreman wrote,  “In the context of the illegal 
involvement of this country in the war in Vietnam, I can-
not accept research money from an agency whose prima-
17 This incident seems blown out of proportion in the Academic 
Senate’s deliberations. First, as indicated, the Mulford Act gave 
campus authorities  and  Berkeley  police  the  right  to  eject  non-
students from the campus. Second, this incident is the  only one 
actually cited in the Senate deliberations and none of  the self-
styled faculty “witnesses” who said they had seen this disruption 
were questioned. Furthermore, some professors, who failed to win 
a  majority,  tried  to  amend  the  resolution  so  that  the  incident 
would be considered an allegation rather than a fact. Finally, the 
description of this incident in “Berkeley Activist Ordered Off,” 
Daily Californian,  January 29, 1971,  raises  questions about  its 
validity.  This  article  indicates  that  activists  had  addressed  the 
class  before the session actually began and they mentioned they 
would be available after the session. If any “disruption” occurred 
during the  class,  a  non-student  may  not  have  been  the  cause; 
consequently, “disruption” in this case may be comparable to the 
Cornell  incident,  which involve academic freedom for  students 
and which had been discussed in a previous Chapter. 
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ry interest and purpose is the prosecution of that war and 
the furtherance of policies which are likely to lead to 
similar wars including wars in the very area of my re-
search endeavor.”
Again,  within  this  short  time  frame,  on  March  5, 
1971, the Committee on Academic Freedom issued an-
other memo reminding Shelly Messinger, Acting Dean 
of the Criminology School, about its February commu-
niqué. In this memo, the Committee requested adminis-
trators, department chairs and deans from every major 
academic unit, to provide “material” relevant to their in-
quiry into internal threats to academic freedom. It added 
that the scope of its investigation was not being confined 
to threatening incidents,  and it  wanted suggestions for 
developing “a broader perspective” to be “delivered per-
sonally or in writing.” Since no instance mentioned by 
the Committee’s original statement about internal threats 
to freedom indicated a faculty member being responsible 
for such threats, this deceitful expansion of its original 
mandate assumedly had a more sinister purpose, namely, 
mapping the distribution and identities of political dis-
senters and their departments throughout the campus.
Apropos of sinister purposes, two months before the 
Committee was created, UC Regent Max Rafferty, can-
didly admitted to the press that  “unpublicized moves” 
were under way to remove college professors involved 
in “objectionable” campus activities.18 Rafferty said, “If 
the cause remains – more student violence and dissent – 
there will be more dismissed.” “They’re are [sic] quietly 
going through that now on more and more campuses,” 
he  added.  Regarding  14  professors  who  had  recently 
been fired from Fresno State College, Rafferty sarcasti-
18 Rafferty had lost his Superintendent of Education position. He 
had just been defeated in a statewide election.
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cally remarked, “More and more of the loose nuts on the 
faculties are going to be weeded out.”19 Meanwhile, the 
California  legislature  had  targeted  student  movements 
by  passing  more  legislation  against  students  than  any 
other state in the Union.
On this issue, The New York Times reported that “fac-
ulty  cells”  were  emerging  on  university  campuses  to 
cope  with  student  unrest.  This  development  at  UC 
Berkeley was accelerated by Governor Reagan’s cuts in 
university funding. Facing the threat to personal security 
imposed  by  these  cuts,  some faculty,  especially  those 
who had remained silent—as many had done in the Mc-
Carthy  era—supported  the  counter-reformists.  They 
joined the growing academic lynch mob by denying ten-
ure  or  renewals  to  the  most  visible  anti-war  faculty 
members,  Richard  Lichtman,  Michael  Leiserson  and 
Kerrigan Prescott.20
Simultaneously, the leaders of the mob institutional-
ized repression by getting the Academic Senate to pro-
tect their interests. From a legal point of view, however, 
this  protection  was  unnecessary.  The  Mulford  Act, 
passed by the California State legislature to cope with 
student  unrest,  enabled  the  campus  police  to  arrest  a 
non-student who had challenged Scalapino in the class-
room,  escort  him  off-campus  and  charge  him  with  a 
crime. Protection against harassment outside the campus 
was also covered by criminal law.
Given these legal safeguards, what in the world ne-
cessitated the Committee’s alarming message and justifi-
19 “Dissident  Profs:  Rafferty  Views  Faculty  Firings,”  San 
Francisco Chronicle, Dec 19, 1970. 
20 Later, Stephen Talbot in the Native American Studies program 
was added to this list.
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cation  for  disciplinary  rules?  The  chain  of  events  in-
escapably points to its  desire  to  intimidate  and search 
out  political  dissidents  and  to  deflect  attention  from 
threats to these dissidents by “friendly fascists” on the 
faculty.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM & WAR CRIMES
To realize the enormity of the harm veiled by this stage-
managing of academic freedom, and to put it in perspec-
tive, we must return to the final days of the free speech 
crisis. On December 8, 1964—five days after mass ar-
rests in Sproul Hall had produced a campus-wide strike 
and one day after the spectacular failure of Kerr’s con-
vocation at the Greek Theatre—the Academic Senate re-
solved  to  end  the  “free  speech  crisis”  by  granting 
amnesty to the arrested students.  Despite the Regents’ 
opposition,21 the  Senate  also  voted  to  allow  political 
speech  and  activity  on  campus.22 The  faculty  over-
whelmingly agreed that this was the only hope of set-
tling  “one  of  the  most  agonizing,  shattering  and 
potentially  destructive  experiences  that  any  American 
university has ever had to pass through.”23
When the Senate met in Wheeler auditorium, thou-
sands of students massed in front of Wheeler Hall and 
packed  its  corridors.  Loudspeakers  immediately  in-
21 The Regents, however, did not overturn the Senate’s decisions.
22 These activities, as indicated previously, were subject to “time, 
place and manner” rules preventing students from disrupting “the 
normal functions” of the university.
23 Professor  McClosky  expressed  this  judgment.  See  the 
proceedings of the meeting, in UCB Academic Senate, 1964. (The 
proceedings were transcribed from an audiotape. The pages of the 
copy  provided  by  the  Bancroft  Library  archives  are  not 
numbered.)
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formed the students of the faculty vote and, upon emerg-
ing from Wheeler Hall, the professors passed single-file 
through a cheering  ecstatic  crowd.  “Many of  us  were 
crying as we applauded. Many of them were crying too,” 
students reported. Although some professors complained 
the vote had been extorted by student pressure, universi-
ty developments sweeping across the nation showed that 
that  vote  signified  “the  most  consequential  decision 
made by a university faculty in that era.”24
Unlike the Cornell Senate two years later, the Berke-
ley professors had spent little time debating the question 
of amnesty. Instead, they argued whether the content of 
political  speech  and  activity  should  be  restricted.  Al-
though the majority had favored a “free speech” resolu-
tion  offered  by  the  Senate’s  Academic  Freedom 
Committee, which did not restrict content, Lewis Feuer, 
from  Philosophy  and  Sociology  Departments,  wanted 
the resolution modified. He proposed an amendment that 
only permitted activities “directed to no immediate act 
of force or violence.”
Granting freedom of speech without this restriction, 
Feuer  insisted,  would  allow  a  student  Ku  Klux  Klan 
chapter  to  organize  actions  for  defacing  Jewish  syna-
gogues  and Negro and Catholic  churches.  He prophe-
sized that a free speech resolution without this restriction 
would  encourage  circumstances  similar  to  those  that 
helped destroy freedom and democracy in Germany dur-
ing  the  thirties.  Nazi  students  had  claimed  immunity 
from  university  authorities,  which  could  do  nothing, 
when  they  organized  their  attacks  on  Jews,  liberals, 
Democrats and Socialists, according to Feuer.
24 See the commentary on an afterward to the proceedings cited 
above.
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Carl Landauer, an economist who became a founding 
member  of  the  CAC,  supported  Feuer’s  amendment.25 
He reminded the Senate of how hard it was to resist the 
Regents during the McCarthy period. He felt that grant-
ing free speech without Feuer’s amendment would make 
resistance to the Regents totally indefensible.
Professor  Arnon,  a  cell  physiologist  and  another 
founding member of the CAC, backed Feuer’s amend-
ment. He declared the Senate was being blackmailed by 
a  student  mob determined to  fight  for  their  principles 
even if they destroyed themselves and the university. He 
mentioned rumors that outside groups would be coming 
to  the  campus  at  Berkeley  if  student  demands  were 
granted. He asked rhetorically what would the Senate do 
if students invited “outsiders”—such as a “President or 
Chairman of a prominent civil liberties organization”—
to join their campus rallies?26
Despite  these  arguments,  the  majority  believed  the 
amendment would perpetuate the conflict between stu-
dents  and  authorities.  David  Rytinn,  from the  Speech 
Department, observed that if students prepared boycotts 
or sit-ins or picketing against the outside community in 
the  name of  civil  liberties,  Feuer’s  amendment  would 
render them again subject to the same kind of punitive 
threats and arrests as led to the crisis in the first place. 
The amendment was considered so vague that civil dis-
obedience could be called “force and violence.”
Bernard Diamond, identified as a psychiatrist in the 
25 Yet Landauer agreed with the majority about the necessity for 
amnesty. “Mistakes have been made from all sides and the only 
conclusion we can draw is no further penalties,” he said.
26 See UCB Academic Senate, 1964.
27 Later,  Diamond’s  joint  appointments  included  the  School  of 
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jections. First, he said the criminal law adequately cov-
ers acts of force and violence and neither the Senate nor 
the Regents have any business replacing the law. Sec-
ond, the courts provide adequate means for administer-
ing  and  interpreting  the  law;  and  neither  Senate 
committees nor administration should invade a territory 
that does not properly belong to them. Third, the defini-
tion of force and violence in relationship to civil disobe-
dience is an exceedingly complex one; and the faculty or 
university “do not and will never have the necessary ma-
chinery for the implementation of and interpretation of 
the individual acts which may be relevant to this.”
Furthermore,  many  felt  the  U.S.  Constitution  and 
Supreme  Court  decisions  already  provided  acceptable 
criteria for judging free speech. Joseph Tussman, from 
the Department of Philosophy, dared to ask, suppose a 
person advocates  violence  but  does  it  in  a  context  in 
which  there  is  not  the  slightest  danger  it  will  come 
about? Is  there any reason why the authorities  should 
stop that even if their concern is violence?
Upon objecting to Feuer’s amendment, Owen Cham-
berlain, from the Department of Physics, made an im-
portant point. He said the students are proud of their use 
of civil disobedience because it puts high value on the 
lives of others and at the same time low value on the ar-
bitrary rules of men. They feel the necessity of having 
their views heard yet believe there is little that would al-
low  them  the  effectiveness  they  feel  their  conviction 
warrants. “It is all very well for a committee of the fac-
ulty to say that the recent disorders have hindered the 
consideration of student proposals, yet I for one do not 
believe it. The students feel that they have had no legiti-
mate channel open.” 
Law.
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The  Berkeley  Senate  had  rejected  Feuer’s  amend-
ment;  nevertheless,  seven  years  later  it  basically  ap-
proved a “force and violence” rationale  similar  to  the 
one rejected in 1964. It departed dramatically in 1972 
from the 1964 Senate’s wishes by adopting hazy inter-
pretations  of  “force  and  violence”  rather  than  those 
based on the Constitution and criminal law. 
However,  between  1964  and  1972,  the  anti-war 
movement in Berkeley had expanded enormously and so 
had movements elsewhere. While these movements had 
repeatedly damned official accounts of the war, the ma-
jor  news media  usually  defended the  government  and 
willingly printed its lies. Nonetheless, significant breaks 
in media coverage occurred as early as December 1966, 
when New York Times Editor Harrison E. Salisbury filed 
dispatches from Hanoi. The foreign press had reported 
that the U.S. had escalated the bombing and civilian ar-
eas had been targeted. The administration denied the es-
calation  while  Pentagon  releases  said  military  targets 
near Hanoi might have been hit but any damage to the 
city itself was due to antiaircraft ordnance falling back 
upon the city. Salisbury’s first dispatch refuted these lies. 
He reported that the center of the city had been bombed 
and the U.S. had been bombing North Vietnamese popu-
lation centers since 1965. He wrote, “The government is 
waging a war of steel and fire in Vietnam. It should not 
treat the American people as a second adversary, to be 
kept at bay with a smoke screen of distortion and sooth-
ing syrup.”
From  1967  on,  newspapers,  pamphlets,  magazines 
and  books  exposed  atrocities  routinely  committed  by 
American  units  in  Vietnam,  mostly  against  civilians. 
Eyewitness accounts of the criminal policies being re-
lentlessly pursued by US military were provided at the 
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proceedings of the War Crimes Tribunal, organized by 
Bertrand  Russell  and  held  in  Stockholm  and  Copen-
hagen.  Vietnam  veterans  also  provided  first  hand  ac-
counts and, in 1970, 2,000 veterans startled the nation by 
camping on the Mall in Washington DC and returning 
medals won in battle by tossing them onto the steps of 
the Capitol. A year later, Representatives Ron Dellums 
and John Conyers paraded eyewitnesses at a Congres-
sional hearing on US war crimes. 
Consequently,  Americans  were  repeatedly  informed 
about  the war  crimes being committed in  Indochina.28 
They were told about the enormous numbers of civilians 
killed and wounded by US and ARVN air and artillery 
strikes; the creation of free-fire zones which were inef-
fective against the NLF but devastating to civilians; the 
forced  relocation  of  millions  of  Vietnamese  villagers 
into dreadful refugee camps and slums; the use of herbi-
cides to destroy crops and presumably deprive the NLF 
of food, which proved disastrous for the rural popula-
tion; the customary beatings, torture and killing of NLF 
and  North  Vietnamese  prisoners  of  war,  primarily  by 
ARVN troops but tolerated by US advisors; the terrorism 
and assassination promulgated by the notorious Phoenix 
Program; and the atrocities committed by US troops that 
were rarely punished. Furthermore, in 1971, government 
fabrications were blown sky high when newspapers pub-
lished articles based on a classified historical study, or-
dered  by  McNamara  in  1967,  of  US  involvement  in 
Vietnam.
Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who worked at 
the Rand Corporation, had secretly copied the study and 
its supporting documents in 1969. After pleading unsuc-
cessfully with anti-war legislators like J. William Full-
28 The term, ‘Indochina,’ includes Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
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bright, George McGovern and Paul (Pete) McCloskey to 
release the study, they sent excerpts to a handful of lead-
ing  newspapers.  The  government  tried  to  stop  these 
newspapers from publishing and its legal battle with The 
New York Times went all the way to the Supreme Court, 
which ruled in favor of The Times in June 1971.
Dubbed  The  Pentagon  Papers, the  excerpts  of  the 
Rand study demonstrated that American Presidents had 
deceived, ignored or manipulated a Congress composed 
of individuals who were either complicit in this deceit or 
too  cowardly  to  meet  their  responsibilities  under  the 
Constitution. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson and Nixon progressively committed US military 
resources  to  a  criminal  war  of  aggression  against  the 
Vietnamese. Truman provided military equipment on a 
large scale to the French colonial government, to be used 
against Vietnam rebels. To encourage the breakdown of 
the  Geneva  settlement  between  the  French  and  Viet-
namese, the Eisenhower administration undermined their 
negotiations. Kennedy encouraged the overthrow and as-
sassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Viet-
nam and  his  replacement  by  army  officers.29 He  also 
initiated covert warfare, which was escalated into open 
warfare  by  Johnson whose  plans  for  further  action  in 
1964 produced the Tonkin Gulf incident.30 For years af-
terward, Nixon followed up this incident by encouraging 
the calculated deceitful manipulation of public opinion. 
To  disarm  public  opposition  to  the  war  and  boost 
Nixon’s reelection chances, for instance, Kissinger lied a 
few days before the 1972 election when he announced: 
29 Members of his family and cabinet were also assassinated in this 
CIA backed operation. 
30 But this incident did not initiate US aggression. Telford Taylor 
(Nuremberg  and  Vietnam,  174)  states  that  15,000  troops  were 
already stationed in Vietnam when Johnson took office.
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“Peace is at hand!” But the negotiations with the NLF 
and North  Vietnamese  collapsed shortly  after  the  No-
vember election. Then, in the middle of the next month 
and through  Christmas,  Nixon ordered  18 days of car-
pet-bombing aimed at homes, hospitals and civilians in 
Hanoi and Haiphong.31
The  Pentagon  Papers proved  conclusively  that  the 
government had waged a “war of aggression” in Viet-
nam—a war crime according to Nuremberg precedents. 
Before the Papers were published, General Telford Tay-
lor, the chief prosecuting counsel at the Nuremberg tri-
als, in  Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, 
had  difficulty  deciding  whether  the  United  States  had 
committed the crime of aggression, because the informa-
tion to make an informed legal judgment about its possi-
ble  guilt  had  not  been  disclosed.  Although  the 
Nuremberg tribunal was equipped with “virtual libraries 
of the defeated governments’ most secret papers,”32 the 
documents proving the United States’ aggression in Viet-
nam had not been available until  The Pentagon Papers 
were published in 1971.
About 36 people worked on the Rand study and most 
of  them were  military  officers.  All  of  them including 
Ellsberg had served in Vietnam.33 The study contained a 
3,000-page analysis, to which 4,000 pages of officially 
31 During this time, a number of B2-Bomber pilots refused to fly 
missions.
32 Taylor (Nuremberg and Vietnam, 120.), said: “The Nuremberg 
and Tokyo judgments were rendered by international tribunals on 
a  post  mortem  basis  (all  too  literally),  surrounded  by  virtual 
libraries of the defeated governments’ most secret papers.” 
33 See,  “Conversation  with  Daniel  Ellsberg.”  In  Harry  Kreisler, 
“Presidential  Decisions  and  Public  Dissent:  Reflections  of  the 
Vietnam  War.”  Conversations  with  History.  Institute  of 
International Studies, UC Berkeley, July 29, 1988.
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classified documents were appended. One did not have 
to  be  a  professor  at  an  elite  university  to  realize  that 
these documents, beyond a doubt, proved the anti-war 
movements and their unofficial war crime tribunals had 
been right all along. The documents demonstrated that 
isolated soldiers were not responsible for the use of air-
borne  weapons  of  mass  destruction  or  search-and-de-
stroy missions that killed every living thing in sight. Nor 
were these crimes merely committed by officers— like 
Lieutenants  William  Calley  and  Bob  Kerrey34—who 
were following orders or caught up in the frenzy of war. 
The  crimes  were  inevitable  consequences  of  policies 
planned and executed by officials at the highest levels of 
government. 
The Papers confirmed that the United States had lied 
when it justified its invasion of Vietnam on behalf of a 
sovereign  power.  The  South  Vietnamese  government 
was not a sovereign power. Originally, the “zones” dis-
tinguishing Northern and Southern Vietnam were based 
on a cease-fire agreement pending a democratic election. 
According to Taylor,
The  Geneva  agreement  of  1954  did  not 
purport  to  establish  two  nations,  but  two 
‘zones,’  and  explicitly  declared  that  ‘the 
military demarcation line is provisional and 
should  not  in  any  way  be  interpreted  as 
constituting  a  political  or  territorial 
boundary. It was the basis for a cease-fire, 
and the purpose of the zones was specified 
as  ‘regrouping.’  The  agreement  further 
34 In  2001,  the  American  public  was  informed  about  another 
atrocity—this  time  involving  the  ex-Senator  Bob  Kerrey  who 
commanded  a  unit  that  killed  every  civilian  in  a  Vietnamese 
village even though it was not confronted by armed opposition.
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provided for ‘free’ nationwide elections, to 
be  held  in  1956,  as  the  basis  for  a 
government  based  on  ‘the  principles  of 
independence,  unity  and  territorial 
integrity.’35
But,  the  Papers showed the United States  encouraged 
the  corrupt  South  Vietnamese  government  break  that 
agreement  because  it  knew the  government  could  not 
obtain  domestic  support  for  that  tactic  democratically. 
Then, after deciding that the government also incapable 
of winning the ensuing civil war, the U.S. selected Viet-
namese officers who had served in the French colonial 
forces, and engineered the military coup d’ état.36 Conse-
quently,  the  US war crimes were not  restricted to  the 
manner  in  which  it  fought  the  Vietnamese  War.  They 
originated  in  a  “crime of  aggression”  because  the  US 
had  invaded  Vietnam  to  maintain  colonial  surrogates 
during a civil war. 
The  growing  number  of  people  raising  questions 
about criminality at the highest level of government in-
cluded Taylor, the Nuremberg prosecutor. Even though 
he restricted his judgment to My Lai, free strike zones, 
treatment of prisoners and other atrocities committed by 
ground troops, he pointed out that if standards applied in 
the  prosecution  of  German  and  Japanese  war  crimes 
were applied impartially to American statesmen and bu-
reaucrats managing the Vietnam War, they would most 
35 Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, p.102.
36 See Young, Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, 159. In early 1966, a U.S. 
intelligence  assessment  noted  later,  there  was  an  “almost  total 
absence of any organized popular support, or even sympathy for 
the  American-backed  regime,”  quoted  in  Kahin,  Intervention, 
421.
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likely be found guilty.37 While clarifying the grounds for 
this  judgment,  he  dismissed  the  argument  that  these 
Americans were innocent because they were ignorant of 
the atrocities committed by U.S. forces. He said that af-
ter March 16, 1968, when soldiers in the field reported a 
number of atrocities, (including the My Lai massacre) to 
their superior officers, nobody could reasonably claim to 
have been uniformed.
Christopher  Hitchens,  in  the  most  recent  and com-
pelling indictment of Kissinger, goes further than Taylor. 
His book,  The Trial of  Henry Kissinger,  reviewed the 
overwhelming amount of evidence for the crimes com-
mitted in  Indochina.38 To back his indictment,  he em-
ploys  eyewitnesses,  documents  released  under  the 
Freedom  of  Information  Act,  previously  unpublished 
correspondence, transcriptions of the “Nixon tapes” and 
testimony  given  to  Congressional  committees. 
Kissinger’s criminal acts, according to Hitchens, began 
in 1964 when he prolonged the war by secretly ensuring 
the  failure  of  peace  negotiations  between  President 
Johnson’s  administration  and  Vietnamese  representa-
tives. While the CAC and Academic Freedom Commit-
tee were conducting their campaign against the Berkeley 
anti-war activists in 1972, Kissinger was designing and 
managing policies  killing  and wounding at  least  three 
million civilians in Indochina alone.39
37 Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam, 154–182.
38 Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger.
39 The  first  few  names  on  the  Vietnam  War  Memorial  in 
Washington, DC, are dated 1954 when the U.S. began to support 
French forces. Since the last few are dated 1975, the U.S. was 
involved in the Vietnam conflict for 21 years. Furthermore, when 
civilians are included, the true Vietnamese casualties may have 
reached 4,000,000.
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What about the university administrators and faculty 
who condemned both the Berkeley war crimes tribunal 
and the expression of anti-war sentiments in classrooms? 
Weren’t  these people morally  culpable.  They certainly 
could not claim ignorance of the atrocities being com-
mitted in  Indochina.  The publication of excerpts  from 
the Pentagon Papers— in leading newspapers and in 1.5 
million copies of a paperback edition published by the 
NY  Times—had  informed  the  university  community 
about the government’s deceitful manipulation of public 
opinion. These and other publications indicated that the 
CAC and Academic Freedom Committee were not im-
partial apolitical agencies, justifiably defending the uni-
versity as “a house of reason.” They were an extension, 
in  civil  society,  of  government  policies  aimed  at  ob-
structing  justice  and  enabling  serial  killers  to  commit 
crimes with impunity.
In 1964, the Senate majority rejected Feuer’s amend-
ment  and his  absurd comparisons between students in 
Berkeley  and  Nazi  students  who  had  invoked  free 
speech principles to claim immunity for their attacks on 
Jews,  liberals,  Democrats,  Communists  and Socialists. 
Actually, the Nazi government had granted their immu-
nity and enforced it  with assaults,  torture,  prisons and 
concentration camps. American federal, state and univer-
sity authorities, on the other hand, steadfastly opposed 
the anti-war movement in Berkeley. Along with their al-
lies  on  the  university  faculty,  they  discouraged  free 
speech and employed a double standard when defending 
particular faculty members from criticism. These mem-
bers were tacitly accorded institutional “immunity” de-
spite  accusations  of  complicity  in  the  greatest  crimes 
recognized by modern nations. 

6 |  Moving In for the Ki l l
he early nineteen seventies witnessed numerous in-
stances of campus repression. In one instance, the 
San Jose State economics department, with a diversified 
and balanced faculty (including free marketers, Keyne-
sians, institutionalists and Marxists) was taken over by 
the administration. Threatened by the free play of ideas, 
the administration refused to allow the faculty to pick 
the chairperson, fired four junior faculty members and 
denied tenure to another faculty member. 
T
Even visiting professors at other universities were af-
fected. At UC Santa Barbara, for instance, the adminis-
tration,  without  good  cause,  in  the  Fall  of  1970 
terminated Maurice Zeitlin as a Visiting Sociologist be-
cause he had engaged in anti-war protests at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin.1 Protesting this case, the department 
chair, Walter Buckley, noted other instances on his cam-
pus.
1  Zeitlin was terminated even though his visiting appointment had 
been approved “without salary” and even though the University 
of  Wisconsin  had  never  charged  him  with  an  infraction  of 
university regulations after he had participated in a faculty strike 
over the Cambodian invasion. See, “Zeitlin Case: statement from 
Soc.  Dept.”  Editorial  page,  UCSB  Daily  Nexus,  Thursday, 
October 8, 1970.
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One  outstanding  case,  never  public,  included  the 
Chancellor’s  repeated  refusal  to  grant  the  request  of 
twice Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling—made through 
the Chemistry Department—for a small piece of labora-
tory space in which to carry on his research.2 Another 
outstanding action, Dr. John Seeley, former chairman at 
Brandeis and internationally known scholar, was refused 
a courtesy use of the facilities for research. Both of these 
men are considered “politically controversial.”
On the Berkeley campus, the opportunity for legiti-
mating the purge of the Criminology School presented 
itself  just  after  Messinger  submitted a  proposal  to  the 
Graduate  Council,  requesting  formal  ratification  for  a 
curriculum leading to a Doctor of Philosophy. The doc-
torate provided by the School was a professional doctor-
ate; hence, Doctor of Criminology rather than Doctor of 
Philosophy. Messinger’s proposal was intended for stu-
dents who had acquired greater theoretical sophistication 
and research training in order to “focus on problems of 
generating  knowledge  about  crime  and  criminal 
justice.”3 
Before we recount how the counter-reformists seized 
this moment, the background to this proposal should be 
detailed.  To begin with,  the planning for a Ph.D. pro-
gram had been a logical culmination of changes in facul-
ty and curriculum. The School opened in 1949 and, until 
1960, August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson essentially de-
2  Subsequently, Prof. Pauling received an appointment at UC San 
Diego.
3 Messinger  circulated  this  proposal  among  the  Criminology 
faculty  and  asked  them  to  keep  it  confidential  until  their 
comments were incorporated and it was sufficiently polished to 
send  on  to  the  Graduate  Council.  See  Sheldon  Messinger, 
“Program for  a  Graduate  Studies  in  Criminology  for  a  Ph.D., 
December 1970.”
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veloped the School as a career academy for professional 
managers of the criminal justice system, much as West 
Point trains elite army officers. The School was imbued 
with an uncritical Cold War ideology4 and, in addition, 
the entire faculty had been recruited from the criminal 
justice system and understood the School as a service in-
stitution for that system. However, threatened with the 
School’s elimination for its  narrow vocational aims, it 
was reorganized in 1961 by Dean Lohman. 
Under  Lohman,  an  interdisciplinary  faculty  con-
cerned with the social, psychological and legal aspects 
of crime partially replaced the earlier managerial empha-
sis.  Changing the priorities  to  favor  the  graduate  pro-
gram rather than the undergraduate, the School trained 
research personnel, college and university teachers and 
professional policy makers. 
In the ensuing period, most faculty were social scien-
tists and legal scholars; and, some, stirred by the chang-
ing  political  climate,  began  to  raise  fundamental 
questions  about  crime  and  criminal  justice  itself.  By 
1968, Lohman himself believed, “Many of the problems 
confronting us today have a significance quite different 
from the meanings traditionally ascribed to them and to 
the  social  contexts  to  which  they  relate.”  He  said  it 
would be  “profitable  to  examine the  agencies,  institu-
4  When  the  American  Military  Government  Documents  were 
declassified,  Falco  Werkentin,  a  German criminologist,  sent  us 
two memos written by Vollmer who, after Germany’s surrender, 
had been assigned the task of monitoring the West Berlin police 
department. In one memo, Vollmer decided to leave the decision 
about whether to hire police applicants who were members of the 
Nazi party up to local German authorities. In the other document, 
he decided the American military government would not allow 
anyone suspected of  communist  sympathies  to be hired by the 
police department.
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tions,  and organizations  to  which  we uncritically  sub-
scribe and to apply the ideas of alienation and estrange-
ment to the institutional framework itself.” In fact,  he 
declared, “The changing patterns of crime are a reflec-
tion of far-reaching changes in American community life 
. . . It is not likely that we will be successful in control-
ling crime without seriously changing the organization 
and  administration  of  criminal  justice.”5 Accordingly, 
Lohman favored faculty members who could teach so-
cial  science  and  professionally  oriented  courses  that 
transcended the narrow managerialism of the earlier era.
However, toward the end of 1968 Lohman died sud-
denly and Leslie Wilkins, the Associate Dean, became 
Dean. Wilkins was greatly admired by students and fac-
ulty alike because of his high moral standards and pro-
fessional dedication. He felt that the school was moving 
in the right direction and encouraged faculty delibera-
tions  strengthening  the  broadened  curriculum.  He  ob-
served, 
The School has developed and is still in the 
course  of  developing  a  philosophy  of 
operation which distinguishes the training of 
persons to enter a profession from that  of 
training qualified persons to question basic 
assumptions  which  underlay  professional 
activities  through  the  use  of  research 
analysis.6 
He supported the general belief that a Doctor of Philoso-
phy in Criminology, centered on social science and re-
5  Joseph D. Lohman, “Crises of a Society in Ferment,” Crime and 
Delinquency, January 1968, pp. 31-41.
6  The memo was addressed to the School’s “Policy and Planning 
Committee,” and it is dated, May 14, 1968.
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search training, should be provided by the School.
Wilkins also set up a number of faculty committees to 
reorganize  the  curriculum.  The  reorganization  went 
through  various  phases.  By  1971,  when  the  Sindler 
Committee  attacked  the  School,  the  curriculum  had 
broadened significantly.
But Wilkins’s ethical principles placed him in an un-
tenable  position.  As  the  “third  world  liberation”  and 
“black  power”  protests  escalated,  the  UCB authorities 
demanded his cooperation in policing and informing on 
the faculty.7 Being asked to inform on the faculty who 
were cooperating with the strikers  at  that  time placed 
Wilkins between “a rock and a hard place.” On one oc-
casion  during  the  TWLF  strike,  when  Schwendinger 
happened to be present, Wilkins received a call from an 
administrator who demanded the names of faculty refus-
ing to teach in assigned classrooms.8 Wilkin’s shouted in 
reply to the caller: “I am not a policeman!” and slammed 
the phone down.9
Wilkins resigned in the aftermath of the third world 
strike. At a faculty meeting of the School of Criminolo-
gy on February 24, 1969, he announced his decision:
7  Although the  administration  eventually  relented  and  instituted 
ethnic studies, black studies and affirmative action programs, it 
resisted these reforms. To overcome this resistance, a strike was 
called.  Eventually,  thousands of  students boycotted classes  and 
sympathetic  faculty  refused  to  teach  even  though  they  were 
repelled by arson and vandalism reportedly committed by a small 
group of black students. 
8  These  faculty members  did not  hold classes  in  their  assigned 
rooms but some like Schwendinger held them in a religious center 
on the edge of the campus.
9  Schwendinger, who was in Wilkin’s office at the time, witnessed 
his angry response.
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I have just informed Chancellor Heyns that I 
wish to be relieved of making the kind of 
decisions that seem to be required of deans 
during this crisis,  and that  I  am resigning 
from the University at the end of the spring 
quarter. I trust the faculty and see my role as 
supporting them rather than spying on them, 
as  seems  required  now.  My  decision  to 
resign was based…on a cumulative series of 
political and personal pressures, the former 
having recently been brought to bear on the 
University  and  on  the  School.  I  feel  the 
position of Dean in this School is a political 
one and I am not able to cope with such a 
setting.10
Wilkins finally left the School.11 Sheldon Messinger then 
became Acting Dean and, taking up the task initiated by 
Wilkins,  drafted  the  Ph.D.  curriculum  proposal  with 
agreement  from the  faculty.  This  draft,  however,  was 
preceded by an unusual set of events. In 1971, the Dean 
of Graduate Studies, following traditional procedures for 
evaluating  departments  and  professional  schools,  ap-
pointed the “Wolfgang Committee” composed of nation-
ally renowned criminologists, Martin Wolfgang, Donald 
Riddle, Richard Myren and James Short, to evaluate the 
School.  This  committee,  far  from  recommending  the 
demise of the School, found it “healthier than ever be-
fore.” It reported that the faculty was overworked and 
recommended limiting the size of the undergraduate pro-
gram. But it undeniably found the School academically 
sound, the faculty stable,  and even though some rela-
tions with outside agencies could be improved, student 
10 Quoted in Wasserman, op cit., p. 50.
11 He accepted a job at  the  SUNY,  Albany,  School  of  Criminal 
Justice.
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field placements in criminal justice agencies were gener-
ally fine. Wilkins was considered an excellent Dean, the 
students were firmly behind the School and the faculty 
and  student  moral  was  high.  The  committee,  perhaps 
aware of Bowker’s reservations about the School, sug-
gested that he become more familiar with the faculty’s 
sense of commitment and vision.12
After the School received the very favorable review 
by  the  Wolfgang  Committee,  the  Ph.D.  proposal  was 
confidently forwarded for approval in 1971 to the Aca-
demic Senate and administration.
However,  after  discovering  that  notable  criminolo-
gists  had  implicitly  criticized him but  not  the School, 
Bowker left nothing to chance. With Elberg, the Dean of 
Graduate Studies,  he formed his own committee com-
posed,  this  time,  of  politically  accommodating faculty 
members. Sindler, still raging over Cornell’s reconcilia-
tion with African-American students, was appointed the 
Committee  Chairman.  Like  Kenneth  Starr’s  investiga-
tion  of  President  Clinton,  which  began with  Clinton’s 
Arkansas associates,  Sindler  broadened the mission of 
the committee and joyfully served the Chancellor by de-
vising every conceivable reason to destroy the School. 
Since the evaluation by the Wolfgang Committee had 
praised  the  curricula  and  research  developed  by  the 
School  faculty,  Sindler  could not  readily employ their 
professional standards to condemn the School on those 
grounds. Accordingly, Bowker ignored the events justi-
fying the original rejection of the School’s “vocational-
12 Report of the Visiting Committee on the School of Criminology 
to the Chancellor, University of California, Berkeley, California. 
December  17,  1971.  Although  the  committee  may  have  been 
selected while Heyns was still Chancellor, Bowker replaced him 
at beginning of the 1971 fall semester.
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ism” prior to the 1960s and the subsequent appointment 
of  Joseph D.  Lohman.  Since  a  vocational  and techni-
cal-service school at Berkeley was a patently outdated 
relic, Lohman, you remember, had been given the task of 
reorganizing  the  curriculum.  Nonetheless,  Sindler  em-
braced the School’s archaic Charter as a police academy 
and forensic laboratory and used this prehistoric docu-
ment to define the “professional mission” of the School. 
He claimed the School should be closed because it had 
abandoned  its  original  mission  and  become too  “aca-
demic”13 even though this rationale, if applied generally, 
would have justified closing virtually every one of the 
professional schools at Berkeley.
To  deal  with  the  inevitable  reaction  to  the  report, 
Sindler armed his allies at the university by denouncing 
the courses taught  by radicals,  the organization of the 
School’s curriculum and the quality of its teaching staff. 
He also criticized the large number of students attracted 
to its courses, the size of the graduate program, the ob-
jections raised by law-enforcement, and on and on. He 
said  the  undergraduate  curriculum  was  disorganized 
even though it had been painstakingly reorganized and 
its  core  curriculum contained  twice  as  many  required 
courses  as  Sindler’s  Political  Science  Department  in 
Berkeley.
The report  could not stand scrutiny and subsequent 
review committees, individual faculty, the AFT faculty 
chapter,  student  organizations  and  student  newspapers 
challenged every one of its critical observations. But the 
debate  among  the  UCB  faculty  fixated  on  Sindler’s 
seemingly apolitical criticisms of the School rather than 
13 The  Sindler  committee  shamelessly  alleged  that  the  PhD 
program  request  proved  that  the  criminology  faculty  were 
abandoning their “professional” mission.
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the politics producing his report. Since university func-
tionaries and their political overlords backed Sindler, the 
report now provided counter-reformists with the ability 
to shift the terms of debate at will. Simultaneously, other 
faculty, including criminologists, could not, without per-
sonal risk, publicly challenge the tactics being made to 
legitimize the School by Bowker and his review com-
mittee.

7 |  Platt Denied Tenure
ome radicals at the School were socialists. Yet even 
though  they  were  fond  of  revolutionary  rhetoric, 
their activism was always based on nonviolent and re-
formist agendas. They informed the public and students 
about social class and racial inequities in criminal justice 
systems.  They exposed sexist  legal  practices  and pro-
moted  resources  for  women  who  were  battered  and 
raped. They fought to make police accountable through 
community  control  and  civilian  review  boards.  They 
participated in the struggle for prisoners’ rights and op-
posed  experimentation  in  prisons.  They  collaborated 
with anti-war movements and attacked university com-
plicity in the military-industrial complex.
S
In a sensitive and thoughtful article about the Berke-
ley period, Platt asserts that the radicals tended toward 
ultraleftism, romanticism and a messianic  utopianism.1 
But the word “tended,” in this context, should be quali-
fied because it glosses over significant political differ-
1  See, among others, Platt, Anthony M. 1991. “If We know, Then 
We  Must  Fight.’ The  Origins  of  Radical  Criminology  in  the 
United  States.”  Pp.  218–232  in  Radical  Sociologists  and  the  
Movement: Experiences, Lessons, and Legacies, edited by Marin 
Oppenheimer,  Martin  Murray,  and  Rhonda  E.  Levine. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. See pp. 227–228.
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ences  among  the  radicals—including  the  socialists.  It 
also pays no attention to the seemingly paradoxical com-
bination of revolutionary rhetoric and reformist agendas 
that characterized student movements in the Sixties. De-
spite their fondness for this kind of rhetoric, the radicals 
at  the  School  were  for  all  practical  purposes  “radical 
democrats” or “social democrats”—not Pop-Leninists.
Platt, of course, has never contended that ultraleftists, 
romanticists or messianic utopians killed the School of 
Criminology even though “respectable witnesses” at the 
scene of the crime point to the usual suspects. But the 
scene of the murder is like film noir, darkly lit and filled 
with characters who stubbornly refuse to see the frame-
up that obstructed justice by shunting the investigation 
into a search for red herrings.
The university  administration’s  denial  of  tenure for 
Platt  provides  additional  evidence  about  who  actually 
committed the crime. Since this denial was a gross viola-
tion  of  academic  freedom, the university  publications, 
mass media and everyone attending the School followed 
Tony Platt’s tenure case. His undergraduate years were 
spent at Oxford University in England. He received the 
1967 Richard McGee Award as “Outstanding Graduate 
Student” and was considered among the most brilliant 
students to graduate from the School. He joined the fac-
ulty toward the end of the Sixties after being employed 
at  the University  of Chicago and his academic record 
justified an accelerated promotion. In the early Seven-
ties, the senior faculty, two Deans, and the Committee 
on Privilege and Tenure had recommended his tenure. 
Nonetheless, Platt’s name was deleted from the recom-
mendations list sent to the Regents after he was arrested 
and  beaten  by  police  and  falsely  accused  of  criminal 
acts.
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The lies justifying the demise of the School and the 
identification of the usual suspects were particularly evi-
dent in Platt’s case. What, if anything, were his crimes? 
Platt and a friend, Tom Hayden, had joined a demonstra-
tion marking the anniversary of the savage police reac-
tion against  the “People’s  Park” demonstration.  Platt’s 
sworn account, written immediately after his encounter 
with police, also illustrates how customary police brutal-
ity had become at Berkeley:
I was first arrested at 4:00PM on Saturday, 
May 15,1971.  Three cops were chasing a 
young man over Bancroft Avenue and onto 
the campus, just north of Sproul Hall. I ran 
over to watch as they beat and handcuffed 
the man ... Schneider, a plainclothes campus 
cop was one of the three involved in beating 
the  handcuffed  prisoner.2 While  this  was 
happening,  other  cops were saturating  the 
area with tear gas,  which seemed to have 
little  effect  on  dispersing  people. 
[Schneider]  said,  ‘I’ve  got  two  more 
maggots in the car.  I’ll  bring them down’ 
(into the police station). [He] pushed by me 
and  knocked  my  glasses  to  the  floor, 
breaking  the  frames.  He  went  over  to  a 
police  car  parked  on  the  east  side  of 
Barrows Lane, next to Sproul Hall. He told 
Tom  Hayden  and  Jeff  Gerth  [who  were 
arrested in the midst of the chaos]3 to ‘get 
out, you maggots.’
2  Platt’s  statement  identified the plainclothesman’s  name but he 
was not sure of the spelling.
3  The FBI had distributed photographs of SDS and other notable 
personalities.  Police  were  ready  to  arrest  these  leaders  on 
trumped-up  charges  when  they  were  spotted  during 
demonstrations.
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He  pushed  the  two  prisoners  around  and  cursed  and 
pushed Platt as he brought them towards the police sta-
tion. Platt asked him what he was doing and he replied, 
“Get out of here. Fuck off maggot!”
Platt went to the campus police department to register 
a  complaint  about  police  brutality.  However,  when he 
said  that  he  wanted  to  see  Chief  Beal  or  “somebody 
else” to file a complaint, the policeman on guard at the 
entrance grabbed him, twisted his arm, and led him to a 
holding  area.  Platt  explained,  “There  were  four  other 
persons in the holding area [including Hayden, who had 
been beaten, and Gerth] all standing facing the wall.” He 
was also told to face the wall, with his hands against the 
wall and legs spread apart. “Somebody pushed my hands 
and legs wider so that my body was taut and stretched,” 
he reported. Then, Schneider, catching him completely 
by surprise,  punched him in the lower right abdomen. 
Platt  protested,  “The  blow  hurt  because  it  was  well 
placed and I was completely vulnerable. I dropped to the 
floor and two cops immediately picked me up and or-
dered me to stand against the wall again.” Following the 
attack, he not only felt nauseous but his stomach hurt for 
hours. He was then charged with “interfering with an of-
ficer.”
Platt was fingerprinted, booked and released on bail. 
He walked to the street where he had parked his car pri-
or to  the demonstration.  But someone had slashed his 
tires and smashed his rear-view mirror. (No other car on 
that  street  had  been  vandalized.)  While  Platt  was  in-
specting the adjacent cars, a patrol car suddenly pulled 
up  with  two policemen.  One pointed  at  a  car  next  to 
Platt’s and identified it as his own. He accused Platt of 
intending  to  vandalize  his  [the  policeman’s]  car.  Al-
though the policeman was repeatedly told that the  van-
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dalized  car  was Platt’s own  car,  he  handcuffed  Platt, 
beat him, took him to the station and beat him again. He 
was fingerprinted and, incredible as it may seem, booked 
this time for committing “malicious mischief to an auto-
mobile.”
Platt had been booked on false charges and criminally 
assaulted by the police. Nevertheless, the university ad-
ministration  invoked  disciplinary  rules  against  him  to 
justify removing his name from the tenure list sent to the 
Regents.  Subsequently,  however,  at  his  trial  in  the 
Berkeley  municipal  court,  the  judge  dismissed  the 
charges and a police department document substantiat-
ing Platt’s mistreatment was publicized.4 
After  the  criminal  charges  against  Platt  were  dis-
missed,  the  administration  invented  new  reasons  for 
denying his tenure. UC President Heyns had called Platt 
“immature.” His replacement, UCB Chancellor Bowker, 
cited  Platt’s  political  disagreements  with  local  police 
agencies as one reasons for denying tenure. He also said 
that he had conducted his own review of Platt’s merits, 
in part, based on a secret file not made available to re-
view committees. 
In a 1972 memo, Bowker provides further examples 
of his cynical disregard of the rules of fair play.5 He em-
phasized negative student evaluations and suggested that 
students  were  only  “stimulated  and  engaged”  by  his 
classes because they shared Platt’s political bias. Unbe-
lievably,  even though Platt  was considered one of  the 
finest students to have graduated from the Criminology 
4  During  the  following  months,  Takagi  and  Schwendinger 
circulated  a  letter  describing  the  Platt  case  that  asked  for 
donations to offset his legal costs.
5  Memo to Budget Committee, from Chancellor Albert H. Bowker, 
May 1, 1972.
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School,  Bowker  reached  back  to  Platt’s  student  days 
and, after  examining his transcripts, claimed that Platt 
should have taken more graduate courses in criminology 
and other subjects. He even scrutinized Platt’s qualifying 
examination for the Doctorate degree and lamely found 
a scribbled notation by a respected faculty member6 who 
praised Platt’s answer but observed that he really didn’t 
answer the question.7 
Bowker cited Platt didn’t deserve tenure because of 
his  political  disagreements  with  local  police  agencies. 
He also objected to Platt’s speeches at rallies and his tes-
timony  as  a  citizen  and  “expert”  before  the  Berkeley 
City Council. Platt had participated with others in a suc-
cessful attempt to prevent purchase of a police helicopter 
by the City of Berkeley. The helicopter could have been 
used for controlling demonstrations but would have had 
little  value—especially  in  light  of  its  great  cost—in 
fighting street crime. Yet Bowker called Platt a “dema-
gogue” for saying the helicopter would especially target 
Third  World  members  and  campus  communities  and 
thereby “accelerate  the  trend  toward  police  militarism 
and  a  garrison  state.”  (Such  comments,  it  will  be  re-
called, were made when the memory was still fresh of a 
National Guard helicopter spraying tear gas on demon-
strators at the Student Union Building and Sproul Plaza.) 
Platt had campaigned, albeit unsuccessfully, for (1) a 
reorganization of the Berkeley police to ensure commu-
nity control and for (2) a citizen’s police-review board 
6  This faculty member was an “outside member,”  from another 
department, required for conducting qualifying and oral doctoral 
exams.
7  The  faculty  member,  however,  did  approve  of  Platt’s  overall 
performance and signed his name to the formal documents noting 
that Platt had passed the examination.
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that would handle complaints about police. His right to 
engage in these activities was supported by constitution-
al  law.  Yet,  Bowker  now claimed Platt  was  unprofes-
sional because he undermined police morale.
AFT Local 1474 denounced Bowker’s barefaced vio-
lations of academic freedom. It devoted an entire edition 
of its newspaper, University Guardian, to the Platt case. 
“BOWKER  BLOCKS  PROMOTION—TRAMPLES 
ACADEMIC  FREEDOM”  headlined  the  first  page. 
Bowker’s outrageous comments  about  Platt’s  writings, 
teaching and political activities were itemized on page 
two. The third page detailed the Senate’s Privilege and 
Tenure Committee’s majority finding that Bowker had 
violated Platt’s academic freedom. Pages four and five 
scathingly reviewed the hypocrisy and spelled out  the 
lies behind Bowker’s refusal to recommend tenure. Page 
four was particularly informative: It printed an unsolicit-
ed statement, given to a Senate Committee by a visiting 
scholar who, as early as May 22, 1972, attended a dinner 
hosted by Bowker. The scholar said that the after-dinner 
conversation  centered  on Platt’s  case  for  over  half  an 
hour. He added,
Chancellor Bowker said that the School of 
Criminology did not belong on the Berkeley 
campus and that he would like to get rid of 
it.  He  said  budget  cuts  necessitated 
eliminating  certain  departments  and  that 
weak or second-rate departments would be 
the first to go. In discussing his grounds for 
considering the School of Criminology to be 
of  little  value,  Bowker  said  that  ‘all  the 
important  law enforcement officials  in the 
area with one exception, the Sheriff of San 
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Francisco, said they had no use for it.’8
Since,  Bowker  formed  the  Sindler  Committee  in  No-
vember, his candid remarks six months earlier at the din-
ner  indicate  that  the  Committee  was  a  fraud.  Its 
members were chosen because they would give Bowker 
what he wanted. 
The final page of the University Guardian featured a 
letter from Leon Wofsy, Professor of Immunology and 
President  of  the  Local,  which  drew parallels  between 
Nixon’s  Constitutional  violations  and Bowker’s  confi-
dential letter to the Senate Budget Committee earlier in 
1972. Wofsy declared,
No one considering the sequence of events 
and, above all, reading that letter, can escape 
the  sense  of  being  exposed  to  another 
episode of life as seen from inside executive 
chambers  in  Richard Nixon’s  Washington. 
In fact, there can be hardly a doubt about 
how 95% of  the  Berkeley  campus  would 
react  if  this  were  indeed  a  tale  out  of 
Washington:  a  story  of  gross  abuse  of 
executive  power  and  privilege,  of 
confidential files on enemies, of invitation to 
improper  political  intervention  by  law 
enforcement  agencies,  of  legal  maneuvers 
and interminable delays, of employment of 
budget  and administrative  manipulation to 
violate rights and punish an individual.9
Wofsy  unsuccessfully  urged  the  Academic  Senate  to 
8  “Unacceptable to Police Agencies.”  University Guardian,  AFT 
Local 1474, November 1973, p. 4.
9  Leon Wofsy, “Open Letter to UC Faculty.” University Guardian, 
AFT Local 1474. Nov. 1973, p. 8.
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strongly censure Bowker and call on the Chancellor to 
“restore  without  delay”  Platt’s  nomination  to  tenure 
rank. 
To obtain tenure, Platt fought an exhausting, unsuc-
cessful,  four-year  battle  with  the  Chancellor’s  office. 
The Academic Senate’s Privilege and Tenure Committee 
again and again reviewed his qualifications decided in 
his favor. It concluded that the Chancellor had violated 
Platt’s  academic  freedom  because  “political  criteria” 
were a factor in his case. But the administration rejected 
the Committee’s findings.10 Platt was never given tenure  
at UCB.
10 “Will  Faculty  Defend  Academic  Freedom?”  University  
Guardian, American Federation of Teachers, October 1974.
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redictably, Sindler had admirers. In the Foreword to 
The Closing of  the American Mind:  How Higher  
Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the  
Souls of Today’s Students, Allen Bloom wrote: “I want to 
express  my  admiration  for  Allan  P.  Sindler,  who  has 
been for me the model of the selfless university man. 
His lifelong behavior proves that the enterprise is still 
possible  and  worthwhile.”1 That  “worthwhile”  enter-
prise,  unsurprisingly, still  aimed at  revitalizing the cli-
mate of the Fifties when, according to Bloom, women 
were distinguished from men because they were femi-
nine and elite universities only served students who had 
the “personal advantages” in money and talent that mer-
ited a liberal  education. For Bloom, bringing back the 
past  would  compensate  for  the  catastrophic  Six-
ties—when spineless faculty refused to join the “brave 
band” who fought the rabble that dumped liberal educa-
tion and allowed inner-city “barbarians” and affirmative 
action into the “house of reason.”
P
1  Bloom states,  “The Earhart  Foundation and the John M. Olin 
Foundation have supported me as teacher and scholar for a long 
time, and I am very grateful to their officers.” These foundations 
are  among  the  growing  number  of  right-wing  foundations 
supporting conservative academics.
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Bloom taught at Cornell with Sindler in 1969 when 
African American students seized Willard Straight Hall.2 
In Bloom’s view, Cornell’s President, James A. Perkins, 
shared the blame for this “outrage” because he had sup-
ported affirmative action in 1967. Bloom said this sup-
port  increased enrollment of black students (especially 
inner-city blacks) who were ill prepared “for the great 
intellectual and social challenges awaiting them in the 
university.” 
Bloom insisted that the Cornell faculty should have 
failed these students instead of passing them and thereby 
making them “recognizably second class citizens.” He 
was further enraged by that “capitulation” because this 
stigma was neutralized by the Black Power movement. 
He claimed that the movement “hit the universities like a 
tidal wave” and it wrongly asserted that universities did 
not teach the truth. It claimed black students were sec-
ond-class not because they were academically poor but 
because they were being forced to imitate white culture. 
“The  way  was  opened  for  black  students  to  live  and 
study  the  black  experience,  to  be  comfortable,  rather 
than be constrained by the learning accessible to man as 
man,” Bloom moaned.
Bloom further alleged that black students extorted a 
reconciliation  at  gunpoint  following  the  seizure  of 
Willard  Straight  Hall.  He  noted  approvingly  that  law 
professors, supported by the mass media, petitioned the 
Trustees to dismiss President Perkins because he had re-
fused  to  summon  police  when  the  sit-in  occurred. 
Perkins was forced to resign. (In later years, Tom Jones, 
2  Bloom left Cornell for the University of Chicago where he wrote 
the book. It was riddled with inaccurate claims and pandered to 
popular  prejudices;  but  it  was  lauded  by  the  mass  media  and 
became a bestseller.
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the  black  student  leader  whose  threats  panicked  the 
group led by Sindler became a TIAA-CREF vice presi-
dent.  Afterwards,  Jones  obtained  an  annual  salary  of 
$2,000,000 at Smith Barney’s and he graciously funded 
a Cornell scholarship in Perkins’ name.)
Granted, Sindler,  a political scientist,  may not have 
fully  agreed with Bloom but  they undoubtedly  shared 
similar views of affirmative action and women’s, ethnic 
and  black-studies  programs.  Bloom’s  opinions  about 
these matters, of course, were easy to pin down because 
he wore them on his sleeve; however, since Sindler culti-
vated a cool air of impartiality, his opinions were not un-
covered easily.
Still,  Charles  M.  Lamb,  another  political  scientist, 
was not taken-in by Sindler’s public persona. With re-
gard to Sindler’s study of the Bakke “reverse discrimina-
tion” case,3 he observed,
Underneath what appears to be an objective 
study are signs of a pro-Bakke bias. First, of 
all the opinions written in the Bakke case, 
only  Justice  Brennan’s  anti-Bakke  stance 
comes  under  direct  fire.  For  example, 
Sindler  characterizes  the  Brennan position 
as  tautological,  incomplete,  misleading, 
fallacious, as an ‘attempt to settle the matter 
by judicial fiat,’ and as seeking to ‘reconcile 
racial  preferences  and  not  reverse 
discrimination  by  defining  reverse 
discrimination out of existence.’4
3  In  this  ‘reverse  discrimination’  case,  the  Supreme  Court 
concluded in a narrow 5-4 decision the minority quota program of 
the UC Davis Medical School was illegal.
4  Charles  M.  Lamb’s  1979 review of  Alan  P.  Sindler’s  Bakke, 
DeFunis,  and  Minority  Admissions:  The  Quest  for  Equal 
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Although it is virtually impossible to prove “intent” (as 
opposed to readily observable data) in affirmative-action 
cases, Sindler insisted a person’s intentions must be used 
to demonstrate proof of institutionalized racism and dis-
crimination at the workplace.
Although  Bloom’s  denunciation  of  the  Sixties  ap-
peared a decade and a half after Sindler’s academic-free-
dom memo and report, together they signified phases of 
the same conservative putsch. While attempting to con-
tain  the  damage  created  by  “barbarians”  who  “failed 
democracy” and “destroyed the souls of students,” they 
demonized the Sixties. The damage, in their minds, was 
caused,  above all,  by  radical  intellectuals  who at  that 
time debunked patriotic  myths,  undermined customary 
beliefs supporting female inequality, portrayed universi-
ties as instruments of class and racial  oppression,  and 
exposed hypocrisies underlying corporate liberalism (the 
dominant ideology of advanced capitalist societies). 
THE D EFINITION OF CRIME & THE CRISIS
Of course, radicals at the School contributed to this de-
mystification of ruling institutions and ideology. Given 
their professional interests and outlooks, they naturally 
debunked the traditional rationales for class, gender and 
racially  biased  law  enforcement  policies.  As  political 
dissent intensified, their targets expanded. They began to 
include class control of government and America’s polit-
ical economy. 
They  even  criticized  legal  definitions  of  crime. 
Schwendinger,  for  instance,  was  familiar  with  a  long 
standing debate about the relation between criminology, 
Opportunity.  In  The  American  Political  Science  Review  73 
(December) 1161–1162. 
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the law, and the state. He felt that this debate had opened 
a  Pandora’s  box  and  let  loose  fundamental  questions 
about the nature and aims of criminology.
He  said  that  criminology  was  the  only  discipline 
whose object of inquiry was imposed by the state. While 
church and state in the Middle Ages had defined the pa-
rameters  of  physics  and astronomy,  scientists  in  these 
fields today reject  the role played previously by these 
authorities. Nevertheless, criminologists overwhelming-
ly take for granted that crime is defined by the law and 
sanctioned by the state.
He also was familiar  with  the  work of  an eminent 
criminologist, Edwin Sutherland, who believed that oth-
er definitions of crime were possible. Sutherland noted 
that “white collar crimes were committed by people who 
had the power to limit how their harmful acts could be 
prosecuted or whether these acts were even defined as a 
crime.”5 To  justify  his  standpoint,  Sutherland  stressed 
that crime is generally regarded to be  socially harmful 
conduct. The phrase “socially harmful” in this context 
implies that criminal acts such as murder or theft are, in 
principle, offenses offending society at large as well as 
an individual. 
Schwendinger  went  further.  If  “crime” was consid-
ered socially harmful conduct, what about policies that 
lawmakers  did  not  consider  crimes  even  though  they 
were caused by the suppression of human rights? And 
what about the popular usage of the word crime for great 
social harms that are not crimes by law simply because 
5  For centuries, writers have noted the degree to which criminal 
codes  target  the  poor  and  powerless  rather  than  the  rich  and 
powerful. As Anatole France exclaimed, “The law in its majestic 
equality, forbids the rich and the poor to steal bread and to sleep 
under bridges.”
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powerful groups or classes determine what will be de-
fined as crime? Also, if these great harms are produced 
by  systemic  characteristics  of  a  social  system,  should 
that system be considered criminal?
Operational  interpretations  of  definitions  of  crime 
were also problematic. Students at the School of Crimi-
nology took courses  at  the  Law School.  And to meet 
course  requirements,  they  were  submitting  essays  that 
condemned Nixon and Kissinger as war criminals. Their 
instructors  rejected  their  essays  and  insisted  that  they 
were using the word crime unprofessionally. Nixon and 
Kissinger,  in  their  view,  were  not  war  criminals  until 
they had actually been found guilty in a court of law.
This kind of view had been expressed in the long-lost 
debate by a legal scholar, Paul Tappan, who contended 
that Edwin Sutherland, a criminologist, had no right to 
use the term white-collar crime to classify corporations 
not been found guilty of violating the law or not com-
mitted acts codified by criminal laws. Consequently, the 
Berkeley professors who shared Tappan’s opinion were 
tightening the customary bonds that tied criminology to 
the state and its definitions of crime.
Schwendinger felt that Sutherland’s objections were 
valid. But he felt that the notion of “social harm” had to 
be spelled out. He suggested that grounding definitions 
of crime in historically evolving conceptions of funda-
mental human rights might prove useful in making this 
break. 
For example, when the Cambodian invasion occurred, 
Schwendinger had already drafted the article on the defi-
nition  of  crime  but  the  invasion  underscored  its  rele-
vance. Students across the nation flew into a rage against 
the war. One-third of the colleges in the United States 
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were shut down by demonstrations and walkouts. Ohio 
National  Guardsmen  killed  four  student  protesters  at 
Kent State, and two Mississippi students were killed at 
Jackson State. Nevertheless, even though Congress sub-
sequently repealed the Gulf  of  Tonkin Resolution and 
passed the Cooper-Church Amendment, prohibiting the 
use of troops outside South Vietnam, Nixon continued to 
bomb Cambodia until 1973. An estimated one hundred 
thousand peasants died in the bombing, and two million 
people were left homeless. The suffering and devastation 
rallied the Cambodian peasantry to Pol Pot and, by as-
suring his success, set the stage for his “killing fields.” 
Was any of this a crime?
During this  period  Schwendinger  defended the stu-
dents  who  had  been  accused  by  Law  School  faculty 
members of being unprofessional. In one of his classes, 
this defense employed his thinking about the “definition 
of crime” debate and, after “word got around,” doctoral 
students  who  were  editors  of  Issues  in  Criminology, 
asked him to write an article for their journal.6
The challenge to customary limits of professional ac-
tivity in criminology was picked up. It helped undermine 
the legitimacy of Bowker and Sindler’s insistence that 
the  School  had  no  other  purpose  beyond  serving  the 
state.7 
6  Herman Schwendinger  and Julia  Schwendinger “Defenders  of 
Order or Guardians of Human Rights?” Issues in Criminology, 5 
(2) Summer. 1970. Pp. 23–157. Julia was at that time a doctoral 
student at the School.
7  The Schwendingers’ article is still in circulation and can be found 
in Stuart Henry and Mark M. Lanier’s 2001 anthology,  What is  
Crime? Controversies over the Nature of Crime and What to Do  
about  It.  Latham,  Maryland:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
pp. 65–98.
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THE SOCIOLOGISTS OF THE CHAIR
Professional  legitimacy was challenged in  other  disci-
plines. At the 1968 American Sociology Society Confer-
ence,  for  example,  Martin  Nicolaus  astonished  the 
profession by declaring:
...  the  sociologist  who  always  wears  the 
livery, the suit and tie of his masters – this is 
the type of sociologist who sets the tone of 
the  profession,  and  it  is  this  type  of 
sociologist  who  is  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  a  house  servant  in  the  corporate 
establishment,  a  white  intellectual  Uncle 
Tom not only for this government and ruling 
class  but  for  any  government  and  ruling 
class.
Herman and Julia Schwendinger cite Nicolaus’ declara-
tion in The Sociologists of the Chair: A Radical Analysis  
of  the  Formative  Years  of  North  American  Sociology  
(1883-1922). The Chair—a shortened title of this wordy 
book—strongly criticized the founding fathers of Ameri-
can sociology as well as contemporary sociologists who 
dominated the field. When Herman Schwendinger’s ten-
ure was being decided, this work undermined the possi-
bility of receiving unanimously favorable reviews. Other 
conditions were also important, but they cannot be as-
sessed until readers are familiar with the book.
The book’s cover featured an early 20th century politi-
cal drawing symbolizing how labor leaders like Eugene 
Debs had viewed the academy. Entitled, “None So Blind 
As  Those  Who  Cannot  Afford  To  See,”  the  drawing 
showed academics averting their eyes or using a book 
and mortarboard to block the sight of a bloated capitalist 
whose chariot was being drawn by slaves. 
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The opening chapters unraveled the standpoints pro-
ducing the academic response to the class relations. It 
pointed out that during the formative years of American 
sociology,  sociologists  generally  subscribed  to  liberal-
ism,  the  dominant  worldview  in  capitalist  societies.8 
However,  this  did not mean that there were no differ-
ences  among  them.  Furthermore,  liberalism  itself  has 
changed at each stage of capitalist development. Corre-
sponding broadly to mercantile, industrial and monopoly 
stages, three major variants of liberalism, namely, classi-
cal, laissez-faire and corporate liberalism, have emerged. 
By the turn of the 20th century, all three had sociological 
exponents even though corporate liberalism eventually 
dominated when sociology became an academic disci-
pline.9 
Corporate liberals argued that without political regu-
lation of economic life, capitalism would be destroyed 
by class conflicts sparked by gigantic corporations, labor 
unions and socialist movements. Corporate liberals legit-
imized  social  inequality,  centralization  of  capital  and 
American imperialism; nevertheless, they also supported 
the welfare state. Additional doctrines made this liberal 
variant viable in the face of changing economic and po-
litical realities. 
Since The Chair focused on the relationships between 
early  sociological  ideas  and  long-term  developments, 
trends  in liberal  thought were “held constant” and the 
work  of  intellectual  precursors  were  examined  only 
when they affected these trends. Consequently, it depart-
8  The Chair broke with histories of sociology that emphasized the 
influence  of  Protestantism;  it  considered  liberalism  far  more 
important for understanding developments in sociology.
9  These  stages  are  founded  on  development  of  mercantile, 
industrial and monopoly capitalism.
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ed significantly from accounts based on the succession 
of “great men” and a linear approach to the history of 
social thought.  The Chair’s discussion of historical pre-
cursors  of  corporate  liberalism  instead  emphasized  a 
highly varied population because, at each new stage of 
development, intellectuals living during that stage recon-
stituted the standards influencing the selection and inte-
gration  of  preexisting  ideas  into  liberal  thought.  For 
instance,  19th century laissez-faire liberals  felt  that the 
French  physiocrats  had  contributed  to  the  doctrine  of 
free trade even though the physiocrats had focused on 
agrarian rather than an industrial free trade policy. Cor-
porate liberals used Comte’s ideas to fashion their own 
liberal doctrines even though he had been antagonistic to 
many liberal ideas during his own lifetime. Accordingly, 
the identification of a person’s contribution to liberalism 
was based first and foremost on an examination of the 
general contents of liberalism, and not on the writings of 
any single individual.
Furthermore, for understanding dominant trends, de-
partures from these trends during an individual’s career 
were  considered  irrelevant.  W.I.Thomas  changed  his 
mind about  the  biological  basis  for  female  inferiority. 
When Social Darwinism had dominated sociology, how-
ever, his belief in the inferiority of women was clearly 
evident. 
Also, The Chair proposed that any attempt to explain 
the development of sociology in the United States must 
take into account the university as a prime generator of 
liberal ideology. Liberalism, in this view, does not mere-
ly function as an influential external source of sociologi-
cal ideas. Academic life is organized generally around 
liberal precepts, and academics, among others, make lib-
eralism what it is.
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C. Wright Mills in “The Professional Ideology of So-
cial Pathologists,” had challenged the authority of liber-
alism  among  sociologists.10 He  said,  “Liberalism  has 
become less of a reform movement than the administra-
tion of social services in a welfare state; sociology has 
lost its reforming push; its tendencies toward fragmen-
tary problems and scattered causation has been conser-
vatively  turned  to  the  use  of  corporation,  army  and 
state.” Instead of conducting a critical analysis of the po-
litical framework of American capitalism, early sociolo-
gists  at  the  University  of  Chicago and elsewhere  had 
identified  themselves  with  law  or  administration  and 
perceived  the  everyday  troubles  of  men  and  women 
from a bureaucratic point of view. In The Chair these so-
ciologists  were  called  “technocrats”  or  “technocratic 
scholars” because they instituted administrative and sci-
entific  technologies  so as  to  maintain  the  institutional 
and class structures that make modern capitalism what it 
is.11 
To  repel  the  political  unrest  and  egalitarian  move-
ments of the Sixties, sociologists initiated the fashion of 
calling for renewing faith in the icons of their profes-
sion.12 In 1970, for example, when anti-war protests had 
escalated, the presidential address to the American Soci-
ological  Association  by  UCB  sociologist,  Reinhard 
Bendix safeguarded the noble spirit of “independent in-
quiry,  free  discussion  and  academic  self-government” 
10 C.  Wright  Mills.  The  Professional  Ideology  of  Social 
Pathologists. American Journal of Sociology 49 No.2 Sept. 1943.
11 In  state-socialist  societies,  The  Chair added,  the  technocrat 
performs  an  analogous  role  by  either  stimulating  new  class 
differentiations  or  maintaining  the  old,  under  the  control  of  a 
political oligarchy. (See p152-154)
12 Bloom  is  another  eminent  scholar  exemplifying  this  fashion 
albeit in the humanities.
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against the “distrust of reason” exhibited by radical stu-
dents. Bendix urged sociologists not to heed these bar-
baric  students  and  abandon  the  scholarly  heritage 
created earlier  by such men as Sigmund Freud, Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber.
But what kind of theories and policies did these icons 
actually  create  in  the  name of  reason and rationality? 
According to  The Chair, Durkheim underwrote an offi-
cial morality based on technocratic and imperialist doc-
trines;  Freud’s  theories  buttressed the exploitative and 
sexist conditions in modern societies with the force of 
natural  law;  and Weber,  despite  his  qualifications,  es-
poused an elitist doctrine of ideological neutrality. 
The  Schwendingers  also  challenged  the  scientific 
worth  of  these  icons.  For  example,  they  scrutinized 
Durkheim’s  Division of Labor In Society, considered a 
classic by technocratic sociologists. However, after com-
paring this work to Marx’s analysis of division of labor 
under capitalism, The Chair concluded that Durkheim’s 
work was decidedly inferior. Aside from its commonsen-
sical interpretations, it was based on a flawed, utopian, 
utterly  classless,  syndicalist  model  of  capitalist  soci-
eties.13
Pushing the limit still further, the Schwendingers took 
on Freud. They found that his patriarchal and homopho-
bic instinct theory was being discredited along with oth-
er instinct theories as early as the 1920s in light of L.L. 
Bernard’s discovery of 15,789 separate instincts listed in 
biological and social-science literature.14 They noted that 
13 Empirical research has falsified Durkheim’s theory of retributive 
and resttutive law.
14 This rejection, of course, preceded the contemporary assault on 
Freud’s  approach  to  homosexuality,  gender  relations,  Oedipal 
complex,  patriarchal  family  or  dreaming  and  unconscious 
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founding sociologists had revitalized Freud’s pathology 
of criminal behavior and wrongly attributed the behavior 
of  revolutionaries,  labor  leaders  and  homosexuals  as 
“sublimated” deviant adaptations to “disorganized” con-
ditions—by substituting “wishes,” “needs” or “values” 
for instincts.15 
Finally,  specialists  in  religion  and  economics  have 
long regarded Weber’s theory of the origins of capital-
ism as untenable. Only in sociology can one find people 
who continue  to  believe  that  his  theory  has  scientific 
merit.16 
Unlike Theda Skocpol who claimed that federal sup-
port  for  widows and orphans  after  the  civil  war  gave 
birth to the welfare state,17 The Chair contended the wel-
fare state was produced by economic and political condi-
tions occurring in due course among industrial nations. 
It observed that the founders of American sociology re-
constituted  liberalism  to  interpret  and  deal  with  class 
processes,  conducted  by  behavioral,  cognitive  and 
neuropsychological research. See, for instance, E. Fuller Torrey’s 
survey, Freudian Fraud: The Malignant Effect of Freud’s Theory  
on American Thought and Culture.  New York:  Harper Collins, 
1992.
15 See, for example,  the section, The Construction of the Freud-
Thomas Bridge in the Chair.
16 Richard  F.  Hamilton  identified  twelve  empirical  claims  by 
Weber.  After  comparing  these  claims  with  historical  data,  he 
found  (1996:  85–86))  that  none  of  them  received  unqualified 
support. (Eight were totally unsupported while confirmation for 
the remaining claims was ambiguous.) Finally, Hamilton (1996: 
91–97),  examined citation indices  and  discovered  that  Weber’s 
thesis  was  still  being  regarded  positively  by  sociological 
textbooks and eminent sociologists like UCB’s Neil Smelser.
17 Theda  Skocpol.  1992.  Protecting  Soldiers  and  Mothers:  The  
Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States, Belknap 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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conflict,  political  unrest  and  industrial  warfare.  Since 
some of them had been educated in German universities, 
they knew that German corporate liberals had success-
fully advised Chancellor Bismarck to stop his futile at-
tempt  to  crush  the  Social  Democratic  Labor  Party  by 
force and, instead, to defuse working class discontent by 
co-opting  portions  of  the  socialist  party’s  platform. 
Adopting  their  advice,  Bismarck  got  the  Reichstag  to 
provide for accident and sickness insurance for workers, 
old-age insurance (“social  security”),  industrial  sanita-
tion  and  safety,  progressive  taxation,  protection  for 
women and children, and nationalization of the commu-
nication  and  transportation  industries.  Such  measures, 
the  Schwendingers  proposed,  successfully  challenged 
the  policies  of  laissez-faire  liberalism and created  the 
first “welfare state.”18 
Besides, even though they were corporate liberals, the 
Germans were called “socialists of the chair” (Katheder-
sozialisten) or “professorial socialists” because they oc-
cupied  academic  “chairs”  and  because  conservatives 
identified their welfare state policies with “creeping so-
cialism.” The Schwendingers adapted the title  Sociolo-
gists  of  the  Chair from this  German  usage.  The  title 
emphasized that American sociology has been essential-
ly an academic enterprise.
While demystifying the icons of American sociology, 
The Chair spelled out its own approach to their writings. 
It pointed out that their theoretical ideas did not sudden-
ly emerge fully developed because they were being ad-
justed  to  rapidly  changing  conditions.  When  they 
searched  the  past  for  suggestive  ideas  to  solutions  of 
18 United States  was one of  the last  highly industrial  nations to 
adopt  welfare  state  policies.  And  it  did  most  of  this  adoption 
during the Great Depression, a period of intense class conflict.
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new problems, old categories and phrases were used in 
new ways. Consequently, their theories were at first ex-
pressed by “transitional  categories” incorporating both 
new and old ways of thinking. In time, however, the so-
ciological thought born in this process increasingly lost 
its transitional characteristics. As economic and political 
changes were being consolidated, they were, so to speak, 
“rationalized,” that  is,  articulated by formal  categories 
and incorporated into “grand theories” about the nature 
of man,  woman and society.  About  four decades tran-
spired before these extremely abstract conceptions fully 
emerged in American sociology.19
The Chair also indicated that the founding sociolo-
gists rewrote history in a double sense. First, while for-
mulating new conceptions of social evolution, they made 
their own history by reconstructing the way the past was 
perceived.  They  also  made  history  by  contributing  to 
ideological perspectives that impinged upon the chang-
ing shape of capitalism. Racist doctrines used by Ameri-
can  sociologists,  for  instance,  interacted  with 
exploitative  relations  that  differentiated  metropolitan 
from “underdeveloped”  countries  in  Asia,  Africa,  and 
South America. They also interacted with the oppression 
of racial and national groups within the United States. 
To dramatize the proper context for evaluating their the-
ories,  The Chair  described the robbery, brigandage and 
genocidal  acts  generated by American imperialists  be-
cause  they  provided  an  historical  background  against 
which the works of the founding sociologists should be 
19 These developments, of course, did not occur in an ideological 
vacuum. Between 1880 and l920, in particular, diverse scholars 
representing  numerous  fields  throughout  the  Western  world 
generated the new liberal philosophy of life that eventually led to 
the construction of new families of ethical, epistemological, and 
theoretical models of man, woman and society.
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evaluated.
For  example,  Lester  Ward,  one  of  the  founders  of 
American sociology, claimed that the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs  had  treated  the  Indians  equitably.  He  asserted 
that a “Negro” who rapes a white  woman is  not only 
driven by lust; he is also motivated by a desire “to raise 
his race to a little higher level.” Edward R. Ross, another 
founder,  slandered people in  China,  India,  Africa,  and 
elsewhere. He believed that Jews constituted a distinct 
race and indicated that the Jews of Eastern Europe, in 
particular,  are  “moral  cripples,  their  souls  warped and 
dwarfed.”  Franklin  H.  Giddings,  another  founder,  at-
tacked people who opposed the Spanish-American War, 
exclaiming  that  the  “racial  energies”  of  Anglo-Saxon 
Americans  might  discharge  themselves  in  anarchistic, 
socialistic and other “destructive modes” of life if they 
were not displaced by imperialist ventures. Charles H. 
Cooley referred to the feelings of self,  which not only 
distinguished  the  individual  from others,  but  also  the 
Anglo-Saxon race from its inferiors.20 
It is also important to note Giddings’ justifications for 
American imperialism. They castigated anti-imperialists 
for ignoring the “cosmic laws” about “the survival of the 
fittest” which had been popularized by the great champi-
on of laissez-faire  liberalism,  Herbert  Spencer.  Never-
20 He  observed  that  “controlled  by  intellect  and  purpose,  this 
passion for differentiation becomes self-reliance, self-discipline, 
and immutable persistence in private aim: qualities which more 
than any others make the greater power of superior persons and 
races.” Comparing Northern Europeans to Southern Europeans, 
Cooley  further  wrote  that  the  former,  “less  given  to  blind 
enthusiasm for  popular  idols  have  more  constructive  power  in 
building ideals from various personal sources . . . [they] are more 
sober and independent in their judgment of particular persons . . . 
their idealism is all the more potent. . .” etc.
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theless, Giddings revised Spencer’s social Darwinism to 
suit  his  own  political  stance.  Although  he  rejected 
Spencer’s  laissez-faire  opposition  to  gunboat  colonial 
policies,  he  kept  the  faith  with Spencer’s  racism.  The 
same was true of other founders such as Ward, Ross, and 
Cooley.
As  social  Darwinism  was  being  discarded,  reform 
Darwinism emerged as a transitional school of thought.21 
Ward, Giddings, Ross, and Cooley modified Spencer’s 
social Darwinism because they believed that social re-
formers, public administrators and legislators were capa-
ble  of achieving “enlightened” control of evolutionary 
social  processes.  Consequently,  in  this  process, 
Spencer’s “scientific laws” were ripped from their lais-
sez-faire  contexts  and used  to  justify  reformist  liberal 
doctrines. By modifying his racist, environmentalist and 
evolutionary “laws” so that they could justify “guided” 
social change,22 social reformers could adopt a number 
of Spencer’s Darwinist assumptions to justify accelerat-
ing evolutionary changes, in an “enlightened” manner.23 
The Chair further demystified the founders, showing 
that some of their writings proposed public policies that 
would  ameliorate  gender  inequality.  But  Ward  and 
Thomas, for instance, filtered their proposals through the 
belief that female intelligence had deteriorated biologi-
cally, even though they agreed with Lewis Henry Mor-
21 This  phrase  was  borrowed  from  Richard  Hofstadter  (Social  
Darwinism in  American  Thought.  New York:  George  Braziller 
1959).
22 After all, Spencer also believed reformers were quite capable of 
introducing  social  changes,  even  though  legislation  aimed  at 
prolonging the lives of “degenerate races” would be disastrous for 
the human species.
23 Simultaneously, his “structural and functional” analytic strategy 
was also modified to serve these ends.
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gan that prehistoric women were born superior or equal 
to men. Women, in their view, had become inferior be-
cause they had to adapt biologically to bland environ-
mental conditions created by their passive nature or by 
restrictions imposed by males who were more aggres-
sive  and  sexually  motivated.  To  enhance  the  gradual 
evolution of female intelligence, these reform Darwin-
ists supported stimulating educational environments for 
women. Nevertheless, underlying their support was the 
assumption that females were in fact biological inferi-
ors.24 
Furthermore, The Chair noted that reform Darwinism 
shaped liberal explanations of other kinds of social in-
equality. Ross, the granddaddy of social-control theory, 
for instance, considered his work a scientific guide to so-
cial  problems  like  crime  and  political  unrest.  He  be-
lieved in the superiority of the “Aryan race.” He asserted 
that  Aryan superior  intelligence,  enterprise  and daring 
posed special problems for officials, executives and edu-
cators.  Unlike  unintelligent,  slothful  and  cowardly 
Africans and Asians, the Aryans could not be controlled 
by force, superstition and religion alone. Therefore, he 
24 Mary Jo Deegan (Jane Addams and the Men of  the Chicago 
School,  1892–1918, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988) 
objects  that  the Schwendingers  ignored Thomas’ later  writings, 
which  oppose  biological  determination  of  female  inequality. 
However, Thomas’ later writings were in this context irrelevant 
because  the  object  of  analysis  was  ‘transitional  theories’ and 
dominant  ideologies.  (The  Schwendingers’ Introduction  plainly 
indicates  the  epistemological  grounds  for  differentiating 
theoretical trends and ideologies from individuals.) Deegan also 
ignores their discussion of the word ‘radical.’ She believes that a 
Fabian  socialist  is  necessarily  a  radical  even  though  socialist 
ideas,  ‘sweetwater  socialists’ and corporate liberalism were not 
always mutually exclusive. There was plenty of room for Fabian 
ideas among the Kathedersozialisten.
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encouraged people who managed social  institutions  to 
adopt  “sophisticated”  measures  that  cultivate  self-con-
trol and thereby encourage Aryans to conform voluntari-
ly to the law.
The Chair uncovered still another dimension of cor-
porate liberalism based on liberal syndicalism, a transi-
tional view of social class and class conflict. This form 
of  syndicalism  was  developed  by  Albion  Small, 
Durkheim and others who reinvigorated liberalism in the 
face of growing class war between gigantic corporations, 
on one hand, and labor and socialist movements on the 
other.25 Small’s syndicalist writings objected to laissez-
faire  views of  the  economy and the state.  He defined 
market relations within the context of society as a whole, 
and reoriented sociologists toward pluralist theories and 
doctrines  emphasizing  class  harmony,  class  collabora-
tion and the “functional interdependence” of economic 
groups.
Small was particularly important for the formation of 
academic sociology because he was critical to the emer-
gence of sociology at the University of Chicago. As an 
administrator, he determined who would be employed in 
the  first  sociology  graduate  program  and  who  would 
publish articles in the first sociology journal in the Unit-
ed States.  The Chair exposed the class bias and corpo-
rate  leanings  that  permeated  Small’s  writings  and 
administrative practices. For example, on several occa-
25 While  reformulating  liberalism,  the  Americans  selected 
preexisting  ideas,  whether  espoused  by  liberals  or  not,  that 
seemed relevant to  their  analyses  of contemporary events.  The 
Chair had  to  describe  these  ideas  and  show  why  they  were 
important.  Unfortunately,  it  pedantically  devoted  160  opening 
pages to various precursors even though their relevance could not 
be appreciated until transitional theories, bridging the corporate 
phase of liberalism with earlier phases, were described.
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sions, state and federal troops readily supported capital 
in its war against labor.26 During Small’s tenure, Presi-
dent Cleveland in 1894 dispatched 10,000 infantry, cav-
alry,  and  artillery  troops  to  Chicago,  the  largest  U.S. 
railway  center,  to  suppress  striking  workers  who  had 
crippled engines, overturned freight cars, and sabotaged 
tracks  in  the  Great  Pullman  Strike.  Corporate  barons, 
some of whom controlled the University of Chicago, had 
lost millions.27 Consequently, Small obeyed corporate in-
terests by backing the firing of a University of Chicago 
faculty member, Edward W. Bemis who, despite his gen-
erally critical stand toward the strike, had taken the side 
of labor. 
The  Schwendingers  also  deconstructed  Park  and 
Burgess’s  renowned theory  about  “universal  processes 
of social interaction.” They uncovered the analytic struc-
ture of  this  theory and showed that  its  explanation of 
these processes actually  did not constitute  a  theory.  It 
was  merely  composed  of  loosely  connected  formal 
“metatheoretical  abstractions”  whose  meanings  were 
keyed to “families of theories” formulated by social Dar-
winists, reform Darwinists, pluralists, psychoanalytic so-
ciologists, and so on.28
26 Virtual  civil war broke out in 1914 when company thugs and 
state militia in 1914 massacred women and children at Ludlow 
miner’s  camp.  Enraged  detachments  of  United  Mine  Workers 
roamed throughout Colorado after this incident occurred, battling 
company  police  and  state  troopers  and  dynamiting  mine  and 
smelter works owned by John D. Rockefeller. President Wilson at 
Rockefeller’s urging sent thousands of federal troops to Colorado 
to crush the uprising.
27 A few months after the strike was crushed, the regular army was 
raised to 50,000 men and more armories  were being started in 
Chicago, New York, and elsewhere, to keep down any possible 
labor uprising in the future.
28 For the  utopian research program underlying these “universal 
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Furthermore, The Chair recognized Park’s role in cat-
alyzing the Chicago School of urban sociology. The au-
thors used Harvey W. Zorbaugh’s  Gold Coast and the  
Slum, which epitomized this school, as still another ex-
ample  of  “the  professional  ideology  of  social 
pathology.”29 Examining  Zorbaugh’s  work,  The  Chair 
found that he caricatured Chicago working-class districts 
as “disorganized slums” compared to the cohesive up-
per-class districts in the “Gold Coast.”  The Chair said 
that Zorbaugh’s study was little more than pseudo-scien-
tific apologetics for upper-class control of city life.30 Af-
ter  examining  other  works,  The Chair concluded  that 
Park and Burgess’ liberal  functionalism, and its  major 
component, “structural functionalism,” dominated soci-
ology until  the tumultuous 1960s because they served 
corporate interests in particular, and obfuscated or justi-
fied capitalism and its social inequalities in general.
In  contrast  with  the  apologetics  of  sociology’s 
founders,  The Chair found that free-lance intellectuals 
early in the 20th century were adding a distinctly differ-
ent voice to rising urban discontent. Indignantly labeled 
“muckrakers” (by Theodore Roosevelt),  journalists be-
gan to publish systematic exposures of corrupt political 
machines, land frauds, and harmful practices in the food 
and drug industries. They centered their fire on fraudu-
lent  stock-market  manipulations  by finance  capitalists. 
processes” see  The Chair’s  chapters  on Park and Burgess,  and 
Thrasher. 
29 Zorbaugh’s work is considered a major achievement in Chicago 
School’s development.
30 Zorbaugh  indicated  that  working-class  Chicago  communities 
were incapable of  running Chicago because they were socially 
disorganized. The North side, “Gold Coast,” composed of upper 
class  families,  on the  other  hand,  was  deemed entitled  to  rule 
because of their superior solidarity and social organization.
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These writers excoriated the “public be damned” attitude 
of the industrial robber barons, and raked the monopo-
lies and monopoly trusts with their scathing criticism.
Simultaneously,  such  authors  as  Theodore  Dreiser 
and Jack London began to publish compelling descrip-
tions of the lives of working people. A notable work of 
this kind was Jack London’s People of the Abyss. Dress-
ing  himself  in  clothing  befitting  an  unemployed 
“down-and-out”  workingman  in  London,  England,  he 
lived  among the  people  who desperately  searched  for 
work but  could find no steady employment.  From his 
sensitive observations of interpersonal relations and by 
noting personal conversations, London illustrated the de-
gree to which “the people of the abyss” aided each other 
despite  the  extraordinary  deprivation  confronting  their 
everyday  existence.  His  ethnographic  observations  re-
vealed  the  compassionate  and  human  qualities  of  the 
persons he met, as well as the degree to which their spir-
its were perpetually menaced by poverty.
Although  some  of  London’s  works  were  deeply 
flawed  by the  racist  and social  Darwinist  attitudes  so 
prevalent  among  West  Coast  writers  and  workers  (as 
well  as  sociologists),  The  People  of  the  Abyss was  a 
powerful indictment of “the managing class” which op-
pressed the working people of England. In order to make 
this indictment, London contrasted this managing class 
with the Inuit tribe living along the banks of the Yukon 
River. He regarded the Inuit as an example of “savage 
folk” who shared their food, shelter, and clothing with 
each other no matter how little they possessed. London 
argued that the social organization among these people 
was superior to modern civilization. He stated, for exam-
ple, that the Inuit had “their times of plenty and times of 
famine. In good times they feast; in bad times they die of 
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starvation. But starvation as a chronic condition, present 
with a large number of them all the time, is a thing un-
known.” On the other hand, he pointed out, in England 
the food eaten by “the managing class” as well as “the 
wine it drinks, the shows it makes, and the fine clothes it 
wears,  are  challenged  by  eight  million  mouths  which 
have never enough to feed them, and by twice the eight 
million  bodies  which  have  never  been  sufficiently 
clothed and housed.”
London used what  sociologists  call  “participant-ob-
servation” methods to arrive at an understanding of hu-
man  relations  and  he  succeeded  in  producing  an 
outstanding ethnographic work. But  The People of the  
Abyss never received any credit in professional histories 
of urban ethnography in the United States. Perhaps the 
reasons include the fact that London was a nonprofes-
sional who became a socialist around 1905. Perhaps they 
involve London’s belief that social reformers and intel-
lectual “savants” who descended upon slum areas with 
their “college settlements, missions, charities and what 
not,” were failures. He believed, despite their sincerity, 
“They do not understand the simple sociology of Christ, 
yet they come to the miserable and the despised with the 
pomp of social redeemers.” He pointed out that, in spite 
of  their  perseverance,  they  accomplished  absolutely 
nothing  “beyond  relieving  an  infinitesimal  fraction  of 
the misery and collecting a certain amount of data which 
might otherwise have been more scientifically and less 
expensively collected ...” “As someone has said,” Lon-
don caustically concluded, “they do everything for the 
poor except get off their backs.”
Corporate liberalism would never have dominated so-
cial thought in the United States without the control ex-
erted  by  corporations  on  universities.  To  demonstrate 
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this control, The Chair reviewed Thorsten Veblen’s 1918 
critical work,  On the Higher Learning, which used the 
University of Chicago as a model. Veblen flatly stated 
that business domination of governing boards had virtu-
ally transformed major universities into industrial orga-
nizations and their faculties into apologists for finance 
capital.31 Upton  Sinclair’s  scathing  1922  book,  The 
Goose-Step, went even further. It described the system-
atic  repression  of  radicals  and  caricatured  as  docile 
geese self-policing academics, heads capped by mortar-
boards, goose-stepping in military formation at Colum-
bia,  Harvard,  Pennsylvania,  Yale  and  Chicago 
universities. It noted that the trustees in leading Califor-
nia  universities,  including  UCB,  formed  interlocking 
networks of bankers, corporate directors and attorneys.32
At that time, the repressive conditions sustained by 
this  control  were  indisputable.  Political  dissidents 
among the faculty were easily dismissed from employ-
ment.  Furthermore,  dismissal  was  extremely  serious, 
since there was an academic blacklist in existence. With 
regard to this, Veblen declared:
So  well  is  the  academic  blacklist 
understood,  indeed,  and  so  sensitive  and 
trustworthy is  the  fearsome loyalty of  the 
common  run  among  academic  men,  that 
very few among them will venture openly to 
say  a  good  word  for  any  one  of  their 
colleagues who may have fallen under the 
displeasure of some incumbent of executive 
office.  This  work  of  intimidation  and 
31 Veblen  used,  as  indicated  in  The  Chair,  the  University  of 
Chicago as a model.
32 Upton Sinclair, The Goose-Step: a Study of American Education. 
Albert & Charles Boni, 1922 Revised Edition. (Orig. 1936)
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subordination  may  fairly  be  said  to  have 
acquired the force of an institution, and to 
need no current surveillance or effort.33
The Chair described the extent of repression in Ameri-
can universities. It emphasized characteristics of classic 
academic-freedom cases being ignored by liberal sociol-
ogists. For example, Ross was fired after making a racist 
speech in support of the Asian Exclusion Acts, at a San 
Francisco labor meeting. He had criticized Leland Stan-
ford, the robber baron who founded Stanford University, 
for hiring Chinese “coolies” at wages that undermined 
the living standards of white workers. But Ross was not 
fired because he was a virulent racist. If he had not criti-
cized Stanford but merely said that Chinese should not 
be allowed to immigrate to the U.S. or should be denied 
employment if they did, he would never have been fired.
Another famous case involved the esteemed political 
economist,  Richard  T.  Ely  who had  helped  Ross  find 
employment after he had been dismissed. Ely had been 
accused of teaching Marxism at the University of Wis-
consin and of sheltering a labor leader during a strike. 
The university trustees decided the charges were grave 
enough to examine the truthfulness of the allegations. At 
their  formal  hearings,  evidence—including  testimony 
from Ely’s students showed that he was teaching Marx-
ism only to condemn it; that he informed students about 
socialism but believed it was destructive; and that he had 
never entertained a union leader at his home or encour-
aged workers to strike. Ely, in fact, wrote, if the charges 
were actually true they would “unquestionably unfit me 
to  occupy  a  responsible  position  as  an  instructor  of 
youth in a great university.” 
33 See The Chair, p. 515.
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Ely and his  defenders  impressed  the trustees.  They 
did not fire him. However, observing that he would cer-
tainly have been fired if he had been a Marxist or sup-
ported  the  strike,  The Chair concluded  that  academic 
freedom couldn’t be taken at face value when its operat-
ing interpretations were being determined by corporate 
control of universities. 
Examination of additional cases involving academics 
who opposed participation  in  World  War  I,  like  Scott 
Nearing, showed that universities had room for corpo-
rate sycophants, racists and imperialists but they barely 
tolerated people who militantly supported racial equali-
ty, labor unions, socialist parties, anti-war movements or 
Marxism. Universalistic declarations, however, masked 
these  operating  limits  of  academic  freedom.  For  in-
stance, when the Wisconsin trustees published their deci-
sion in the Ely case, which was subsequently inscribed 
on a tablet in Bascom Hall, they declared,
In all lines of academic investigation it is the 
utmost  importance  that  the  investigator 
should  be  absolutely  free  to  follow  the 
indications of truth wherever they may lead. 
Whatever  may  be  the  limitations  which 
trammel inquiry elsewhere we believe that 
the  great  State  University  of  Wisconsin 
should  ever  encourage  that  continual  and 
fearless  sifting  and  winnowing  by  which 
alone truth can be found.
After noting the history of academic repression in Ameri-
ca, The Chair refuted the myth that academics were free 
to  engage  in  the  “fearless  sifting  and  winnowing  by 
which truth alone can be found.”
Comparisons with their contemporaries enabled  The 
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Chair to also question whether racist, classist and sexist 
biases were found in the writings of Ward, Ross, Small, 
Ellwood, Ogburn, Chapin, Park, Burgess, Weatherly and 
the  others  simply  because  they  were  “men  of  their 
time”—mere  passive  recipients  of  dominant  thinking. 
Their works were not compared to the works of Marxists 
alone. Contrasts were made with writings by people like 
the anarchist William Haywood, the labor leader Eugene 
V. Debs, and the militant liberal William E.B. Du Bois, 
who  epitomized  authentically  radical  American  tradi-
tions.34 Haywood attacked the “race prejudice” expressed 
by  socialists  influenced  by  social  Darwinism.  Unlike 
Small’s utopian version of liberal syndicalism, he advo-
cated  anarcho-syndicalism.  In  addition  to  denouncing 
racism  in  the  American  labor  movement,  Debs  con-
demned American universities for “doing nothing” about 
the “great labor problem in America” because they got 
their “money from the other side.”35 
Du Bois reported that he had trouble at Atlanta Uni-
versity because the university could not obtain research 
funds from wealthy Northern capitalists as long as he re-
mained there.36 Du Bois had opposed the “Tuskegee Ma-
chine”  headed  by  Booker  T.  Washington  that  in  his 
opinion placed greater priority on vocational training to 
provide  cheap  labor  for  Northern  capitalists  than  on 
fighting for Negro suffrage. In his first decade at Atlanta, 
Du Bois had hoped to establish “a center of sociological 
research, in close connection and cooperation with Har-
vard,  Columbia,  Johns  Hopkins  and  the  University  of 
34 The  word  “radical”  was  not  confined  to  Marxian  socialist 
traditions.
35 Debs  attributed  the  source  of  this  remark  to  University  of 
Chicago President Harper.
36 Du  Bois  was  a  liberal  at  that  time  but  eventually  became a 
socialist.
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Pennsylvania.”  Obviously,  since  he  was  a  sociologist, 
this plan was dependent on close and congenial relations 
with leading members of his profession. His candid re-
marks  at  the  second  annual  sociological  conference, 
however, revealed growing disillusionment that these re-
lations would ever be established:
When we at Atlanta University say that we 
are  the  only  institution  in  the  US  that  is 
making  any  serious  study  of  the  race 
problem in the US, we make no great boast 
because it is not that we are doing so much, 
but rather that the rest of the nation is doing 
nothing, and we can get from the rest of the 
nation  very  little  encouragement, 
cooperation, or help in this work.
Du Bois’ autobiography implicates the political dynam-
ics that isolated him from people like Ward, Ross, Small, 
Ellwood, Ogburn, Chapin, Park, Burgess, Weatherly and 
the other liberals who became presidents of the Ameri-
can Sociological  Society.  His  career  demonstrates  that 
whoever  controls  the academic labor  force also deter-
mines the dominant political compositions of profession-
al  associations  and  their  publications.  Du  Bois  was 
forced to leave Atlanta while Robert E. Park, who had 
been employed for a while as Booker T. Washington’s 
personal secretary and ghostwriter,37 went on to become 
a leading academic authority on race relations. Du Bois, 
some of whose finest works were written while he en-
gaged in political activity following his departure, had to 
abandon his dream of using social science to change the 
status of African-Americans in the United States.
37 See  David Levering Lewis,  W.E.B.  Du Bois:  A Biography of  
Race 1868–1919. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1993. The term 
“ghostwriter” is Levering’s. 
9 |  “Reading” the Text
hen  The  Chair  was  published,  David  Matza 
allowed Basic Books to print a testimonial on the 
jacket.  He  called  The  Chair “a  brilliant  Marxian 
consideration  of  the  foundations  of  American 
sociological theory that will be quite controversial since 
the Schwendingers  take on just  about everyone in the 
field.”
W
The  word,  “controversial,”  was  an  understatement. 
Two unequivocally  polarized  reviews of  the  book ap-
peared in Contemporary Sociology, the American Socio-
logical  Society  book-review  journal.  The  chief  editor 
reported having solicited reviews from two other people; 
but one could not send a review while the other respond-
ed with a 100-page manuscript, far exceeding acceptable 
page limits. The editor then took an unprecedented step 
by  publishing  two  unsolicited  reviews,  one  favorable 
and the other unfavorable.
Phil Heiple’s review pronounced The Chair “power-
ful and convincing.” He wrote, “The central assertions 
of this book have long been common knowledge among 
radical sociologists but never before has there been such 
a totalistic and fully documented account of the political 
origins  and  implications  of  American  sociology.”  He 
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claimed the work yielded “new insights and reveal hith-
erto unrealized depths of corporate control over research 
and education.  The extent to which academic scholars 
are builders and perpetuators of the status quo is indicat-
ed  with  extreme  clarity.”  He  applauded  the 
Schwendingers for relying upon Antonio Gramsci’s con-
cept of “hegemony” and for classifying Small as an “or-
ganic  intellectual.”  He  also  complimented  the 
Schwendingers for uncovering the transition of sociolo-
gists from liberal reformers to technocratic functionaries 
and the connection between academic repression and the 
disinterested  pursuit  of  knowledge.  Heiple  declared, 
“Much like Baritz’s disclosure of the corporate control 
of industrial psychologists in The Servants of Power, the 
Schwendingers reveal the actual powerlessness of soci-
ologists and the manipulation of sociologists by corpo-
rate interests.”1
The negative review by Peter  Kivisto,  on the other 
hand, condemned Schwendinger’s assertions.  He flatly 
dismissed their claim that corporate interests controlled 
universities. He also considered  The Chair’s moral “in-
dictments”  scandalous.  Calling  American  sociology’s 
founders “sexists” and “racists” was especially grating. 
He rejected the Schwendinger’s claim that sociologists 
had legitimated monopoly capital and formulated tech-
nocratic social-control policies.
Kivisto  also  criticized  Schwendinger’s  treatment  of 
the individuals who had founded sociology.2 He objected 
1 Heiple  published  a second review in  Insurgent  Sociologist.  He 
observed:  “The  section  on  academic  repression  should  be 
mandatory reading for every radical sociologist in the university. 
It is brilliant, as is the book as a whole.”
2 The  phrase  “organic  intellectual”  is  derived  from  Gramsci’s 
notebooks  written  while  he  was  imprisoned by Mussolini.  See 
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to the their depiction of Small as an “organic intellectu-
al” who “muted radical criticism of society.” Though he 
granted that they employed Gramsci’s term “hegemony” 
and Lukacs’ “reification,” he dubbed the Schwendingers 
“true positivists” rather than Marxists. Objecting to their 
treatment of Durkheim and Freud, Kivisto, on the other 
hand, indignantly protested: “[Even] Marx did not en-
gage in such heretical activity; rather, he sought to dis-
cover  kernels  of  truth  and  insight  in  the  work  of  his 
predecessors, working through their tradition rather than 
around it.”
While Kivisto seemed to have acquired his expertise 
from Marx for Dummies, Paul J. Baker, another review-
er, must have relied on Cliff’s Evangelical College Notes  
on Albion Small. In a review for the  American Journal 
of Sociology, Baker agreed that the Schwendingers were 
heretics. He called The Chair “demonology.”3 It was “a 
propaganda piece for sectarian socialists but difficult to 
take seriously as a work of scholarship.” To justify his 
allegations, he said the Schwendingers were ignorant of 
the facts when they claimed the standards for profession-
al competence by the end of the formative years had be-
come thoroughly “positivistic” (i.e., more precisely, and 
perversely, “technocratic”). He insisted that Small “nev-
er ‘rejected’ his own ethical ideas as old fashioned and 
opinionated.” Furthermore, in his opinion, “there is no 
record of pioneer sociologists converting to positivism, 
grudgingly or otherwise.”
Baker was wrong. The Chair had repeatedly demon-
Antonio Gramsci.  1971.  Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 
(editors and translators, Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith) New York: 
International Publishers.
3  Paul  J.  Baker,  1975,  “Review  of  Sociologists  of  the  Chair.” 
American Journal of Sociology 80 (May) 1487–1489.
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strated this conversion. Furthermore, it included the emi-
nent “Christian Sociologist,” Albion Small, whose later 
writings emphasized the newer analytic (i.e.,  positivis-
tic) methods and minimized those based on a Christian 
ethic.  After  making a  confession about  his  own place 
among the early sociological “sinners,” and after casti-
gating sociologists and non-sociologists for their unsci-
entific and naive writings, Small categorically stated, “In 
short, a humiliating proportion of the so-called ‘sociolo-
gy’ of the last thirty years in America ... has been simply 
old-fashioned  opinionativeness  under  a  new-fangled 
name.”4 
Edward  L.  Suntrup,  in  THE  ANNALS,  gave  The 
Chair its due. He emphasized  The Chair’s worthwhile-
ness despite its troubling character: “For those who prac-
tice,  or  pretend  to  practice  value-free  science  as 
sociologists, the reading of this book will or should be 
disturbing. Whether it will be ultimately disturbing will 
depend upon whether one accepts the authors’ historical 
interpretations and theoretical linkages – and there are 
many – as well as whether one agrees with their anti-lib-
eralism, Marxist assumptions. In either case, the book is 
worth reading.”5
Gale Omvedt, in  Issues in Criminology, emphasized 
The Chair’s relevance for a feminist approach to sociol-
ogy.6 She said, “Giving form to the content and style of 
their  book  is  the  uniqueness  of  their  starting  points.” 
4  Albion  Small,  Origins  of  Sociology,  Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago Press. 1924, p. 379. 
5  Edward  L.  Suntrup.  1974.  THE  ANNALS of  the  American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 416 (November) 257–
258.
6  Gail  Omvedt,  1973,  “Prolegomena To A Feminist  Sociology,” 
Issues in Criminology 8 (Fall) 163–174.
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These included the premise that “equality and freedom 
from exploitation be the criteria by which a society is 
judged” and that “equality  is  possible  since inequality 
and exploitation are not due to ‘human nature’ or univer-
sal  ‘functional imperatives’ of a society.” In Omvedt’s 
opinion, “The Sociologists of the Chair represents a ma-
jor challenge to the conventional history of American so-
ciology  that  would  not,  like  Gouldner’s  work,  be 
acceptable to the established profession.”
Alvin Gouldner had written an admirable book, but 
he wrongly believed that social theory was moving to-
ward a rapprochement between Marxist and functional 
sociologies.  He  claimed  a  critical  sociology  would 
emerge from reflexive awareness of value commitments 
on the part of individual scientists. Yet, this claim over-
rated individualistic and subjective criteria for scientific 
knowledge and it underestimated the effect of material 
conditions on theoretical preferences. The Chair, among 
other things, urged radical sociologists to counter these 
conditions  by  supporting  their  own associations,  jour-
nals, conferences and other joint activities to compensate 
for the isolation most feel in their departments.
The radical movement at the Criminology School in-
fluenced  the  Schwendingers.  But  their  work  was  not 
governed  by  a  knee-jerk  accord  with  the  movement’s 
ethical or political imperatives. Certainly, commitments 
to  egalitarian ideals influenced their  work;  but the re-
views that denounced them for “finding what they were 
looking  for”  had  dismissed  an  elemental  criterion  for 
judging research. They had found what they were look-
ing for because their study, at every turn, confirmed the-
oretical ideas proposed by C. Wright Mills, Dusky Lee 
Smith,  James  Weinstein  and  William  Appleman 
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Williams.7
Ironically, the research producing  The Chair  did not 
originally  aim  at  an  historical  analysis  of  sociology’s 
founders. At first, the Schwendingers were merely inter-
ested in background material for introducing their book 
on subcultures and delinquency. Their own field obser-
vations  and  interviews  had  invalidated  and  rejected 
highly  praised  delinquency  theories  by  Albert  Cohen, 
Richard  Cloward  and  Lloyd  Ohlin,  who  followed  in 
Robert K. Merton’s footsteps.8 (Regardless, even though 
their delinquent subcultures were fictitious entities, Co-
hen’s  Delinquent Boys and Cloward and Ohlin’s  Delin-
quency and Opportunity, were cited 1,145 times—more 
citations than any other basic theoretical work on delin-
quency published from 1945 to 1972!) How could these 
predecessors provide reliable traditions? Skepticism and 
cynicism were more appropriate.
Besides, Schwendingers’ search for empirical studies 
backing August Hollingshead’s theory encouraged fur-
ther disenchantment. Sociologists in the Fifties and Six-
ties were positively convinced that August Hollingshead 
had  produced  the  definitive  work  on social  class  and 
7  C.  Wright  Mills,  1949,  “The  Professional  Ideology  of  Social 
Pathologists.”  American  Journal  of  Sociology 49  (September) 
165–180.  Dusky Lee Smith,  1965,  “Sociology and the Rise of 
Corporate Capitalism.”  Science and Society 29 (Fall) 401–418. 
James  Weinstein,  1968,  The  Corporate  Ideal  and  the  Liberal  
State:  1900–1918. Boston:  Beacon  Press.  William  Appleman 
Williams, 1961,  The Contours of American History. New York: 
World.
8  Albert Cohen, 1955, Delinquent Boys, The Culture of the Gang. 
Glencoe,  Ill.:  Free  Press.  Richard  Cloward  and  Lloyd  Ohlin, 
1960.  Delinquency  and  Opportunity.  Glencoe,  Ill.:  Free  Press. 
Robert  K.  Merton,  1938,  “Social  Structure  and  Anomie.” 
American Sociological Review 3 (October) 672–682.
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peer relations.9 How could this be? Every single large-s-
cale sociometric study uncovered by the Schwendingers  
disconfirmed his thesis. Furthermore, theoretical alterna-
tives  to  Hollingshead’s  structural  functional  theory  of 
social class and peer relations were virtually nonexistent. 
To discover what accounted for this disgraceful state of 
affairs, the Schwendingers turned back to earlier periods 
in the development of sociology. What was the result?
By the end of the Sixties, Schwendinger had been en-
couraged by Herbert Blumer, an outstanding sociologist, 
to publish his dissertation. But Herman’s obsessive quest 
for  understanding  what  went  wrong  with  delinquency 
theory had taken on a life of its own. He systematically 
detected  links  that  connected  Merton’s  and  Holling-
shead’s classic works to the founders of American soci-
ology. This exploration finally involved his wife, Julia, 
who  had  been  a  co-director  in  a  research  project  on 
delinquency  funded  by  the  NIMH.  Working  together, 
they  ignored  the  possibility  that  Herman’s  tenure  at 
Berkeley would have been secured by the publication of 
his  dissertation.  Instead  they  single-mindedly  pursued 
the origins of delinquency theories about delinquency.
They knew that sociology in their time was dominat-
ed by what was called “structural functionalist theories.” 
But, they tried to understand why American sociologists 
believed structural functional theories were true. Robert 
Merton’s “general theory of deviance,” for instance, was 
contradicted by every crime committed by powerful and 
wealthy people. Moreover, they realized that delinquen-
cy subculture theories—despite the existence of delin-
quency committed by children of well-to-do families—
were  also  dependent  for  their  credibility  on  com-
9  August B. Hollingshead, 1949, Elmtown’s Youth. New York: John 
Wiley.
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mon-sense wisdom backed by centuries-old observations 
about street crimes and economic disadvantage? 
How can theories that produce no genuinely new in-
formation about human relationships be considered ma-
jor  contributions  to  science?  Competent  scientists 
automatically  raised  questions  like  these,  but  they 
seemed stuck in the throats of structural functionalists so 
they couldn’t spit them out.
To identify the ideological functions of sociological 
writings, the Schwendingers’ analytic usage of “sexism,” 
“racism,”  “imperialism”  and  “exploitation”  conformed 
to countless other Marxian works that used these cate-
gories for classifying theoretical as well as moral stand-
points.  Ironically,  sociologists  like  Kivisto  and  Baker 
denounced realistic concepts like “sexism” and “imperi-
alism” as  ideological  and not  analytic,  while  concepts 
like “social control” produced by founding sociologists 
were regarded as analytic and not ideological.
Kivisto and Baker believed that analytic thinking was 
unaffected by history and, in this case, by the demands 
for sexual, racial, national and economic equality being 
raised by centuries-old social  and political  movements 
whose advocates created their own ideas about the possi-
bilities of human existence.
Still, there were more subtle reasons for understand-
ing the response to The Chair. Michael T. Ort’s review, 
in  Crime and Social Justice, revealed these reasons by 
concentrating  on  The  Chair’s  epistemology.10 He  said 
the book had features not duplicated elsewhere. It con-
tained an approach to the “theory of theory” which may 
10 Michael  Ort,  1975,  “Social  Theory,  Ideology  and  the 
Technocratic Structure.” Crime and Social Justice 4 (Fall–Winter) 
66–70.
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not have been familiar to its readers. Social theory has 
been  studied  from  the  “sociology-of-knowledge”  per-
spective, which situates social  thinking within specific 
socio-historical environments and shows how it arises to 
pose or solve certain problems. Ort asserted, “This the 
Schwendingers do but they go much further by explor-
ing the internal logic and tacit assumptions of dominant 
theories.” Because of The Chair’s interests in the analyt-
ic structures underlying theories,  it  “never degenerates 
into  either  an  economically  or  environmentally  deter-
ministic  explanation  as  is  so  typical  of  many Marxist 
and  sociological  discourses  on  theoretical  topics.”  He 
believed that appreciating  The  Chair required a careful 
reading as well as analytic capability.
Because of  The Chair’s  analytic approach, Ort pre-
dicted that “readers will not find either an exposition of 
theoretical perspectives absolutely adhering to the order 
of  historical  development  or  a discussion of the com-
plete  contribution made by each theorist.”11 To clarify 
this important point, Ort added, “Again, this work is not 
a simple enumeration of theoretical ideas, but is an anal-
ysis of the integral relationship between social structure, 
ideology,  social  theory,  and  the  social  framework  in 
which it is produced. It is not concerned, for example, 
with the ‘richness’ of W. I. Thomas’s thought, but only 
with his contribution to the development of liberalism in 
social theory.” Unfortunately, “it is precisely this analyt-
ic approach which has baffled some hackneyed review-
ers who looked to the text for a common-place ‘history 
of ideas’ or a ponderous exposition of the ‘linear’ devel-
opment of ‘scientific’ knowledge.” 
The Chair had added problems with hackneyed re-
viewers because it challenged the idea that the founders 
11 Ort considers this approach both “structural” and “synchronic”.
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should merely be considered “waxen tablets” inscribed 
with the racism of their times. Marx’s writings certainly 
cannot be regarded as the last word on the topic of 19th-
century exploitation and imperialism, but they certainly 
were superior to Herbert Spencer’s. If applied creatively 
and systematically  to  American  conditions,  a  Marxian 
analysis would have linked racial and national oppres-
sion to capitalist  development and imperialism. It  cer-
tainly  would  not  have  interpreted  these  forms  of 
oppression, as did founders like Ross, in the context of a 
universal struggle for existence among biologically su-
perior and inferior races.12 
The  book  backed  this  assertion  by  comparing  the 
founders’ works with contemporaneous, alternative ways 
of  thinking.  For  example,  Ward,  as  indicated,  wrote 
about the subjugation of women.  The Chair compared 
his theory to Engels’ theory and showed that these men 
faced similar analytic options and, at least in part,  the 
same  theoretical  problems.  Both  of  them rejected  the 
prevalent notion that women were slaves of men in the 
earliest prehistoric times. Each of them, moreover, pre-
dicted equality  for  women in  the  future.  Furthermore, 
anthropological interest and theories about women, mar-
riage and the family had developed rapidly during the 
two decades prior to 1883 when Ward’s first work deal-
ing with women was published. Although comparative 
knowledge was still undeveloped, Ward and Engels had 
12 Their writings reinforced the ideas that had influenced liberals 
and nonliberals alike. When socialist leaders such as Eugene Debs 
and William Haywood began to denounce the “race prejudice” 
which  had  been  expressed  by such socialists  as  Victor  Berger, 
they were struggling against the effects of liberalism. During the 
formative  years,  Spencerism,  social  Darwinism,  and 
neo-Malthusian ideas, rather than Marxian theories, were adopted 
in writings and policies of many socialists.
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available the same assortment of ideas about the evolu-
tion of human society. These ideas included: social-Dar-
winist  categories  based  on  natural  selection; 
psychological categories for male aggression such as in-
stinct; technological categories that linked evolutionary 
developments  with  economic  change;  socio-economic 
categories  referring  to  changing modes of  production; 
and an array of political categories useful for solving the 
problem of social integration.
As the most plausible keys to the origins of the subju-
gation of women and the institution of marriage and the 
family,  Ward,  oriented  toward liberalism,  chose man’s 
sexual passion, man’s desire for private property, wom-
an’s desire for security, and various reductionist mecha-
nisms linked with the concepts of natural selection and 
scarce resources. Engels, moving in a materialist direc-
tion, based the major part of his explanation on changes 
in the modes of production, private property and origins 
of the state. Male sexual passions, he insisted, had noth-
ing to do with the origins of the patriarchal family.13
The Schwendinger’s insisted that the founders of so-
ciology were  relatively  autonomous agents.  They rode 
the initial wave of modern university development, rela-
tively  unencumbered  by  ancient  academic  traditions. 
They rapidly institutionalized their status as members of 
a  newly  independent  discipline  within  the  academy. 
They established separate sociology departments much 
earlier than the Europeans, and were able to train a much 
larger core of professional sociologists who applied the 
13 Engels said the patriarchal family “was not in any way the fruit 
of individual sex-love, with which it had nothing whatever to do.” 
See, Frederick Engels, 1968,  The Origin of the Family, Private  
Property,  and  the  State.  Moscow:  Progress  Publishers,  p.62. 
Originally published in 1884.
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new ways of thinking to greater varieties of social  is-
sues. As a consequence, Americans, like Ross, were far 
more capable of elaborating the programmatic implica-
tions of categories such as “social control” by which so-
cial  and political  hegemony had been, was being,  and 
could be maintained.
The Chair treated ideological knowledge as the by-
product of complex processes that exhibited an internal 
dynamic of their own.14 For example, although Park and 
Burgess formulated their own theories, the uniqueness of 
their  contribution  to  functionalist  theories  lay  in  their 
ability,  first,  to  distinguish  distinct  trends  in  social 
thought; second, to extract widely used paradigms from 
preexisting “families of theories,” and third, to parsimo-
niously reconceptualize and formalize these paradigms.15 
Eventually,  what  the  Schwendingers  dubbed  the 
“metatheoretical formulations” produced by this process 
came to be classified by Park and Burgess as “universal 
processes  of  social  interaction.”  The  Chair identified 
these so-called empirical processes as components of a 
tacit utopian liberal paradigm that guided future genera-
tions  of  sociologists.  Furthermore,  Park  and  Burgess’ 
works reinforced the conviction that the corpus of liberal 
theories  was an objective,  value-free representation  of 
reality.
Examples of how this metaphysics worked were de-
scribed in  a  chapter  devoted  to  “urban technography” 
14 This stress on relative autonomy touches on a later debate over 
the  value  of  decoupling  ideology  from  social  structure  in 
structural analyses. “In the absence of any degree of autonomy it 
becomes impossible to examine their interplay,” Margaret Archer 
insists. 
15 These  men  were  also  adept  at  identifying  common  analytic 
strategies to make them available to other scholars.
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(i.e.,  technocratic  urban ethnography).  This  pioneering 
approach  to  social  problems  was  innovated  by  The 
Chicago School of ethnography. Under Park’s tutelage, 
for instance, sociologists studied social problems posed 
by hobos, prostitutes and gangs. While these studies in 
some cases reflected the humanistic intentions of their 
authors, their analytic frameworks were grounded in so-
cial-control theory and their causal schema were based 
on opportunities for the gratification of desires. 
In The Hobo, for instance, Anderson proposed that in-
dividuals become tramps and hobos because of unem-
ployment,  seasonal  work,  discrimination,  or  personal 
crises and defects. So far, so good. However, once com-
mitted  to  a  migratory  mode  of  existence,  the  hobo 
hungers  for  intimate  associations  and  affections,  even 
though he is “disbarred from family life.” Therefore, be-
cause his “fundamental wishes for response and status 
have been denied expression,” the hobo attempts to real-
ize these wishes by alternative means. But look where 
Anderson takes us from here. Deprived of sexual fulfill-
ment, the hobo turns to homosexuality. Denied status in 
organized society, “he longs for a classless society where 
all  inequalities  shall  be  abolished.”  “In  the  Industrial 
Workers of the World and other radical organizations, he 
finds in association with restless men of his own kind 
the recognition everywhere else denied him.”16
Cressey’s  The  Taxi-Dance  Hall  was  published  ten 
years after  The Hobo. By that time, sociologists in this 
technographic  series  classified  an  individual’s  behav-
ioral regularities according to “cycles” of development. 
According to Cressey, the first cycle in the taxi dancer 
began with a working girl’s dissatisfaction with the type 
16 Nels  Anderson,  The  Hobo.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago 
Press. 1923, p. 149.
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of  life  associated  with  her  home  and  neighborhood. 
Driven  by  the  frustrated  desire  for  money,  masculine 
contacts,  or  status,  the  girl  “finds  her  way  to  the 
taxi-dance hall, wherein she is able to secure a satisfac-
tion  of  certain  wishes  previously  unfulfilled.”  At  the 
dance hall,  the girl  finds herself “rushed” and “enjoys 
the thrill of being very popular.” In time, however, she 
must make “a deliberate effort to maintain her status.” If 
she fails and is no longer able to secure sufficient pa-
tronage exclusively  from the white  group [men],  “she 
comes  eventually  to  accept  the  romantic  attentions  of 
Filipinos  and other  Orientals.” Failure to  maintain the 
prestige accorded by the Orientals results in frequenting 
the “black and tan” cabarets. If she fails to maintain her 
prestige in the cabarets, she finally turns to prostitution 
in the “black belt.”
Nowhere in these works do you find causality linked 
to  the  evils  of  a  class  society.  In  Anderson’s  and 
Cressey’s studies we find the repetitive use of Thomas’ 
four “wishes,” frustrated striving, and such functionally 
equivalent relationships as “family life,” a socialist labor 
organization  or  status  relations  in  white  or  Asian  or 
“black and tan” dance halls. In later decades, the Ameri-
can  Dream (i.e.,  desires  for  social  status  or  economic 
mobility)  replaced  the  four  wishes;  and  functionally 
equivalent relationships were converted into formal cate-
gories by middle-range metatheorists (e.g., “legitimate” 
and “illegitimate opportunity structures”).
In  reality,  this  process  of  “metatheorizing,”  of  ab-
stracting paradigmatic ideas commonly found in theories 
and then dubbing these ideas “universal processes” or 
“middle-range theories” has never been empirically vali-
dated  in  any  scientific  discipline.  Merton’s  so-called 
“general theory of deviancy” exemplifies how this un-
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scientific approach was applied in the sociology of “de-
viancy” and in criminology. 
While describing these metatheoretical developments 
and their accompanying rhetoric of ideological neutrali-
ty, The Chair urged radical sociologists to move beyond 
criticism of each liberal category or each liberal theory 
or each liberal school of thought. It provided an analytic 
strategy that identified whole families of liberal theories 
and schools of thought. Unfortunately, using these “fam-
ilies” in  research meant  the unwitting adoption of the 
“way things are” from the standpoint of a corporate-lib-
eral metaphysics of normality.
Chapter 8 in The Chair noted that C. Wright Mills, in 
“The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists,” had 
challenged the authority of liberalism as early as 1959. 
Left-liberals, anarchists and socialists in the late Sixties 
greatly expanded Mills’ critique. Eventually, their writ-
ings shattered the hegemony of structural functional par-
adigms in sociology and, to a degree, helped broaden the 
political composition of sociology departments. Simulta-
neously, however, they created a professional “crisis of 
legitimacy” that galvanized eminent liberal sociologists 
in defense of their technocratic discipline. 
Looking  back  to  the  formative  years,  for  example, 
eminent sociologists such as Robert Nisbet claimed that 
liberal scholarship at the turn of the century represented 
the culmination of a golden age in social thought.17 Men 
like  Durkheim,  Weber,  Simmel,  Freud,  and  Tönnies 
were  considered  the  foremost  products  of  this  golden 
age, and those who followed in their footsteps were, by 
implication, their scions. The Chair, however, suggested 
17 Robert A. Nisbet,  The Sociological Tradition. New York: Basic 
Books. 1966.
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that  establishment  sociology—as  an  outcome  of  the 
most abstract ideas produced during the formative years
—has been able to justify social repression in the name 
of freedom, to color technocratic aims with humanitari-
an-sounding platitudes, and to mask ideological engage-
ment with the doctrine of ideological neutrality.
Other sociologists like Reinhard Bendix, for example, 
claimed that  the writings  of “classical”  sociologists  at 
the turn of the century were informed by the traditions of 
rationalism and romanticism, which had emerged in the 
18th and 19th centuries. But The Chair showed that cor-
porate-liberal works from the formative years were not 
actually generated by a desire for enlightened accommo-
dation between rationalism and romanticism. These writ-
ings represented an intellectual accommodation to social 
inequality,  imperialism and monopoly capitalism.  Nei-
ther  the  liberating  passions  nor  the  rational  optimism 
that emerged toward the end of the Age of Reason in-
formed European and American corporate liberals at the 
turn of the 19th century.
The formative years of modern sociology began when 
the pioneering sociologists in America were preoccupied 
with the maintenance of capitalism, not its destruction. 
In  their  reformist  zeal  to  achieve  both  order  and 
progress, they condemned the egotistical souls of busi-
ness barons but declared that conflict between syndicat-
ed capital and labor was reconcilable. They illuminated 
their sociological visions of a capitalist utopia with the 
shiny  faces  of  efficient  people  bound  together  in  the 
mythical  solidarity  of  bygone  days.  The  spirits  of 
Malthus, Comte, and Darwin walked through their pages 
and even Christ himself was called upon in time of need. 
For four stormy decades they employed the writings of 
the quick and the dead to revitalize the universal ideas of 
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19th  century liberalism. By the 1920s, the leading mem-
bers of the new generation of sociologists had begun to 
abandon the secular and religious images of benevolent 
humanitarianism that had justified their conservative re-
formist  tradition.  In  a  climate  of  political  repression, 
Park, Burgess, Ogburn and others consolidated metathe-
oretical developments in the field and replaced the liber-
al rhetoric of benevolence with the liberal technocratic 
rhetoric of neutrality. The clarion voice of the social re-
former was muted. The cautious professional tone of the 
academic scientist and clean-cut image of the adminis-
trative-consultant  now stood alone: With the standard-
ization  of  a  formal  ensemble  of  categories  and  the 
professionalization of the field, the pioneering phase of 
sociology came to an end. In 1921 and 1922— at the 
pinnacle of its early development— a new phase in the 
history of the field began.

10 |  Schwendinger Denied Tenure
long with Platt’s losing battle for tenure and the as-
sassination of the School, Herman Schwendinger 
was shot down. Subsequently, Julia Schwendinger and 
an ex-Jesuit Dean of Liberal Arts as well as the sociolo-
gy faculty  at  the  State  University  of  New York,  New 
Paltz, restored his professional career. Prior to his doc-
torate in sociology, Schwendinger had earned a Masters 
in  Social  Work  from Columbia  University.  His  social 
work experience centered on adolescent groups, includ-
ing street gangs; and when he became a doctoral student 
in 1959 at UCLA, he utilized trusted relations with gang 
members to jump-start his research on adolescent sub-
cultures and delinquency. By 1963, when he graduated, 
he had spent almost four years as “participant observer” 
studying Los Angeles gangs.
A
Shortly  before  receiving  Herman’s  PhD,  the 
Schwendingers applied for a half-million-dollar grant to 
extend  their  “instrumental  theory”  of  delinquency.1 
Since neither Herman nor Julia actually had a doctoral 
degree in hand, they needed a sponsor who would assure 
the  National  Institute  of  Mental  Health  that  the  grant 
1  The grants were among the highest received for research by any 
member of the School faculty. They finally totaled over $500,000 
when Herman’s tenure review occurred.
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would be administered responsibly. Joseph Lohman of-
fered to be their  sponsor,2 funneling the grant through 
the Berkeley School of Criminology, even though the re-
search was conducted in Los Angeles.3 Their project was 
partly  dependent  on  well-established  contacts  with 
young criminals  who were actively engaged in illegal 
market activities; therefore, it had to be conducted in this 
southern California city.
When Schwendinger started teaching at Berkeley in 
1967,  he was known as an innovative researcher.  The 
importance of research methods (for the development of 
theory and as “instruments of discovery”) was instilled 
in him early at Stuyvesant High School, an exceptional 
New York City public school devoted to science and en-
gineering.4 Next,  Schwendinger  attended  another  out-
standing institution known widely as the “Poor Man’s 
Harvard”—the College of the City of New York, where 
he was a  psychology major.5 Consequently,  instead of 
merely relying on survey methods or  official  data,  he 
utilized  field  observations,  small-group  field  experi-
ments, sociometric procedures and other social-psycho-
logical methods seldom used in criminology. To obtain 
data  required  by  his  “instrumental  theory,”  he  devel-
2  Harold  Garfinkel,  a  brilliant  sociologist  at  UCLA,  also  had 
offered to be a sponsor.
3  Julia also had a Masters in Social Work from Columbia and she 
was enrolled in sociology at UCLA. Her graduate student career 
in  sociology,  however,  was  interrupted  by  the  research  project 
(which she co-directed) and the move to Berkeley. She enrolled in 
the School’s doctoral program and graduated in 1974.
4  Reportedly  more  Nobel  Laureates  graduated  from Stuyvesant 
High than any other high school in the world.
5  We’ve also seen the phrase, “Harvard of the Proletariat,” used in 
a NY Times article. Established in the mid-1800s, CCNY was the 
first free college in the world. And, despite the nickname, it was 
better than Harvard.
   SCHWENDINGER DENIED TENURE  | 191 
oped, among other things, methods for quantifying sub-
cultural  identities  and sociometric/mathematical  proce-
dures for analyzing networks composed of thousands of 
youth.6 
A manuscript with some of these methods and find-
ings had been accepted around 1968 for publication in a 
Prentice Hall series edited by Herbert Blumer.7 Howev-
er, instead of simply following up editorial suggestions 
and  sending  it  in,  the  Schwendingers  procrastinated. 
They wanted to include a macro sociological theory of 
adolescent subcultures that was not completed until the 
early 1970s.8 Also, they were anxious about the potential 
political  abuse  of  their  procedures  for  mapping  large 
subcultural  networks.9 Delaying  publication  and  com-
6  By the late 1970s, co-authored with Julia, his theoretical ideas 
and  experimental  work  had  been  published  and  in  some cases 
republished in professional publications. See also, their discussion 
of  the  field  methods  used  for  “spot  checks.”  Their  ‘Galilean’ 
empirical  strategy  is  detailed  in  “Charting  Subcultures  at  a 
Frontier of Knowledge.” British Journal of Sociology. 48 (March) 
1977,  pp.  71–94.  The  1970  article,  “Defenders  of  Order  or 
Guardians of  Human Rights” was reprinted in  What is  Crime: 
Controversies over the Nature of Crime and What to do about It, 
(eds.) Stuart Henry and Mark M. Lanier. New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield 2001 pp. 65–98.
7  This manuscript was based on Schwendinger’s dissertation.
8  The essentials of this macro theory were published in a  1976 
article.
9  Our concern about this possibility was based on our success in 
using sociometric data (in 1965–1966) to identify large informal 
networks.  Also,  see,  for  instance,  the  article  on  grand  jury 
investigations and use of  a ‘sociogram strategy’ for identifying 
anti-war networks in Frank J. Donner and Eugene Cerruti, “The 
Grand Jury Network: How the Nixon Administration Has Secretly 
Perverted  A Traditional  Safeguard  of  Individual  Rights,”  The 
Nation, January 3, 1972, pp 5–15, 18–20. See, for a later example, 
Roger  H.  Davis,  1981,  “Social  Network  Analysis:  An  Aid  in 
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pleting their  work on  The Chair finally  resolved their 
uncertainties.
When the first draft of The Chair was completed, the 
Schwendingers  circulated  it  and  received  encouraging 
responses. The manuscript was given to Messinger, who 
had  replaced  Wilkins  as  Acting  Dean.  In  a  memo  to 
Schwendinger, dated July 7, 1971, he said: “That really 
is a magnificent book! I have no doubt at all about its 
publishability. I think it will be reviewed appreciatively, 
if sometimes with anger. You have accomplished a great 
deal.”
He made editorial suggestions and offered to contact 
Aldine, where he served as an editor of an academic se-
ries. The Schwendingers, however, decided to send their 
manuscript to Basic Books, an eminent publisher, where 
it was reviewed and accepted for publication.10 Because 
of its size, the firm contracted with the Schwendingers to 
produce a two-volume work. But, after discovering how 
much  both  volumes  would  cost  readers,  the 
Schwendingers got the publisher to lower the purchase 
price by combining the volumes. 
The Chair was essential to Schwendinger’s quest for 
tenure. However, since the combined work ran to more 
than  600 printed  pages,  the  period  for  processing  the 
publication was prolonged. As a result, only difficult to 
read, bound photocopies of about 1100 unedited pages 
of the immense typewritten manuscript were sent by the 
senior faculty to the three sociologists—Richard Quin-
Conspiracy  Investigations,”  FBI  Law  Enforcement  Bulletin, 
December, pp. 1–9.
10 Basic Books was  the  only publisher  sent  the book.  After  the 
reviews requested by the School were received and evaluated, the 
Schwendingers with the help of students reorganized and edited 
the manuscript. They are forever grateful for this help.
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ney,  Norman Birnbaum, Lewis  Coser—and an anthro-
pologist, Marvin Harris.
Quinney called The Chair “a major achievement.” He 
believed the Schwendingers provided “a more critical, 
more insightful, and more extensive analysis of Ameri-
can sociology” than Gouldner’s Coming Crisis of West-
ern Sociology.11 He said  The Chair destroyed the myth 
about  the  origin  of  sociology  as  a  liberating  force.  It 
showed that concepts and theories formulated during the 
formative years—as a response to social and economic 
turmoil—still guided the work of many social scientists. 
Quinney approved of analyses of Ward, Small and Ross’ 
relationship to the social and economic context of their 
time.  He  congratulated  the  Schwendingers  for  their 
work.
Coser condemned the book. “I have gone through all 
four volumes, 12 a feat which, where there’s any justice 
in this dismal world, I should be awarded several Boy 
Scout stars.” He said, “No effort is made to place the fig-
ures discussed in the general social and historical con-
text of their time.” In fact,
[The Schwendingers] judge all  writings of 
the past in terms of present Left standards. 
Hence these men [the founders of American 
sociology]  are  accused  of  racism,  sexism, 
imperialism, etc. while no attempt is made 
to  explain  why  these  men  made  the 
statements  they  made.  To  be  sure  few of 
these men came up to the purity of women’s 
lib. [sic] ideology espoused by the authors, 
11 Alvin Gouldner, Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New York: 
Basic Books, 1970.
12 These typewritten pages were bound in four segments that Coser 
assumed were four volumes.
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but why should they have, considering the 
context of their culture and their time? To be 
sure,  E.A.  Ross  wrote  some  sharp  things 
against  the  Chinese,  etc.  immigrants,  but 
there is no indication here that he did this in 
terms  of  his  ‘progressive’  defense  of 
American  wage  earners  and  the  threat  to 
their  standard  of  living  by  oriental 
immigration. (The point is not that Ross was 
right,  it  is  however  that  he  cannot  be 
assessed  properly  if  one  doesn’t  indicate 
why he made the statements he made.)
The Schwendingers, Coser added, are as relentless as a 
“D.A. who, through selective use of the evidence, shows 
that the accused is guilty—of non radicalism. . . . This is 
pamphleteering  rather  than  scholarship.”  The book,  in 
his  eyes,  could  not  be  compared  with  works  by  C. 
Wright Mills or Alvin Gouldner. He concluded, “I doubt 
very much that it will find a publisher and it is my con-
sidered  opinion  that  it  lacks  any  redeeming  scholarly 
value.”
Ironically, a contract for the publication of The Chair 
had been signed before Coser evaluated it. Yet, his com-
ments about Ross were more revealing of his poor judg-
ment. Ross, despite Coser’s estimation, did not defend 
American wage earners. He defended  white wage earn-
ers. His so-called “progressive” stance rode roughshod 
over other racial groups in America; and his theory of 
Aryan supremacy included, in addition to Asian immi-
grants,  the Native Americans  who were annihilated in 
Northern  California.13 Finally,  The  Chair is  set  apart 
13 See, for example, Sherburne F. Cook, The Conflict Between the  
California Indians and White Civilization,  Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1976. Also, Theodora Kroeber,  Ishi in Two 
Worlds: A Biography of the Last Wild Indian in North America . 
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from other historical works because it exposed the racist 
content  of  Ross’ defense of  working-class  living stan-
dards. That defense did not take place in a world created 
by  sociological  myths.  It  took  place  in  a  real  world 
where  other  men  of  Ross’ time,  Debs  and  Haywood, 
knew that  racism kept  workers  divided  and more  ex-
ploitable.14
Unlike Coser’s, Birnbaum’s review was positive even 
though he  emphasized  his  “reading was  hasty,  with  a 
great deal of sampling.” He found “the effort to reinter-
pret the early history of American sociology commend-
able.”  He also  found “it  difficult  to  disagree  with the 
general ideological characterization of the period in the 
text.” While he observed, “the authors have gone to con-
siderable trouble to depict the primary sources,” he felt 
they ignored “one or two important works” and “tended 
to use stereotypes (e.g., sexism and racism).” Neverthe-
less, he said the book was “better than a good deal of 
work on American sociology, and will cause some read-
ers to reflect on matters they hitherto ignored.” He felt 
that it was not a work “in the intellectual class” of Mills 
or Gouldner. Still, he also felt that “if the level of work 
found in the authors I have just mentioned were required 
for tenure, most American academic departments would 
be emptied, rather rapidly, of their teachers.”
Harris’s review was irresponsible. He was obviously 
too busy and should have sent the manuscript back with-
out reviewing it. He believed The Chair was a doctoral 
dissertation and said its  organization  was “execrable.” 
He said Schwendinger had the worst case of “foot-and 
note disease” he has seen. “Most of Schwendinger’s evi-
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
14 Wage levels among white workers are higher in industries where 
racial disparities are lower.
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dence seems to consist of the analysis of theory—what 
he calls metatheory. Personally, I find this kind of ap-
proach to the harlot functions of academia irredeemably 
scholastic.” 
After continuing in this vein, Harris wrote,
Perhaps, if I could have read the four tomes 
on an uninterrupted schedule, I would not 
have soured on them quite so much. (But 
who has  such opportunities?)  It  would be 
grossly unfair to give the impression that I 
was  not  educated  by  my  experience.  I 
learned a great deal and if I had a copy to 
consult over the years, I’m sure I would find 
it very useful. I hope that in a more cogent 
form it will be published.
Despite Birnbaum’s review, the other reviews were baf-
fling or equivocal. (What could be said about a reviewer 
who complains about organization of The Chair and the 
fact that the author is “irredeemably scholastic?”) Con-
sequently, even though Schwendinger teaching evalua-
tions  were  outstanding,  the  decision  regarding  tenure 
was delayed pending responses from a new set of re-
viewers. 
This delay was justified by Messenger who noted that 
the  School’s  future  was  in  doubt.  He  also  said  that 
Schwendinger should be spared further anxiety for the 
moment. Schwendinger, at that time, was having great 
difficulty coping with Julia’s life-threatening bout with 
cancer.
Schwendinger’s bid for tenure obviously was in deep 
trouble. Realizing this, he wrote to John Horton, respect-
ed  by  left-wing  sociologists,  for  a  review  which  had 
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been  written  for  Basic  Books.  It  was  sent  to Bowker 
who added it to the other reviews. Horton had called the 
work  exceptional.  He  said,  “C.  Wright  Mills  perhaps 
comes closest to the critical spirit of The Sociologists of  
the Chair. Yet the latter is more sweeping in its social 
analysis. Mills traces connections between professional 
ideologies and middle class beliefs and institutions. The 
Schwendingers  relate  professional  ideologies  to  ruling 
beliefs and institutions.” He said  The Chair was more 
accurately  historical  than  Gouldner’s  effort  and  more 
macrosociological than Mills’ critique.
Although Schwendinger only had a cursory acquain-
tance with Immanuel Wallerstein, he also sent him the 
draft of the book. Wallerstein’s pioneering volumes on 
the modern world system made his national and interna-
tional stature greater than the reviewers selected in the 
first and second stages. To make sure he was fully in-
formed, Schwendinger sent copies of the first tenure re-
views. He replied, “I’m sorry to have taken so long to 
write to you. But this has been a busy period and I want-
ed to read your book carefully.  I  have now done so.” 
Wallerstein added,
It is a very good book indeed, and I am very 
glad you asked me to read it. It shows very 
clearly  what  you  say  it  does—the  socio-
intellectual roots of contemporary American 
sociological theory in the transformation of 
the  U.S.  and  world  economic  structures 
around  the  turn  of  the  20th century.  You 
show  how  the  now  largely  unread  early 
American sociologists (Ward, Small, et al) 
reflected the need to cope ideologically with 
the  changed  social  situation.  This  is  of 
course what one would expect, but you spell 
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it  out.  What  is  even  more  striking  is  the 
degree to which the ideas of the post-second 
World  War  era  are  continuous  with  the 
earlier  ideas.  This  challenges  the 
conventional history of the discipline, which 
you and I were taught as graduate students, 
to  wit,  that  Parsons’  Structure  of  Social 
Action  revolutionized  thinking  in  U.S. 
sociology. It turns out that what he really did 
is  to  show Americans  that  the  ideas  they 
were using had really been stated earlier in 
similar,  if  in  perhaps  more  sophisticated, 
terms by European scholars.
Wallerstein indicated the style of the book presented a 
problem. He said that reading the book was like going 
through jungle underbrush. It took him about 150 pages 
before he began to like the book.15 “Maybe this is what 
happened to some other readers,” he added. 
They  did  not  feel  the  need  or  have  the 
persistence to go past  their  initial  stylistic 
turn-off to the heart of the argument.16 Their 
loss. For you have something important to 
say and it is something that no one has said 
in  this  documented  way  before.  I 
15 Obviously the manuscript had serious stylistic and organizational 
problems. The Schwendingers got a short delay from the editor at 
the publisher while more than 24 students came to their aid and 
helped them reorganize and edit the manuscript. The revised draft 
was sent to the publisher.
16 The founders actively selected preexisting ideas that seemed to 
deal with contemporary events; and The Chair had to show why 
these ideas were important. Unfortunately, it pedantically devoted 
160 opening pages to a variety of precursors even though their 
relevancy could  not  be  really  appreciated  until  the  transitional 
theories,  bridging the corporate phase of liberalism with earlier 
phases, were presented.
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congratulate you on it and thank you for it.
While Coser and Harris had no doubt that the book did 
not merit tenure at a major university, Wallerstein dis-
agreed:
I cannot understand these doubts. I can only 
say  that  it  would  be  a  salutary  thing  for 
American sociology if large numbers of the 
tenured  faculty  at  our  various  major 
departments  had  written  as  good  and  as 
important a book. In these days of political 
polarization in our departments,  there is  a 
facile use of pseudo-academic criticisms of 
the work of others we do not  like.  But  a 
sober appraisal of your work, and a careful 
one,  should,  in  my  view,  end  in  a  very 
positive note. I hope, for all our sakes, that 
you will get this sober and careful appraisal.
Wallerstein gave Schwendinger permission to use the re-
view as he saw fit, but it was not sent to Messinger. In 
the first  place, by then it was obvious that the review 
would be discounted because the School did not solicit 
it. Furthermore, by the time Wallerstein’s review had ar-
rived, Schwendinger had been informed that the second 
set  of  reviewers  would  only  consist  of  UCB  faculty 
members,  Philip  Selznick—a  virulent  anti-Communist 
and chief architect of the Law School department that 
was to replace the Criminology School—and two others, 
Leo Lowenthal, a lesser member of the Frankfort School 
whose  works  have  passed  into  obscurity,  and  Philip 
Nonet who hardly deserves mention. Selznick and Nonet 
were close to Messinger and Skolnick, and they had met 
secretly to establish a politically sanitized “Law and So-
ciety” program at the Law School. Moreover, Skolnick, 
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Diamond and Messinger not only refused to get review-
ers from other universities—they also rejected Paul Tak-
agi’s suggestion to include Troy Duster, David Matza or 
Robert Blauner even though they, too, were members of 
the UCB sociology department.17 Since the second re-
view took place as the School was being closed, using 
Wallerstein’s reply to fight for outside reviewers would 
have been as exhausting and useless—as Platt’s fight for 
tenure had proved.18 
Down but not forgotten, Schwendinger was dismissed 
on June 30, 1975. He sought employment everywhere, 
but the radical reputation of The Chair—and phone calls 
by respective employers to UCB—put him on a black-
list. He applied for a UCLA sociology department posi-
tion where he had been a graduate student but the faculty 
was deadlocked around his candidacy for two years, dur-
ing which time no one else was hired.19 The sociology 
faculty and two Deans approved his application at Bos-
ton University but the archconservative President Silber 
turned  him down.  The  faculty  at  the  California  State 
University, Northridge,  also voted to hire him, but the 
Liberal Arts Dean refused. And so it went.
Julia bravely kept her family afloat with the aid of 
Sheriff Richard Hongisto, who hired her to head the re-
source program for the San Francisco women’s prison. 
Then, she obtained employment as an Assistant Profes-
17 At this point, the book had been edited but Messinger insisted on 
using  the  original  unedited  manuscript  and  refused  to  use  the 
edited copy for the review.
18 Schwendinger was informed that  Bowker allowed the Horton 
review to be included in the first review but a year later he was 
told that it would not be included in the second review, because it 
was not solicited by the senior faculty.
19 Schwendinger finally withdrew his candidacy so the people who 
supported him could work out a compromise with the other side.
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sor at  the University  of Nevada,  Las  Vegas.  But  after 
two  semesters  teaching  criminal-justice  courses,  other 
faculty members told her that she would never get tenure 
at “Disco Tech,” as it was fondly called. She had filed an 
affidavit proving that a colleague had been denied “due 
process”  when the  senior  faculty  cowardly  refused  to 
grant him tenure because a conservative Regent had at-
tacked him for adopting the textbook, The Iron Fist and 
the Velvet Glove. 20 
Fortunately, Herman applied to SUNY, New Paltz. Its 
Dean  of  Liberal  Arts—after  phoning  “West  Coast 
friends”  who  said  Schwendinger  was  an  “exceptional 
scholar”—approved  the  sociology  department’s  unani-
mous recommendation.
The Schwendingers landed on their feet. Their books 
and articles have received the  Tappan Award from the 
Western  Society  of  Criminology,  the  Distinguished 
Scholar Award from the Crime, Law and Deviance Sec-
tion  of  the  American  Sociology  Association,  the  Out-
standing Scholar Award from the Society for the Study 
of Social Problems, a  Scholarship and Research Award 
from the Women’s Division of the American Society of 
Criminology,  and the  Major Achievement  Award from 
the Critical Criminology Division of the American Soci-
ety of Criminology.
Herman was awarded the title of  SUNY  Faculty Ex-
change Scholar.  (This  SUNY-wide Academic  senate 
award provided Herman with honoraria and travel funds 
to share his work with people on other SUNY campus-
20 Lynn Osborn also filed an affidavit. She was a UNLV sociology 
faculty member who had also graduated from the UCB School of 
Criminology. This was not the only occasion where she showed 
her  courage.  The  Schwendingers  remember  visiting  her  in  jail 
during her student days after she was arrested at a demonstration.
 202 |   WHO KILLED THE BERKELEY SCHOOL?
es.)  He  also  received  the  coveted  SUNY  Excellence 
Award “in recognition of sustained, outstanding perfor-
mance and superior service to the State University and 
the State of New York.” 
In 2010, the Schwendingers were included in a work 
entitled  Fifty  Key Thinkers in  Criminology.  This  work 
featured philosophers, legal scholars and social scientists 
who had written landmark works from the 18th century 
onward.21.  None  of  the  faculty  who  denied 
Schwendinger tenure were included in that volume.
21 Fifty Key Thinkers in Criminology.  Edited by Keith Hayward, 
Shadd  Maruna  and  Jayne  Mooney.  London  &  New  York: 
Routledge. 2010. The Schwendingers are covered in pages 159—
162.
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ichard A. Myren, a member of the Wolfgang Com-
mittee and author  of  Education in Criminal  Jus-
tice,  observed:  “Berkeley exhibits  probably the widest 
range of attention to crime studies of any university in 
the United States today.”1 
R
However, from 1973 tenured faculty covered all bets. 
To placate university authorities, Diamond, Skolnick and 
Messinger swiftly validated the half-truths and outright 
lies justifying purging the radicals. Previously, for exam-
ple, Messinger had eagerly supported the move to broad-
en the curriculum; however, after the Sindler Committee 
claimed that the School had abandoned its professional 
mission, he proposed keeping the School but narrowing 
the  curriculum,  confining  it  to  the  “administration  of 
criminal justice.”2 
Skolnick’s turn-about also made the Sindler Commit-
tee credible. In a confidential memo to the Chair of the 
1 “ASUC  Committee  Cites  Services  of  Crim.School,  Daily 
Californian, Volume V, Number 136, Wednesday, April 10, 1974 
p. 1.
2 Messinger’s  memos  to  Charles  Dekker,  Committee  on 
Educational Policy, and Sanford Elberg, Dean, Graduate Division, 
on June 28, 1973 and on July 11, 1973.
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Academic Senate Committee on Educational Policy,3 he 
wrote, 
First,  I  agree  with  the  committee’s 
recommendation  that  the  School  of 
Criminology ought to be phased out, but I 
don’t agree with certain parts of the analysis. 
I believe it would be possible and desirable 
to have a School of Criminology that would, 
precisely  because  of  its  high  academic 
standards, make important contributions. ... 
It seems to me that historically the school 
has suffered from extremes: either the police 
and  correctional  training  orientation  of 
earlier  generations,  or  the  antithesis–the 
grandly systemic,  Marxist  orientation of a 
sizeable proportion of the current generation 
of faculty.4
Second, as one of the faculty who counseled 
a broader orientation for the School in the 
direction of Law and Society, I support the 
general  trend  of  the  recommendation,  but 
find its specifics to be both inadequate and 
inconsistent. ... The resources now allocated 
to  the  School  of  Criminology  should  be 
shifted  into  a  department–say  of  legal 
concepts, organization and institutions.
3  Confidential memo to Professor Charles Dekker, Chairman of the 
Academic  Senate  Committee  on  Educational  Policy,  June  25, 
1973.
4  Only  two  professors  at  the  School  considered  themselves 
Marxists.  Diamond,  in  an  interview  with  a  San  Francisco 
Chronicle  reporter  about  the  School  closing,  also  employed  a 
similar rational.
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Although Skolnick juggled his recommendations with fi-
nesse, his memo clearly favored the second alternative—
a “law and society” department. Undoubtedly concerned 
about  his  own  continued  employment,  he  repeatedly 
stressed the necessity for equipping this department with 
a core faculty and adequate funds.5
Diamond added his own patronizing counsel to this 
well-timed enterprise. After the administration in the fi-
nal  months  made him the  School’s  “Acting  Dean” to 
oversee the closing, he affirmed his place on the side of 
the  angels  and  loudly  expressed  his  disdain  for  the 
School’s  standards  and  curriculum.  Suddenly,  this  fa-
mous  forensic  psychoanalyst—whose  “expert 
testimony”  at  the  Robert  Kennedy  assassination  trial 
claimed that Sirhan Sirhan wasn’t legally responsible be-
cause he was psychotic—issued a memo requiring every 
remaining graduate student who had not taken a course 
in law to take one at the Law School.6 He then conduct-
ed a vendetta against Takagi and Platt after they declined 
to ratify his attempt to fail an African-American doctoral 
student in an oral exam. He accused them of abandoning 
their academic responsibilities. To humiliate them, he in-
sisted on bringing faculty in from other departments to 
monitor oral  examinations taken by their  doctoral stu-
dents.7 
They refused to submit to Diamond’s arrogant disre-
gard of their academic prerogatives. Of course, Platt had 
5  But  it  would  not  include  the  much  maligned  criminalistics 
program, which he recommended terminating.
6  This  idiotic  proposal  was  dropped  when  graduate  students 
expressed their outrage over this last minute requirement.
7  Four doctoral students who were affected sent written objections 
to Diamond. Also, Takagi rightfully refused to serve on any oral 
exam governed by these new conditions.
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been denied tenure and the School’s closing meant that 
he could not maintain his position. But tenured faculty at 
Berkeley were not dismissed unless the administration 
could prove that they had committed a crime or a serious 
breach of ethical standards. Takagi had tenure and the 
administration could not dismiss him on these grounds. 
Nevertheless, his courageous defiance of Diamonds’ de-
mands jeopardized his prospects. Despite his tenured po-
sition, Takagi’s continued employment at UCB was not 
assured if the School was closed.
Diamond gave lip service to Berkeley mores. He had 
previously announced that he would only accepted the 
responsibility of Acting Dean if the senior faculty was 
assured of continued employment. But student protests 
and legal actions taken against his sycophantic and un-
necessary acquiescence to authority8 resulted in his un-
willingness  to  do  anything  to  ensure  employment  for 
Takagi, a senior faculty member. After the School was 
closed, Takagi was not given a position with Skolnick 
and Messinger in the Law and Society program at the 
School of Law in Boalt Hall. Instead, he was added to 
the faculty at the School of Education where he was iso-
lated and left “twisting in the wind.”9 He did not receive 
a single merit increase in salary and retired 10 years later 
without  being promoted beyond the rank of Associate 
Professor which he had at the School of Criminology.
To  discredit  the  UC  administration’s  treatment  of 
Tagaki, we should note that his family in 1942 had been 
forcibly interned in  Manzanar—the first  of 10 perma-
nent  “War  Relocation  Centers”  where  almost  120,000 
Japanese and Japanese Americans were incarcerated un-
8  He was particularly outraged over a civil suit, initiated against 
him by the African American student whom he failed.
9  See, Takagi 1999, op. cit.
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til 1945.10 (Two-thirds of the individuals in these intern-
ment camps were American citizens.)  During their  in-
ternment, young men were allowed to leave the camps 
when they volunteered to serve in a renowned unit that 
fought in the European theatre during WWII.
During the post-war years, Takagi was employed by 
the Alameda County’s Adult Probation Department. By 
early 1963, he was a parole officer in Los Angeles work-
ing with drug users  and dealers.  Three years later,  he 
transferred to San Quentin Prison, where he worked as a 
classification officer for the California Board of Correc-
tions.
Simultaneously,  Takagi  enrolled  in  Berkeley  and 
Stanford.  He  finally  received  a  PhD  and  joined  the 
School of Criminology because of his notable contribu-
tions  to statistical  methods and parole for government 
correctional agencies. 
On  January  21,  1969,  the  Third  World  Strike  at 
Berkeley began and the Asian component of the student 
groups involved in the strike asked Professor Takagi to 
be their sponsor. He also co-taught the first course on 
Asian American history at Berkeley in the winter quarter 
of 1969. Also, Takagi was the faculty sponsor of an “ex-
perimental course,” then called Asian Studies 100X. To-
day,  Asian-American  studies  programs  exist  at  140 
universities.
Takagi also sided with the students and faculty at the 
School who opposed the Vietnam War. In addition, his 
article, “A Garrison State in a ‘Democratic’ Society,” be-
came recognized as the pioneering study about the de-
gree  to  which  police  used  force  when  dealing  with 
10 Takagi was born in the US. His family history is described in 
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African Americans.11 
During the 1980s, Takagi and Tony Platt were jointly 
awarded  the  Paul  Tappan  Award  for  1980–1981,  and 
Paul was elected the chair of the criminology section of 
the American Sociological Association, 1986–1987. He 
also received the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency’s  Gerhard  Mueller  Award,  which  honors  out-
standing  contributions  to  criminology  that  brought  a 
global perspective to U.S. justice policy and advance hu-
man rights. He was also honored by the Association for 
Asian American Studies 
Upon Takagi’s  retirement,  Rep.  Ronald  V.  Dellums 
honored him on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives. Dellums had come to know him and his work over 
a period of two decades and “counted on his knowledge, 
his training, his wisdom, and his ability to articulate the 
critical issues and problems about the justice and penal 
system in the United States.”
During these years Takagi helped edit Crime and So-
cial  Justice12 and  continued  to  contribute  writings  on 
criminal justice. While Carter was president, Tagaki was 
a  consultant  for  federal  agencies,  evaluating  crimi-
nal-justice  proposals  especially  concerned  with  racial 
discrimination. He worked with the Justice Department 
on police use of deadly force and was invited to speak at 
annual meetings of black police officers’ organizations. 
He was sought as a consultant by cities such as Berkeley 
and Portland on police chief selection, and gave talks at 
mandated  cultural  sensitivity  workshops—where  46 
judges,  for  instance,  including  the  Alaska  Supreme 
11 See Crime and Social Justice, 1974 pp. 27–32.
12 The  name  of  the  journal  was  changed  to  Social  Justice:  A 
Journal of Crime, Conflict and World Order.
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Court  justices,  were  informed  about  the  relations  be-
tween racial discrimination and the criminal justice sys-
tem.  Other  programs  in  which  Takagi  participated 
included multi-cultural training of public-school teach-
ers  from the  western  United  States  and  The  National 
Council on Crime & Delinquency’s training program of 
senior probation officers across the country.
Takagi’s  ill  treatment  when  the  School  was  closed 
speaks volumes about the racist hypocrisy behind Bowk-
er and Sindler’s claims that the School was being abol-
ished because it had lost its professional mission. Takagi 
served at the School as the preeminent example of pro-
fessionally  dedicated  faculty.  No  one—including  Dia-
mond,  Messinger  and  Skolnick—came  close. 
Nevertheless, he was no longer able to teach graduate 
courses in criminology. Platt, too, never taught graduate 
criminology  students  again.  Neither  did  Krisberg  nor 
Schwendinger.
A POST MORTEM TO END A LL POST MORTEMS
Caleb Foote, who shared an appointment at the School 
of Law and the School of Criminology, walked lock-step 
behind Diamond, Messinger and Skolnick. Frank Morn, 
resorting  to  hyperbole,  reported  that  Foote  “had vivid 
recollections  of  Dean  Lohman’s  frenzied  attempts  to 
maintain a balance between professional and academic 
goals.”  To  support  professional  training,  Lohman,  ac-
cording to Foote,13 admitted large numbers of “profes-
sional” teachers and “professionals as graduate students, 
whose intellectual  mediocrity  and narrow vision  hung 
like a deadly pall over the school’s intellectual climate.” 
13 Frank  Morn,  Academic  Politics  and  the  History  of  Criminal  
Justice Education. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1995 
p. 105.
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Morn added,
Regarding the scholarship of the School of 
Criminology and the field,  Foote believed 
that Lohman had overloaded the place with 
ill-conceived  ‘evaluative’ or  agency-action 
‘research projects’ for which he had to hire 
staff  of  sufficiently  limited  vision  to  be 
willing to devote themselves to such trivia. 
As these researchers tended to drift into the 
teaching  program  whenever  a  course 
vacancy needed to be filled, the level of the 
faculty tended towards the same mediocrity 
that characterized the graduate student body. 
This, in turn, inhibited Lohman’s efforts to 
recruit and retain able scholars.14 
But Morn’s report and Foote’s so-called “recollections” 
were wildly inaccurate. Foote surely would exclude his 
friends,  Messinger,  Skolnick,  Diamond  and  his  Law 
School colleagues who taught at the School, from his list 
of “mediocre” “agency-action” researchers even though 
they  primarily  dealt  with  legislative,  juridical,  correc-
tional and police agencies. Yet, if the truth were told, the 
“radicals”  never  engaged  in  “mediocre,”  “agency-
action” research. Platt had written an acclaimed histori-
cal work on the juvenile court  and, before joining the 
faculty, worked with Norval Morris at the University of 
Chicago. Lohman had sponsored the Schwendingers’ re-
search  project  but  that  project  was  entirely  based  on 
their causal theory.15 Although it could prove useful for 
14 Ibid.
15 Lohman was the  principle  investigator  and Schwendinger  the 
Co-Principal  because  it  was  felt  that  the  project,  which  was 
devoted to Schwendinger’s delinquency theory, would be funded 
if  the  Dean  had  ultimate  fiscal  responsibility.  As  indicated, 
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“agency- action” research it tried to uncover the nature 
and parameters of delinquent subcultures. Finally, only a 
bonehead would use the word “mediocre” to label Tak-
agi’s  or  Krisberg’s  scholarship.  Takagi  was  active  in 
agency evaluation and training, but he also produced pi-
oneering works on police killings of African Americans 
and  the  historical  development  of  correctional  institu-
tions.16 Krisberg,  on  his  part,  never  was  employed  in 
“agency-action” research conducted at the School itself. 
He joined the faculty after graduating from the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania,  and his interests  ran the gamut of 
criminological concerns even though they converged on 
delinquency  prevention  and  control.  Krisberg  in  1976 
published one of the finest historical accounts of the ju-
venile-justice system.17 After the School closed, he be-
came a research director and then President of NCCD, 
the foremost organization in the field of juvenile justice.
What about the veracity of Foote’s arrogant reference 
to the students? Overwhelmingly,  the so-called “medi-
ocre” and “intellectually narrow” students became aca-
demics  and  directors  of  research  institutes.18 Their 
scholarly contributions to criminology can then and now 
be  compared  favorably  with  those  from any  graduate 
Schwendinger, after all, was still a graduate student and preparing 
for his oral examinations when the NIH reviewed his proposal.
16 Paul  Takagi,  “A Garrison  State  in  a  ‘Democratic  Society.’” 
Crime and Social Justice 1 (Spring-Summer) 1974 pp. 27–33; and 
“The Walnut Street Jail: A Penal Reform to Centralize the Powers 
of the State,” Federal Probation 39 (December) 1975 pp. 18–26.
17 Barry Krisberg, “Children of Ishmael.” In (Eds. Barry Krisberg 
and James Aust)  Children of Ishmael. Palo Alto: Mayfield Co., 
1978.
18 In the 1967 to 1972 period alone, the number of post-graduates 
assuming academic posts (professorships) accounted for about 80 
per cent of the graduate student population.
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program in the country. They certainly were superior to 
Foote’s law school students who were being trained to 
be  legal  practitioners  rather  than  scholars.  When  the 
Sindler report was issued, about 80 percent of the stu-
dents in the doctoral program had obtained jobs in uni-
versities and research institutes. Most of them are still 
employed today as professors, chairpersons and deans. 
One of the foremost criminal-justice research institutes 
in the United States, the Michael Hindelang Institute, is 
named after a student in the program at that time.19
The  School’s  contribution  also  included  graduates 
who  became  administrators  in  public  institutions.  Its 
graduates included the head of the Atlanta Police, direc-
tor of the Georgia Juvenile Justice system, Chief of Po-
lice for  Charleston (North Carolina),  a  General  in  the 
United  States  Army,  Chief  of  Detroit  police  and  the 
Sheriff  of San Francisco County.  One of the most fa-
mous United States prison reformers of the last century, 
Tom Murton, was a graduate of the School. As Superin-
tendent of the Arkansas Correctional system, he coura-
geously  instituted  democratic  reforms,  exposed 
administrative corruption and the assassination of pris-
oners by trustees, committed at the behest of the guards. 
Robert Redford dramatized him and his work in the Hol-
lywood film, Brubaker.
The final reviewers, the Dekker Committee, also took 
the low road and its majority, without seeming to cave-in 
to  the  administration,  tacitly  legitimated  the  purge  by 
19 We  would  like  to  express  our  appreciation  of  Garafalo’s 
acceptance  of  Herman’s  article  in  a  Hindelang  Institute 
publication on the historical origin’s of the privatization of prison 
reform. He had received funds that supported his study but the 
government agency that provided these funds refused to publish 
it. 
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recommending replacement of the School with a “law, 
society and criminal justice” program in the School of 
Law. Their recommendation, however, was suspect be-
cause most of the Law faculty, including Caleb Foote, 
were “mediocre,” “agency action” academics. The Law 
School  was under  fire  from students  who attacked its 
traditional law training and its conspicuous avoidance of 
affirmative-action policies. While two right-wing mem-
bers of the Dekker Committee20 demanded the immedi-
ate closure of the School of Criminology, Laura Nader, a 
professor  of  anthropology  (and  Ralph  Nader’s  sister) 
dissented  from  the  Committee’s  recommendation.  On 
May 9, 1975, she co-signed a statement with two student 
members on the committee that said,
The  law  schools  of  the  state  have  been 
successful  in  training  private  lawyers  for 
private concerns and the legal research done 
is  most  usually  technical  writing  for 
lawyers, by lawyers. There has been glaring 
failure  to  research  and  write  on  subjects 
which interest the general citizen. Boalt Hall 
in  particular  has  a  reputation  for  being 
culture  bound  and  traditional  rather  than 
innovative,  and,  is  among  the  most 
professionally  oriented  of  the  leading  law 
schools . . . we fail to see, when what we are 
dealing with is a social science endeavor, the 
necessity  for  ‘complete  administrative 
integration’  with  the  law  school—an 
institution  with  no  commitment  to  social 
science  research  and  teaching.  .  .  .  We 
question the competence of the law faculty 
20 One of these members, Paul Seabury, had been condemned as a 
war criminal  by anti-war tribunals set  up by Berkeley students 
and residents.
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to train citizens to understand the operation 
of law in society, and at the same time to 
maintain goals of the profession as taught at 
the  law  school.  That  is,  we  raise  doubts 
concerning the ability of the law school to 
accommodate philosophical perspectives in 
such a program.
In  another  minority  report,  student  members  of  the 
Dekker  committee,  R.  Harrison,  A.  Kolling  and  S. 
Smith,  also  expressed  their  objections:  “after  careful 
study,  [they]  concluded  that  two  of  these  factors,  the 
School’s rejection of a professional mission and the ab-
sence of a viable academic field cannot be substantiated 
and  that  the  faculty’s  disagreement  on  common goals 
(implicitly raised by memos written by Messinger and 
Skolnick) is not alone a reason for not continuing the 
School.”  They  applauded  “the  services  performed  by 
and through the School for the community and the State; 
and the School’s  efforts  in the area of  affirmative ac-
tion.”21
Yet Morn’s fairytale continued to reinforce lies about 
the School.  Without  citing sources,  Morn said,  “many 
considered  criminology  education  as  it  existed  in  the 
School as a ‘cheap’ degree.” Ignoring all the evidence to 
the contrary, he claimed, “there was remarkably little re-
sistance  or  fanfare”  to  the  closing  of  the  School.  He 
added,  “In fact,  many students later  remembered with 
pride that they “had closed down the school.” 
21 R. Harrison, A. Kolling and S. Smith,  Minority Report on the 
Future  of  Instruction  and  Research  in  Criminology  on  the  
Berkeley Campus. March 7, 1974, p. 3. (This report can be found 
in Report of the ASUC Academic Affairs Committee to Review 
the New Program in Law, Society, an Criminal Justice. Prepared 
by ASUC Office of Academic Affairs,  Academic Review Unit, 
July 25, 1975.
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Morn could have applauded a Hollywood production 
about  the  School’s  closing  ending  with  lifeboats  of 
sailors cheering as they witnessed their wounded ship go 
to  the  bottom.”22 Apparently,  in  Morn’s  scenario,  the 
usual suspects among the faculty were mediocrities and 
the students, irresponsible sea-faring lunatics.
AS THE SHIP B EGAN TO S INK
Bowker and Sindler had difficulty scuttling the School; 
they couldn’t make it sink fast enough with radical stu-
dents supposedly cheering as it flipped stern upward Ti-
tanic-style and plunged to the bottom of the sea. At one 
point, in fact, Diamond, Kadish, Selznick, Skolnick and 
Messinger—who were busily reinventing a strategy used 
in 1961 to save the School when Lohman became Dean
—distracted them. Kadish and his compadres now tried 
to prevent the School from being closed by recommend-
ing Norval Morris, from the University of Chicago Law 
School, to be the Dean of Criminology at Berkeley. This 
move, they felt, would placate Bowker because Morris 
was an eminent professor of law who could be counted 
on to  administer  a School  swept  clean of  its  radicals. 
However, too many students read Morris’ Honest Politi-
cian’s Guide to Crime Control,23 and no amount of dam-
age  control  could  stop  them from politely  expressing 
their candid opinions when he visited the campus. Mor-
ris declined the offer to become Dean.
Unable to enter a familiar harbor because of stormy 
political  weather,  Diamond,  Skolnick,  Messinger  and 
others reversed course, sailed to a cove where they met 
secretly with Philip Selznick and other members of the 
22 Morn, op. cit., p. 113
23 Norval  Morris,  Honest  Politician’s  Guide  to  Crime  Control. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
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Law and Society Center.24 Hoisting Boalt Hall’s colors, 
they micromanaged the close of the School while formu-
lating a plan for a Law School department for the study 
of “law and society.” When their planning was complet-
ed,  administrative demagogues invited a politically di-
verse group of faculty to meet and formally legitimate 
the plan.  This duplicitous process secured Messinger’s 
and Skolnick’s posts at Berkeley, although the new “de-
partment  of law and society” never gained the world-
wide prestige and legendary status the School of Crimi-
nology had achieved.
Unlike  the  motley  collection  of  ship’s  officers,  the 
mutineers among the students and faculty continued to 
defend the School. Letters seeking support were sent to 
professionals in the United States and abroad.25 All sorts 
of communications, memos, letters, petitions and hand-
bills were sent to Bowker from Academic Senate com-
mittees,  UCB faculty  and  students  at  large,  including 
people  who  worked  as  criminal-justice  administrators 
and specialists who said that the School had played a vi-
tally important role raising issues that needed to be con-
fronted by their agencies. At one point, Bowker reported 
that  he  had  received  from 50  to  60  letters  about  the 
School. And even though the administration decided that 
the School would be closed, the radical students fought 
them every step of the way. 
Early in 1973, criminology students, accurately inter-
preting the Sindler report as a political purge, formed the 
24 Reportedly, Selznick had once led a Trotskyite sect called the 
“Schachtmanites” but he had made a 180 degree turn and become 
a virulent anti-communist.
25 Support  from  31  academics  and  researchers  in  England,  for 
instance, urged Bowker to retain the School “as it was presently 
constituted,” thereby retaining the radical faculty and courses.
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Committee to Save the Criminology School (CSCS) to 
organize mass student support. Petitions, rallies, march-
es, demonstrations, letters to regents, administrators, fac-
ulty  and  newspapers  followed.  San  Francisco  Sheriff 
Richard  Hongisto  addressed  a  Sproul  Plaza  rally  that 
spring followed by a march to California Hall, entering 
it with a list of demands. Two students were arrested and 
then released after the demonstrators agreed to leave the 
building.  The students  wanted  reinstatement  of  under-
graduate and graduate admissions to the school,26 more 
resources for the school and an insured place for radical 
criminology. A campus-wide impeachment convocation 
at the Greek Theater was held in support of the School. 
Statements supporting the School arrived from the new-
ly  formed  Berkeley  Police  Review  Commission,  Bay 
Area Women Against Rape, and criminologists in Eng-
land, France, Italy, Netherlands and Norway. A petition 
with 3599 signatures supporting the school was submit-
ted to Bowker by November.
Bowker, up to that time, had depended on the dilatory 
tactics learned at CUNY. Now, however, he rivaled the 
show,  Best  Little  Whorehouse  in  Texas, by  promising 
students that the university would satisfy their every de-
sire. He said a much larger multidisciplinary interdepart-
mental program would replace the School. He gave them 
the same line he had given students who were trying to 
establish  an  ethnic-studies  program  and  black  studies 
school.
A million words justifying or opposing the School’s 
closing were eventually produced by university authori-
ties, the Sindler Committee,  Academic Senate, Dekker 
Committee, Committee on Educational Policy, Graduate 
26 The administration had terminated admission of undergraduate 
majors and graduate students.
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Council, Criminology faculty, Student Association Com-
mittees, criminology students, Local 1474, student anti-
war and civil-rights movements and the mass media. The 
central point to keep in mind, however, is that Bowker 
and  the  counter-reformist  alliance  never  appraised  the 
School  in  good  faith.  Their  tactical  vacillations  were 
prompted by opposition  from faculty  at  large,  student 
demonstrations,  and  concern  with  the  appearance  of 
“due process” and moral legitimacy. They delayed an-
nouncing the decision to finally sink the School until the 
very end of the Spring 1974 semester—just before stu-
dents were to return home.
During the  previous  year,  the  NLF,  North  Vietnam 
and the U.S. government signed a cease-fire agreement 
in January. By March 1973, the last U.S. troops left Viet-
nam and most of the remaining U.S. prisoners of war 
were  released.  U.S.  bombing  of  Laos  and  Cambodia 
ended in August. In the following spring, Congress de-
nied Nixon’s request for additional funds to aid Saigon.27 
Although several thousand students had turned out re-
peatedly to defend the School, the numbers dropped off 
in 1974. Just before the closing of the School was an-
nounced, about a thousand protested the plan to close the 
School on May 31. When asked about this final protest, 
Vice Chancellor Mark N. Christensen, remarked, “As I 
sit here and the students march around and I think about 
those poor bastards who were here a few years ago, I re-
alize there is one big difference now. There’s no unpopu-
lar war on now.”28 
27 On April 1975, Saigon was captured and the last U.S. personnel 
fled in a helicopter from the U.S. embassy compound.
28 Christiansen  is  quoted  in  William  Trombly,  “UC  Student 
Protests:  Peaceful  Return to ’64.”  Los Angeles  Times,  Monday, 
June 3, 1974, pp. 3, 29.
   ROUND UP THE USUAL SUSPECTS!  | 219 
The battle for the School was lost but on the way we 
“poor  bastards”  had  joined  forces  with  others  in  the 
struggles for affirmative action, to defend women who 
were victims of violence, to bring the crime of rape out 
of  the  closet,  to  create  a  new criminology,  to  support 
prison reforms,  and to  fight  police  brutality.  Also,  we 
opposed  a  war  in  which  more  than  58,000  American 
troops were killed, over 153,000 were wounded and over 
three  million  Vietnamese  were  slaughtered.  To  our 
everlasting credit, we joined with millions of people to  
help end the killing in Vietnam. We helped end the war 
that  McNamara  called  a  “mistake”  after  the  slaughter 
had occurred.
Sometimes we dream about those days, idealizing the 
people who fought for a School whose program we had 
helped to  create.  And we visualize our  old colleagues 
and students encamped overnight in a valley surrounded 
by craggy California hills, singing, dancing and talking 
the hours away before sleep revived them for the strug-
gle the next day. They conducted themselves honorably 




The twenty-first century is an age of crime—state 
crime, corporate crime, crimes against humanity, 
crimes against nature. Elite crime. It is becoming 
increasingly clear that capitalism itself is a criminal 
system and the liberal democratic state a racket. In 
the current period of political repression, economic 
austerity, ecological destruction, criminalization of 
dissent, and mass resistance to these, the need for 
radical criminology is pressing. Radical criminology 
offers important insights into the composition of 
contemporary social struggles—and state maneuvers 
within those struggles. Radical criminology challenges 
openly practices of surveillance, detention, 
punishment and situates these within relations of 
exploitation and oppression that are foundational to 
capitalist society.
Notably, radical (“to the roots”) criminological 
analysis is emerging from the movements as much as, 
even more than, from the academy. Indeed much of 
the most incisive thinking and writing in criminology is 
coming from movement organizers rather than 
academics. Fully open access, and an imprint of 
punctum books , the press is a project of the 
Crit ical  Cr iminology Working Group at 
Kwantlen Polytechnic University. Thought |  Cr imes 
aims to bring together the most exciting and insightful 
new radical writings in criminology. 
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